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Heng Qu 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON NONPROFIT FINANCE 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays on nonprofit finance. Nonprofit finance 
concerns obtaining and managing financial resources to support the social purposes of 
nonprofit organizations. A unique feature of nonprofit finance is that nonprofits derive 
revenue from a variety of sources. Nonprofit finance thus involves answering two 
fundamental questions: What is the optimal combination of revenue sources that supports 
a nonprofit to achieve its mission? Where and how to obtain the revenue sources? The 
two dissertation essays address these two questions respectively.  
The first essay, titled “Modern Portfolio Theory and the Optimization of 
Nonprofit Revenue Mix,” is among the first to properly apply modern portfolio theory 
(MPT) from corporate finance to nonprofit finance. By analyzing nonprofit tax return 
data, I estimate the expected return and risk characteristics for five nonprofit revenue 
sources as well as the correlations among these returns. I use the estimates to identify the 
efficient frontiers for nonprofits in different industries, based on which nonprofit 
managers can select an optimal portfolio that can minimize the risk given a preferred 
level of service provision or maximize the return given a level of risk. The findings also 
pose a challenge to the predominant approach used in previous nonprofit finance studies 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and suggest that MPT is theoretically and practically more 
helpful in guiding nonprofit revenue management.  
The second essay, titled “Charitable Giving in Nonprofit Service Associations: 
Identities, Incentives, and Gender Differences,” concerns nonprofit resource attainment, 
specifically, how do decisionmaking contexts and framing affect donations. Membership 
 	   v	  
in a service club is characterized by two essential elements: members’ shared interest in 
the club’s charitable mission; and private benefits that often come as a result of social 
interactions with other members, such as networking, fellowship, and fun. A laboratory 
experiment was designed to examine 1) whether membership in a service club makes a 
person more generous and 2) the effect of service club membership—stressing either the 
service or socializing aspects—on individual support for collective goods. The study 
finds that female individuals are the least generous when they are reminded of the 
socializing aspect of service-club membership.  
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Introduction: On Nonprofit Finance 	  
Heng Qu 
 
Finance, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, is defined as:  
1) money or other liquid resources of a government, business, group, or 
individual; 2) the system that includes the circulation of money, the 
granting of credit, the making of investments, and the provision of 
banking facilities; 3) the science or study of the management of funds; 4) 
the obtaining of funds or capital.  
 
Thus, the concept of finance is about money, specifically the system and process of its 
attainment and management. The three major areas of finance—individual, corporate, 
and public finance—are well understood, but the area of study in nonprofit finance is less 
developed (Young, 2007). Perhaps it is because nonprofit organizations are different. 
Unlike for-profits that seek to increase the market value of their owners’ equity, 
nonprofits exist primarily to promote the social values they stand for. Different from for-
profits that rely on sales as their primary source of revenue, nonprofits derive revenue 
from various sources. What is more, nonprofits differ from each other in the types of 
activities they engage in as well as the mixes of revenue they use to support their 
activities. The uniqueness and complexities of nonprofits present the need to develop an 
independent area of study in nonprofit finance.  
In the past decade, some nonprofit scholars have made efforts to build the field of 
nonprofit finance. So far the most comprehensive book about nonprofit finance is 
Financing Nonprofits: Putting Theory into Practice (edited by Young, 2007), in which 
topics are organized by sources of nonprofit revenue and the discussions provide both 
theoretical contributions and practical guidance. In addition, Bowman’s (2011) book, 
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Financial Fundamentals for Nonprofits, focuses on the financial management issues of 
different types of nonprofit organizations. Rather than being another financial 
management textbook, it emphasizes the nonprofit differences and their implications to 
nonprofit financial management. The other book, Handbook of Research on Nonprofit 
Economics and Management, edited by Seaman and Young (2010), is a collection of 
survey articles on various nonprofit management topics. Although it is not exclusively 
devoted to topics on nonprofit finance, this book is a good source for researchers in 
nonprofit management.  
Mainly relying on these three sources, this paper focuses on the following 
questions: First, what is nonprofit finance? What is the goal of nonprofit financial 
management? Second, why does it matter to study nonprofit finance? Third, what are the 
major research topics on nonprofit finance? What finance and microeconomic theories 
can be borrowed to understand nonprofit finance and help build its own theories? In a 
limited literature review, this paper provides a quick summary about the known and 
unknown about nonprofit finance, with a greater emphasis on some topics rather than 
others. 
 
What is nonprofit finance? 
How to define nonprofit finance? Let us start by looking at the major concerns of 
corporate and public finance. Corporate finance focuses on the following three areas: 1) 
capital budgeting—what long-term investments (e.g. new plants, new products) should a 
firm make; 2) capital structure—where to obtain the long-term financing to pay for its 
investments, specifically, what is the best mix of equity and debt; and 3) working 
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capital—how should a firm manage the relationship between its short-term assets and 
liabilities to ensure its operations. Overall, the primary goal of corporate financial 
management is to increase the market value of the equity owned by shareholders  (Ross, 
Westerfield, & Jordan, 2008). 
Public finance is “the branch of economics that studies the taxing and spending 
activities of government” (Rosen, 2003, p. 252). Essentially, the study of public finance 
is about “the role of the government in the economy”  (Gruber, 2005, p. 2).  Some 
scholars, like Rosen (2003, p. 252), think that the term public finance is “a misnomer, 
because the fundamental issues are not financial (that is, relating to money). Rather, the 
key problems relate to the use of real resources.” The study of public finance 
encompasses both positive and normative analysis, with the former examining the cause 
and effect of a government policy or activity and the latter dealing with ethical issues like 
fairness (Rosen, 2003). 
In light of corporate and public finance, the study of nonprofit finance should be 
considered from both financial and mission perspectives. First, the pure financial 
concerns are about obtaining and managing various sources of income. As Young 
suggests (2007, p.339), “any theory of non-profit finance must account for three basic 
issues—financing of current operations, financing of longer term capital needs, and the 
balance or mix among different sources of income for these purposes.” This is very 
similar to the three concerns of corporate finance. Second, the pure financial concerns are 
subject to nonprofit missions. As in the case of public finance, the use of nonprofit 
financial resources also involves ethical concerns. Nonprofits exist in society to serve 
social purposes rather than private inurement. Hence, the primary objective of nonprofit 
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financial management is “to ensure that financial resources are available when needed, as 
needed, and at a reasonable cost, and are protected from financial impairment and spent 
according to mission and donor purposes” (Zietlow, Hankin, & Seidner, 2007, p.43). In 
all, nonprofit finance is the study of financial resources procurement and management 
that support the social purposes of nonprofit organizations. 
 
Why Study Nonprofit Finance? 
Nonprofit organizations play an important role in society. They deliver goods and 
services when business and government fail to do so. They represent diverse voices and 
ideas that underlie a pluralistic society. They also make considerable contributions to the 
U.S. economy, accounting for over 5 percent of the GDP and over 9 percent of all wages 
and salaries paid in the U.S. (McKeever, 2015). Various types of nonprofit organizations 
constitute a large and fast-growing nonprofit sector. Between 2003 and 2013, the number 
of registered nonprofit organizations increased by 2.8 percent from 1.38 million to 1.41 
million, not including the unknown number of unregistered nonprofits. About 35 percent 
of the registered nonprofits reported $2.26 trillion in total revenue and $5.17 trillion in 
total assets in 2013, growing even faster than the country’s GDP over the ten-year period 
(McKeever, 2015).   
Yet, it is not rare to find individual nonprofits facing fiscal stress and going out of 
business. What should raise concerns is the “bad” management behind the scenes. There 
are many advantages as well as disadvantages associated with the nonprofit status, which 
have a direct impact on nonprofit financial management. Gift restrictions, for example, 
pose a unique challenge to nonprofits that struggle to maintain solvency. The only way to 
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use restricted gifts is to satisfy donor restrictions.  In a survey of donative faith-based 
nonprofits, however, over half of the organizations reported they temporarily transferred 
from current restricted funds to meet a shortfall in current unrestricted funds, indicating 
that “interfund borrowing is a necessary evil practiced by many organizations” (Zietlow, 
et al., 2007, p.33). More high-profile controversial stories center around nonprofit 
organizations’ investments in fundraising. In 2012, CNN exposed two nonprofit 
organizations for spending less than 10% of their total revenue on mission-related 
services but owing millions of dollars to a direct-marketing company (Perry, 2012). How 
much is too much for nonprofit fundraising expenses? While marginal analysis is 
commonly used in the business world,  the nonprofit sector seems to be stuck in the battle 
of accountability and efficiency, particularly when donors are only concerned about the 
average ratio of fundraising expenses to donations or services.  
In all, nonprofit organizations provide significant social and economic values yet 
can be financially vulnerable. It is important for nonprofit managers to be armed with the 
appropriate knowledge that helps them to generate, manage, and make effective use of 
resources in order to accomplish their organizational missions. The study of nonprofit 
finance aims to provide such knowledge, through which nonprofit managers and policy 
makers will gain an understanding of the distinctive features of nonprofit finance and 
approaches to an effective decision-making in the complex operating environment.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives from Microeconomics and Finance 
There are in general two perspectives in the current study of nonprofit finance. 
The first mainly utilizes the ideas and tools from microeconomics to understand nonprofit 
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behavior, such as the concept of incentives, the analysis of the margin, the analysis of 
markets, the ideas from cost-benefits analysis, and theories of market and government 
failure and public and private goods (Young, 2007). The second primarily borrows the 
concepts and instruments from corporate finance to address the technical issues in 
nonprofit financial management, such as understanding financial statements, developing 
financial reports and ratios, liquidity management, long-term financial planning and 
capital budgeting, debt management, investment policy, risk management, financial 
performance evaluation, and so on (Zietlow, et al., 2007).  
In addition to these two approaches, behavioral finance provides another approach 
to nonprofit finance, which has yet to attract more attention in future research. Behavioral 
finance studies how the psychology of investors or managers affects financial decisions 
and markets. Behavioral finance offers an alternative perspective to standard finance. 
Standard finance, also known as modern portfolio theory, is based on these four 
foundational pillars: 1) investors are rational; 2) markets are efficient; 3) investors design 
their portfolios according to the mean-variance analysis; and 4) expected returns are a 
function of risk alone. According to behavioral finance, however, investors are 
predictably irrational; markets are arguably inefficient; investors design portfolios 
according to the rules of behavioral portfolio theory; and expected return follows 
behavioral asset pricing theory (Statman, 2008). Behavioral finance may also be useful in 
explaining nonprofit financial behavior. For example, it can help us understand how 
nonprofit managers actually decide pricing strategies, product portfolios, and financial 
portfolios.  
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Major Topics in Nonprofit Finance  
The Nonprofit Distinctiveness 
Nonprofit finance is distinguished from corporate finance in many ways. The first 
difference lies in the objective of financial management. The goal of corporate financial 
management is to maximize the market value of the existing owners’ equity. Nonprofits 
do not exist primarily to generate profits nor do they distribute surplus to their 
stakeholders. Rather, nonprofits are mission-driven; they use the surplus to further their 
social purposes. “The absence of owners seeking a handsome return on investment 
enables nonprofits to practice values-centered management” (Bowman, 2011, p.3).  
Second, nonprofits differ from for-profits in the financial management decisions 
regarding capital budgeting, capital structure, and working capital management. In capital 
budgeting, a firm identifies the investment opportunities that will earn more than they 
cost and particularly, evaluates the size, timing, and risk of future cash flows (Ross, et al., 
2008, p. 2-3). A nonprofit decides what new programs or ventures to engage in, based on 
not only pure financial concerns but also mission impact. Similar to for-profits, 
nonprofits can receive fees and commercial income by charging for goods and service 
that are private in nature (i.e., excludable and rival in consumption). Different from for-
profits, nonprofits engage in both mission-related programs and unrelated business. The 
former produces “favored goods” that directly contribute to a nonprofit’s mission but 
may subtract from profits, the latter produces “disfavored goods” that are peripheral to 
mission achievement but can help finance the core mission-related activities (James, 
1983; Schiff & Weisbrod, 1991). The product portfolio analysis thus suggests that 
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nonprofit organizations, in deciding potential programs, should concern the overall 
balance of mission impact and financial sustainability  (Oster, 2010).  
Regarding capital structure, a for-profit firm considers the long-term financing to 
support its long-term investments, specifically, identifies the best mixture of debt and 
equity. Nonprofits cannot legally issue stocks, although some regard donations as a form 
of “equity” because donors receive “dividends-in-kind” when they receive the utility by 
seeing the nonprofit achieved its goal (Wedig, 1994, p. 258). Without the option of 
raising capital from stockholders, nonprofits rely on various forms of debt. In addition to 
bank loans, nonprofits can also obtain capital through program-related investments from 
foundations, which take various forms such as below-market-rate loans, loan guarantees, 
linked deposits, and equity equivalents (Yetman, 2010).  
Working capital management is a daily activity to ensure a firm has sufficient 
resources for operations (Ross, et al., 2008, p. 3). Working capital is the difference 
between a firm’s current assets and current liabilities. The working capital ratio, 
measured by dividing current assets by current liabilities, indicates a firm’s liquidity. An 
important nonprofit difference that challenges nonprofit working capital management is 
that nonprofits have assets with donor restrictions. A gift is restricted if a donor specifies 
a specific purpose or time for its use or mandates to spend the earnings of a gift only. A 
gift may be temporarily or permanently restricted. As a result, nonprofits should exclude 
restricted assets from working capital.  
Third, unlike for-profits, nonprofits have many revenue sources. In addition to 
sales of goods and services, nonprofits can generate income from many alternative 
sources, such as donations, grants, investments, and dues. Looking separately, each 
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revenue source has its own complications and implications. For example, regarding 
donations, special management considerations arise as there are restricted and 
unrestricted gifts. The decision on fundraising expenses involves both financial and 
ethical concerns. With respect to sales of goods and services, nonprofit managers need to 
balance the production of preferred and non-preferred goods. Controversies may arise on 
the unfair competition between nonprofits engaging in unrelated business and their for-
profit counterparts. With government grants and contracts, there have been concerns 
about whether government funding crowds out private contributions (Tinkelman, 2010). 
With endowments, the question is on whether a nonprofit should accumulate 
endowments, which reflects a trade-off between serving the needs of the current and 
future generations (Hansmann, 1987). Taken together, nonprofit managers need to 
evaluate and decide an appropriate revenue composition that can best serve the 
nonprofit’s mission. 
In light of these distinctive features of nonprofit finance, I will summarize the 
major research topics on individual revenue sources as well as on their interactions and 
combinations. I will focus on individual giving, commercial income, government 
funding, investment income, membership income, leaving out other relevant topics such 
as foundation giving, corporate giving, the valuation of volunteer labor, income and 
property tax, and financial health and risk management. 
 
Charitable Contributions 
Charitable contributions include those from individuals, foundations and 
corporations. In 2014, the estimated total charitable giving was $358.38 billion, of which 
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individual giving by living individuals accounted for 72% (80% if including bequest). 
Foundations giving constituted 15% of total giving and corporations only 5% (Giving 
USA 2015). Charitable giving appears to be less important than commercial income and 
government funding—its share in the total revenue of public charities was only 13.3% in 
2014 (McKeever, 2015). It is nonetheless a primary source of income for nonprofits in 
some subsectors, such as arts and environment (Roeger, Blackwood, & Pettijohn, 2012). 
In fact, if seen from a different angle, charitable giving is a critical component of finance 
that two out of five nonprofits would have had a deficit without it (Bowman, 2011, 
p.137). I will focus on individual donations by living donors in the following discussion. 
The large body of research on individual giving generally revolves around three 
important research questions. First, who gives what? Second, why do people give? Third, 
what is the optimal level of fundraising expenses? The first question is who gives what. 
That is, what are the characteristics of individuals and households that make donations 
and how are these characteristics related to how much and where people donate? In a 
comprehensive review on this topic, Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) summarized the key 
variables that influence people’s charitable giving behavior, including: personal and 
household income, wealth, employment status, religion, education, age, marital status, 
number of children, gender, race, ethnicity, immigrant/citizenship status, parental 
background, volunteering, region, and so on. Knowledge on this topic is largely 
descriptive. While it helps practitioners and policy makers to identify the current status 
and future trends of charitable giving, it offers limited value to fundraisers on how to 
design fundraising campaigns (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007). 
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In contrast, understanding why do people give provides valuable information for 
policymakers to develop tax policies and for fundraisers design fundraising campaigns. 
Vesterlund (2006) did an excellent review of the economics studies on motivations for 
individual charitable giving. Economists “think about charitable giving as it is just like 
the purchase of any other commodity” (Vesterlund, 2006, pp. 568). Therefore, 
contributions are expected to depend on an individual’s income and the price of giving. 
The price of giving tells us how much it costs to give a nonprofit an additional dollar; for 
itemizers, the price of giving depends on their marginal tax rate. Economists have 
examined how sensitive charitable giving is to income and price, measured respectively 
as the income and price elasticities of demand. In general, studies find that giving is 
income inelastic but price elastic (Vesterlund, 2006). Knowing how sensitive charitable 
giving is to income and price not only helps us to predict how changes in the economy 
and tax policy will affect charitable giving but also can help the government to design 
better tax policies.  
In addition to the effects of income and price, the potential beneﬁts of charitable 
giving to donors also matter. Vesterlund (2006) summarized two types of benefits often 
used by economists: public benefits (both the donor and other individuals can enjoy the 
benefits from giving) and private benefits (only the donor can enjoy the benefits from 
giving). Previous studies reported various types of private benefits that can motivate 
individual donations, including material rewards, reputation and social acclaim, signaling 
of wealth, warm glow, assuaging guilt, commitment, and so forth. According to 
economists, if an individual is fully motivated by private benefits, her contributions will 
not be affected by others’ donations. If the beneﬁt is public, then an individual has an 
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incentive to free ride on others’ donations. A related issue is how an increase in 
government grants to nonproﬁts will affect individual giving. If the beneﬁt is purely 
private, then we should observe no effect. If the beneﬁt is purely public, then we can 
expect complete crowd-out when the economy is large. Findings from many empirical 
studies suggest that the last dollar donated is motivated by private benefit instead of the 
nonprofit’s output (e.g., Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002), but the result may be altered when 
considering the interactions among donors or the impact of social norms (Vesterlund, 
2006). The knowledge about the motivations for individual giving is informative for 
fundraisers who want to design effective fundraising campaigns. It can help policy 
makers and nonprofit managers who are interested in developing policies and 
mechanisms that can solve the free-rider problem.  
The third question is what is the optimal level of fundraising expenses? There 
has long been a debate on how to properly evaluate a nonprofit’s fundraising efficiency. 
Donors would prefer their donations to be spent on programs rather than on fundraising 
or administrative activities. Therefore, donors would like to give to nonprofits with a low 
level of fundraising ratio, measured as the ratio of fundraising expenses to donations. 
Nonprofits with a high fundraising ratio may suffer increased public scrutiny. The 
fundraising ratio is problematic: based on financial statements or Form 990s, donors can 
only obtain the historical average ratio rather than the current marginal ratio. Empirical 
evidence indicates that the incremental responses of donations to increases in fundraising 
expenses are poorly correlated with the average ratios (Tinkelman, 2006). Instead, 
Steinberg (1991; 1986) developed a theory and suggested that nonprofits should think at 
the margin. That is, program-maximizing managers can optimize their investments in 
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fundraising by spending on fundraising up to the point where an additional dollar raised 
would be just offset by the last dollar spent; budget-maximizing managers can spend until 
the marginal response to an additional dollar of fundraising equals zero. Knowledge on 
this topic has important implications for fundraising practice, financial management, and 
accountability of nonprofit organizations. 
 
Commercial income 
Nonprofit organizations can generate income by charging fees for goods and 
services that are sufficiently private in nature (i.e. excludable and rival in consumption). 
In addition to the sales of mission-related goods and services, they may also engage in 
unrelated business that only indirectly contributes to their missions by providing financial 
support. In fact, almost half of the total revenue of public charities came from private 
payments for goods and services in 2013. If including fees from government sources, 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, fee income accounted for 72% (McKeever, 2015). The 
commercialization of nonprofits has raised a lot of scholarly attention (e.g., Weisbrod, 
1998). Why do nonprofits engage in commercial activities? How should nonprofits 
decide the mix of goods or services so to achieve an overall balance of mission and 
revenue impact? How should nonprofits set prices for different goods and services? 
Additional concerns arise as commercial activities may cause the mission drift of 
nonprofits and the unfair competition between nonprofits and their for-profit 
counterparts. 
Multiproduct firms. James and Young (2007) summarized several economic 
theories that explain the reliance of nonprofit organizations on fee income. On the 
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demand side, nonprofit organizations provide private goods and services in response to 
the contract failure caused by the asymmetric information between producers and 
consumers. The supply side theory emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs in establishing 
nonprofit organizations and seeking additional revenue in the marketplace. According to 
the model developed by James (1983) and later Shiff and Weisbrod (1991), nonprofits are 
multiproduct firms in which nonprofit managers derive utilities from producing 
“preferred” goods and services that satisfy their non-pecuniary motivations and also 
engage in “non-preferred” commercial activities that cross-subsidize their preferred 
activities. This model suggests that nonprofits “generate an overall balance of mission 
impacting and revenue generating activities, such that in the end they are able to be 
financially sustainable while maximizing their mission objectives” (James & Young, 
2007, pp. 113). Based on this model, the nonprofit product portfolio theory provides a 
framework for nonprofits to choose potential programs with an overall balance of mission 
and revenue impact (Oster, 2010).  
Pricing. Nonprofits can secure revenue by charging fees for goods and services 
that are sufficiently “private.” Regardless of organizational form, pricing plays an 
important role in reducing congestion and rationing (and shifting) usage when capacity is 
constrained. Sophisticated pricing strategies, such as differential pricing and product 
bundling strategies, can be used to generate more revenue (Seaman, 2010). Pricing is 
more complicated for nonprofits because they are multiproduct organizations with 
complex objectives and multiple revenue sources. According to Young and Steinberg 
(1995, p.160-176), there are five considerations that influence nonprofit pricing 
strategies: First, the interactions between sales and other sources of revenues, especially 
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donations. Second, the scope of cross-subsidizing one output using profits from another, 
particularly, using profits from unrelated business to finance mission-related output. 
Third, the design of price discrimination policies, specifically, charging a higher price to 
customers who are able to pay while a lower price to those mission targets who are not 
able to pay. Fourth, product differentiation in consideration of the long-run competition. 
Last but not least, the impact of pricing on the mission objective of nonprofit 
organizations, such as the attainment of output, the effectiveness of expressive missions, 
the motivational effect on client effort, and the screening effect among different groups of 
consumers.  
In exploring nonprofit pricing, economists are especially interested in 
understanding “the roles played by demand, capacity constraints and congestions, cost 
and cost uncertainty, subsidies, competitive versus market power considerations, complex 
objective functions, and the forces of tradition versus innovation” (Seaman, 2010, pp. 
142). Also of interest are the differences between nonprofit and for-profit pricing (e.g., 
Steinberg & Weisbrod, 1998). Some areas of nonprofit pricing are better understood than 
others. For example, there has been plenty of theoretical work and empirical studies on 
price discrimination and product bundling, particularly among performing arts nonprofits 
and universities  (e.g., Hansmann, 1981; Steinberg & Weisbrod, 2005). The effect of 
competition and market power on nonprofit pricing, particularly among hospitals and 
universities, has also received a lot of scholarly attention (e.g., Greaney, 2006). However, 
there is thinner research on the fifth issue identified by Young and Steinberg (1995), such 
as the psychological role that pricing may play in the behavior of clients and its 
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implications for optimum pricing. Readers who are interested in the current status of 
nonprofit pricing studies can refer to Seaman (2010). 
 
Government funding 
Government funding to nonprofit organizations come in various forms—tax 
subsidies, grants, and contracts. The U.S. federal government and many state 
governments support qualified nonprofits by allowing donors to deduct their charitable 
contributions from their income tax. 501(c)3 nonprofit organizations are exempt from 
corporate taxes. In addition to tax subsidies, many nonprofits also receive government 
grants and contracts, particularly those providing health care and human services 
(Grønbjerg & Salamon, 2012). In fact, the combined revenue from government grants 
and contracts constituted about one third of the total revenue for public charities in 2013, 
making government funding (not including tax subsidies) the second largest revenue 
source after private payments for goods and services (McKeever, 2015).  
Public administration scholars have examined the advantages and disadvantages 
of government funding using institutional theory and resource dependence theory. On the 
one hand, government funding is found to be a revenue source with high stability and 
continuity (e.g., Grønbjerg, 1992; Froelich, 1999). On the other hand, scholars cast 
caution to the reliance on government funding (Rushton & Brooks, 2007; Froelich, 
1999). The fundamental issue related to government funding is the relationship between 
the nonprofit sector and government.  In a comprehensive examination of the past 30 
years’ government-nonprofit relations, Grønbjerg and Salamon (2012) conclude (pp. 
578): 
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After a rapid period of expanding cooperation, nonprofits have had to deal 
with a significant retrenchment in public funding, a widespread 
diversification of the forms of public assistance, a shift from producer-side 
to consumer-side subsidies, the loss of their “preferred-provider” status in 
many government programs, increased demand for efficiency, less 
favorable tax regimes, increased regulatory pressure, and a far more 
fragmented policy arena.  
 
The implication? Government funding comes with many strings attached. Managing 
government grants and contracts are likely to cause changes in the management process 
and organizational structure of nonprofit organizations (e.g., Grønbjerg, 1991; 1992, 
Froelich, 1999).  
There is abundant research on government funding. Besides the perspectives from 
public administration, economists have examined the effect of tax policies on charitable 
giving and nonprofit behavior (see the section on charitable contributions), as well as the 




Investment income—interest, dividends, and capital gains from investments in 
cash, stocks, or bonds—only accounted for about five percent of the total revenue of 
public charities in 2013 (McKeever, 2015). Nonetheless, investment income is an 
important revenue source for a small number of organizations with funds available for 
investing. Nonprofit organizations can use a highly liquid working cash fund, usually 
consisted of investments in money market funds or bonds with high credit quality and 
short maturity (e.g., T-bills), to supply cash quickly in the event of a negative cash flow 
(Bowman, 2011, p. 35). Nonprofits can also build operating reserve funds to cover 
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unexpected budget deficits, among other purposes (Bowman, 2011, p. 35). Moreover, 
distinguished from for-profits, nonprofit organizations can hold endowments. Through a 
well-managed portfolio of long-term investments, endowed nonprofits can have “a 
perpetual source of income” (Bowman, 2011, p. 40). 
Should nonprofits accumulate endowments? On the one hand, quasi-
endowments can supply a stable source of income that comes with no strings attached 
and offers a hedge against the unpredictable losses in other sources of income. On the 
other hand, for some assets (e.g., historical buildings), their maintenance and operation 
costs may be more than their income can cover. Like in the case of a loss-making 
mission-related activity, a for-profit “would get rid of any asset with a negative expected 
return, but a nonprofit manager is constrained to keep it and find a way to pay for it” 
(Bowman, 2007, p. 283). Challenges also come from whether accumulating a large 
endowment for future is a better use of resources than spending them for today’s societal 
needs. Hansmann (1990) questioned the notion of intergenerational equity as the purpose 
of endowment accumulation by universities and colleges (p. 9):  
In a college or university, each dollar added to endowment represents a 
dollar less for current research or for educational services to current 
students or a dollar more in tuition that must be charged current students 
in order to provide them with the same level of services. The amounts thus 
saved will presumably be used to provide more research, more education, 
or lower tuition in the future. Why, then, do universities save rather than 
spend so much of their income? 
 
Mission-related Investments. Hansmann (1990) made a particularly intriguing 
comment on the form of investments, that is, financial investments “may not be the best 
means to the end” even if a university aims to help future generations, because “it is 
implicitly making the judgement that the dollar will have a higher rate of return if 
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invested in stocks and bonds than in educating an undergraduate” (p. 18). Similar to 
Hansmann’s comment on universities and colleges, some thought leaders and 
practitioners in the field of philanthropy have been urging foundations to make better use 
of their endowments. Private non-operating foundations, which account for over 90 
percent of the U.S. foundations, are required by law to distribute about five percent of 
their net investment assets for charitable purposes and manage the rest, around 95%, of 
their assets for pure financial returns without considering social values. For this reason, 
some thought leaders have been advocating bridging the gap between foundations’ 
charitable programs and asset management by using investment strategies that align 
financial investments with mission achievement (Emerson, 2003). 
Program-related investments (PRIs) and mission-related investments (MRIs) are 
examples of the unconventional investments that support foundations in achieving both 
charitable purposes and some financial returns. Specifically, PRIs are legally defined 
charitable activities to primarily support foundations’ charitable missions. PRIs, made 
from either a private foundation’s program funds or investment assets, allow a foundation 
to gain moderate financial benefits through the repayment of principal and returns on 
below-market-rate loans or equity. MRIs, on the other hand, are essentially financial 
investments with social purposes. Made from foundations’ investment assets, MRIs are 
usually market-rate investments and subject to prudent investor standards as conventional 
investments (Qu & Osili, 2016). In the field of practice, PRIs and MRIs have garnered 
much attention. However, the academic research on PRIs and MRIs barely exists. For 
future research, on the investor side, it would interesting to examine foundations’ 
portfolio of mission-related investments in conjunction with other exogenous sources of 
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income and evaluate the overall impact of those investments. On the recipient side, it 
would be interesting to explore the impact of mission-related investments on the capital 
formation of nonprofit organizations. 
 
Membership income 
Membership income is a unique source of income to nonprofit membership 
associations, which comprise about a quarter of the registered nonprofit organizations 
excluding congregations (NCCS, 2015). Members support their associations in various 
ways. They pay membership dues and fees; they may also make charitable donations. 
While only accounting for a tiny portion (less than 1%) of the total revenue for the 
average 501(c)(3) nonprofits, dues are a significant revenue source for other 501(c) 
nonprofits, particularly social and recreational clubs, labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
groups, and business leagues (McKeever, 2015; Steinberg, 2007). The significance of 
membership dues is likely to be underestimated because the above findings are based on 
the IRS 990 Form entry on “membership dues and assessments,” in which nonprofits can 
report only a portion of the actual dues that are commensurate with membership benefits 
and treating the rest of the dues as member contributions.    
Research on the finance of nonprofit membership associations is rare. There are 
only two studies that I am aware of.  First, Steinberg (2007) specified a functional 
definition of dues and developed a theory that provides guidance to optimize rates and 
structures of dues. According to the nature of goods provided by an organization and the 
organization’s governance structure, dues can function as donations, pure dues, or some 
mixture of these categories. Dues are like donations when an organization provides 
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nonexcludable collective goods and members do not govern; they otherwise function as 
pure dues if the organization offers members governance rights or when the organization 
provides excludable collective goods. Generally, to decide member dues, an organization 
should consider its mission type, solvency, fairness, member characteristics, and 
competition (Steinberg, 2007). Bowman’s unpublished manuscript (collected in 2014) 
offers insights into the financial management of membership associations. He found 
some empirical evidence on the negative correlations between program service revenue 
and membership dues, indicating that membership associations use program service 
revenue to keep membership dues low.  
There are many interesting but unexplored questions regarding membership 
income. For example, how do membership dues interact with other sources of income, 
such as member donations? Does an increase in dues come at the expense of decreased 
donations? How does a due structure, that is, different rates across membership 
categories, influence member donations? The unavailability of survey data on dues poses 
challenges to the study of membership income. Nonetheless, some questions can be 
explored through experiments. My essay on service club membership and generosity is 
the first attempt, which hopefully to serve as a basis for more sophisticated experimental 
studies I would like to follow later.   
 
Revenue Interactions 
I have discussed the various sources of nonprofit revenue. How do these different 
sources of revenue interact with each other? That is, does the increase in one source of 
revenue lead to the decrease (increase) in others? The issue of “crowding out” and 
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“crowding in” is complex and needs to be considered at three different levels: the 
national level, the sectoral level, and the organizational level  (Tinkelman, 2010). First, at 
the national level, we compare total giving, total government spending on the program 
areas that also supported by nonprofits, and the total level of other sources of nonprofit 
revenue. Past empirical studies present mixed results on the interactions between 
individual donations and government spending. Based on the data of federal spending 
and private giving as a percent of GDP since 1966, Tinkelman (2010) found that 
government spending and nonprofit program service revenue have both increased faster 
than GDP while donations have stayed around 2% of GDP. Overall, donations are driven 
by people’s willingness to give a certain portion of their disposable income (around 2%) 
and are more or less independent of the other types of revenue.  
Second, at the sectoral level, an interesting question is the national demand for a 
particular public good, particularly, does an increase in government funding for a 
particular public good crowd out private donations? Scholars are also interested in 
whether and how various forms of government grants (i.e. matching grants, seed money, 
or simple lump-sum unrestricted payments) affect the interaction. There is an impressive 
body of literature on the interaction of individual giving and government funding. Both 
Tinkelman (2010) and Vesterlund (2006) provided an excellent account of previous 
empirical studies relying on survey or tax return data. While the reported strengths and 
directions of the crowding effects vary across studies, most studies reported a crowding 
out rather than crowding in by government funding. Vesterlund (2006) also summarized 
some experimental studies and found that the crowding out effect is larger than that 
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reported by empirical studies. When the strong assumptions of the classical model are 
relaxed, we may observe the crowding effects at various levels.  
Tinkelman (2010) listed six explanations for the incomplete crowding out. First, 
people may derive utility from the act of giving itself (the “warm glow”), which cannot 
be substituted by the utility they derive from the level of the public good produced 
(Andreoni, 1989; Steinberg, 1985; Arrow, 1972). In this case, we would expect 
incomplete crowding effects. Second, a nonprofit may differentiate how its service mix is 
supported, making government funding and private giving complementary. Third, 
individuals may not have perfect information when making their giving decisions (e.g., a 
nonprofit’s funding sources, program quality, the beneficiaries). Fourth, the cost function 
of public-good provision may not be linear and continuous. Fifth, the complete crowding 
out would not hold if not everyone in the economy originally contributes to the public 
good (Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986). Finally, the relation between any two revenue 
sources may not be a simple linear relation. It could be crowding in at low levels of 
government subsidy and crowding out at higher levels (Brooks, 2000).  
The third level is to consider revenue interaction at the organizational level. That 
is, does the level of private donations to an organization, as well as other sources of 
revenue, respond to an increase or decrease in government funding? Are the crowding 
effects due to the acceptance of government funding or the strategic decisions of 
nonprofit managers? Crowding out may result from not only donors’ perceptions of the 
funding change but also nonprofit managers’ strategic reactions, or both. The model of 
multiproduct firm indicates that managers may respond to the decrease in the revenue 
from their preferred activities by pursuing revenue from non-preferred areas. Similarly, 
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when obtaining new financial resources, nonprofit managers might decrease the non-
preferred activities, such as unrelated business or fundraising efforts. Many recent studies 
are consistent with the predicted managerial reactions (e.g., Andreoni & Payne, 2003). 
See Tinkelman (2010) for a summary of the studies.  
 
Revenue Diversification  
Given the many revenue sources and the complexities, scholars have been 
interested in nonprofit revenue choice and how a certain revenue composition may affect 
the financial health and organizational success of a nonprofit. My essay on nonprofit 
income portfolio optimization is also along this line. Among the existing studies, some 
have focused on whether revenue diversification or concentration is associated with the 
financial health of nonprofits (e.g.; Tuckman and Chang, 1991; Chang and Tuckman, 
1994; Greenlee and Trussel, 2000; Carroll and Stater, 2009; Frumpkin and Keating, 
2011; Chikoto and Neely, 2014). Others have developed theories that explain the revenue 
choice by nonprofit managers (e.g., Grønbjerg, 1992; Bielefeld, 1992; Kingma, 1993; 
Chang and Tuckman, 1994; Froelich, 1999; Kearns, 2006; Young, 2006). I will focus on 
the latter issue in the following discussion. A detailed literature review on the former 
issue is available in my essay on nonprofit income portfolio optimization. 
 What motivates a nonprofit manager’s choice of revenue mix? Scholars from 
different disciplines have offered different explanations. Institutional theory posits that 
nonprofits seek heterogeneous revenue sources to increase their legitimacy and 
recognition in a community (Galaskiewicz, 1990; Bielefeld, 1992). Alternatively, 
resource dependence theory suggests that nonprofits can achieve funding stability and 
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organizational success by concentrating on a few revenue sources as they develop a long-
time relationship with a few funders (e.g. Grønbjerg, 1992; Froelich, 1999). Based on the 
utility maximization model of traditional microeconomic theory, Chang and Tuckman 
(1990, 1991) hypothesize that nonprofit managers are motivated by a desire to increase 
surplus to accumulate wealth and equity. As a result, nonprofit managers consciously 
pursue a diversified revenue mix to manage financial risk and reduce financial 
vulnerability. Similarly, Kingma (1993) interpreted the goal of nonprofit managers as “to 
provide a certain level of services (a given level of expected return) while minimizing 
unpredictable changes in revenues (risk)” (p. 105). According to the “multiattribute 
utility theory” developed by Kearns (2007), a nonprofit organization has a complex 
organizational structure with multi-stakeholders inside and outside of the organization. 
Therefore, deciding nonprofit revenue mix is a process influenced by many stakeholders’ 
perspectives and utilities. Young’s (2006) normative theory suggests that nonprofit 
managers should choose an income portfolio that reflects the mix of benefits it provides 
in addition to the financial management concerns (e.g., feasibility, interactions, solvency, 
risk, mission).  
Despite the fruitful research, Chang and Tuckman (2010) suggest several 
interesting future research topics, among which they state there is need to identify 
measures of risk for the sector and to use these measures to evaluate the growth of 
nonprofit revenue streams and their volatility. While with a different study motivation, 
my essay on nonprofit income portfolio optimization is also a response to this suggestion 
by Chang and Tuckman. 
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Connecting the Dots  
Nonprofit finance concerns obtaining and managing various financial resources in 
order to support the social purposes of nonprofit organizations. The concepts and tools 
from corporate finance and microeconomics have informed nonprofit finance, but we 
should also bear in mind that nonprofit finance is different from corporate finance in 
many ways. Nonprofits differ from for-profits in both the financial management objective 
and the decisions regarding capital budgeting, capital structure, and working capital 
management. Unlike for-profits, nonprofits can generate income from many alternative 
sources. Looking separately, each revenue source has its own complications and 
implications to financial management. Taken together, the sources of revenue may 
interact or correlate with each other and influence the performance of the overall 
portfolio. Therefore, nonprofit financial management involves answering two 
fundamental questions: What is the optimal combination of revenue sources that supports 
a nonprofit to achieve its mission? Where and how to obtain the revenue sources? My 
two essays address these two questions respectively.  
The first essay is among the first to properly apply modern portfolio theory 
(MPT) to the optimization of nonprofit revenue mix. By analyzing nonprofit tax return 
data, I estimate the expected return and risk characteristics for five nonprofit revenue 
sources as well as the correlations among these returns. I use the estimates to identify the 
efficient frontier for nonprofits in different industries, based on which nonprofit managers 
can select an optimal portfolio that can minimize the risk given a preferred level of 
service provision or maximize the service given a level of risk. The findings also pose a 
challenge to the predominant approach used in previous nonprofit finance studies 
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(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and suggest that MPT is theoretically and practically more 
helpful in guiding nonprofit revenue management.  
The second essay concerns nonprofit resource attainment, specifically, how do 
decisionmaking contexts and framing affect donations. A laboratory experiment was 
designed to test whether membership in a nonprofit service club makes a person more 
generous. Membership in a service club is characterized by two essential elements: 
members’ shared interest in the club’s charitable mission; and private benefits that often 
come as a result of social interactions with other members, such as networking, 
fellowship, and fun. The study finds that female individuals are the least generous when 
they are reminded of the socializing aspect of service-club membership. Male individuals 
in the social treatment donated more than those in the mission treatment mathematically, 
although the results are not statistically significant. Results are consistent with a variant 
of social identity theory we develop, as well as motivational crowding-out from 
psychology and economics.  
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A unique feature of nonprofit finance is that nonprofit organizations receive revenue from 
a variety of sources. Therefore, an important question of nonprofit financial management 
is: what is the optimal combination of revenue sources that best serves a nonprofit? 
Previous literature on the impact of nonprofit revenue structure shows mixed results. 
While most studies suggest that “revenue diversification” reduces financial vulnerability 
and revenue volatility, a few other studies instead indicate revenue concentration 
contributes to organizational efficiency and revenue growth. These studies predominantly 
use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as an indicator of revenue diversification, which, 
however, is an inappropriate measure according to modern portfolio theory (MPT). In 
this paper, I use MPT as an alternative approach to examining nonprofit revenue mixes. 
By analyzing the NCCS-GuideStar Digitized Data from 1998 to 2003, this paper 
demonstrates how to find the optimal revenue mix using the MPT approach and examine 
whether HHI is a reliable indicator of risk.  
 
Key words: Modern Portfolio Theory, revenue mix optimization, revenue diversification, 
revenue concentration, risk, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
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Introduction 
Nonprofit organizations receive revenue from a variety of sources. In 2013, for 
example, the $1.73 trillion total revenue reported by nearly one million public charities 
was composed of 47.5 percent program service revenue from private sources, 32.5 
percent government funding, 13.3 percent private contributions, 4.8 percent investment 
income, and 1.9 percent other sources (McKeever, 2015). Taking a more granular look, 
program service revenue from private sources can include ticket sales for arts and culture 
organizations, tuition payments for education organizations, or patient revenue for 
hospitals, among others. Government funding can be grants, contracts, or fees for goods 
and services. Private contributions can be gifts and grants from individuals, foundations, 
or corporations. Investment income includes interest on savings, dividends from 
securities, rental income, and capital gains. “Other income” can include a range of 
revenue sources, such as membership dues, special events, sales of assets, sales of 
inventory, and so forth.  
To a certain degree, nonprofit organizations have a choice over different mixes of 
revenue sources. Nonprofit scholars tend to simplify it as choosing a more concentrated 
or diversified revenue structure. Many empirical studies favor revenue diversification, 
suggesting that diversification can increase community buy-in and organizational 
legitimacy (Bielefeld, 1992; Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998), reduce financial 
vulnerability (e.g., Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Hager, 2001), or 
decrease revenue volatility (e.g., Carroll & Stater, 2009; Wicker, Longley, & Breuer, 
2013). A few studies support revenue concentration, demonstrating that such 
concentration can contribute to organizational success (Grønbjerg, 1992), organizational 
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efficiency (Frumkin & Keating, 2011), and financial capacity growth (Chikoto & Neely, 
2014). Many studies have been focused on what determines a nonprofit’s revenue 
structure and how the structure influences a nonprofit’s financial health and performance, 
but few studies provide insights on what is and how to choose the optimal combination of 
revenue sources for a nonprofit organization. This paper fills the gap in the literature by 
exploring the question of nonprofit revenue mix optimization. 
Methodologically, previous studies predominantly use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) as an indicator of revenue diversification to predict nonprofit financial 
health. According to the HHI approach, a revenue mix becomes more diversified as the 
number of revenue sources increases and/or the shares of sources become more equal. 
The higher the degree of diversification, the lower the level of a nonprofit’s financial 
vulnerability or revenue volatility. The HHI approach, however, has major drawbacks. 
First, it only captures the number of revenue sources and the proportion of each source to 
total revenue, without considering the covariances between revenue sources, that is, how 
one individual revenue source moves in relation to another. Second, HHI uses 
information on gross revenue, leaving out the expenses involved to generate a certain 
level of revenue and ignoring the volatility of each revenue source. In contrast, modern 
portfolio theory (MPT) suggests that simply increasing the number of revenue sources in 
a portfolio does not necessarily reduce the portfolio risk and more revenue sources do not 
always lead to a well-diversified portfolio (i.e. revenue mix in a nonprofit setting). 
Because portfolio risk depends on both the variability of the returns on individual 
revenue sources as well as the covariances between the returns, the magic of revenue 
diversification works by carefully selecting revenue sources, the returns on which have 
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low correlations with one another (Markowitz, 1952; 1959). However, with the exception 
of Kingma (1993) and Grasse, et al. (2015), very few studies paid attention to the 
covariances between the returns on nonprofit revenue sources. Even the two articles 
applying MPT did not properly use the MPT approach to calculate nonprofit portfolio 
risk as their empirical results are based on the gross revenue growth rather than the net 
return of revenue sources.  
In this paper, I use MPT as an alternative approach to HHI to examine a less 
explored but more meaningful question: what is the optimal combination of revenue 
sources that can best support a nonprofit organization to achieve its mission (i.e. the 
provision of mission-related services and goods)? This is a optimization problem, in 
which a nonprofit manager’s goal is to choose a combination of revenue streams (i.e. a 
portfolio) that can maximize the organization’s services (i.e. expected portfolio return) 
given her level of risk tolerance, or alternatively, a revenue mix that can minimize the 
unexpected changes (i.e. portfolio risk) given a certain level of services (Kingma, 1993). 
To answer this question, I analyze the National Center on Charitable Statistics (NCCS)-
GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database (“digitized data”) between 1998 and 
2003. The five revenue sources explored in this paper include contributions and grants; 
land, buildings, and equipment for investments; savings and temporary cash investments; 
securities; and sales from special events and activities. For each of the four major 
nonprofit subsectors (arts, culture, and humanities; education; health; and human services) 
and the whole sample, I examine the expected return and risk characteristics of the five 
nonprofit revenue sources as well as the correlations between the returns on revenue 
sources. I then demonstrate how to use the information to identify efficient frontiers for 
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nonprofits in different industries, based on which a nonprofit manager can select the 
optimal revenue mix that minimizes the risk given her preferred level of service 
provision. I find that the specific expected return and risk characteristics of individual 
revenue sources, as well as efficient frontiers, vary by each subsector. Regardless, similar 
patterns hold across different subsectors. Contributions and grants are the riskiest (and 
most rewarding) revenue source among all, and the return from contributions and grants 
has significant and high correlations with the returns on savings and temporary cash 
investments, and securities. Comparing HHI and the portfolio risk based on the MPT 
approach, I find that revenue mixes with a small number of revenue sources, or a high 
level of revenue concentration as indicated by HHI, do not always have high portfolio 
risk; and lower levels of HHI exhibit no associations with optimal revenue mixes.  
This paper makes methodological and theoretical contributions by correctly 
applying the MPT approach to studying nonprofit finance, which, as shown from the 
results, is better than the HHI approach in guiding nonprofit revenue strategies. In the 
following sections, I will first summarize the literature on nonprofit revenue 
diversification and introduce modern portfolio theory. Then, I will describe methods, 
followed by a discussion on data. Next, I will present the results on the characteristics of 
revenue sources and the efficient frontiers by subsector and the whole sample, and 
compare HHI and MPT. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the contributions and 
limitations of this study, along with plans for future research. 
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Literature 
HHI and Nonprofit Revenue Diversification 
The large body of literature on nonprofit revenue strategies revolves around two 
major questions: First, how does the level of revenue diversification, measured by HHI, 
influence the financial health and organizational performance of nonprofits? Second, 
what affects the revenue composition of a nonprofit? Theories exist to explain why and 
how nonprofits choose a certain revenue combination.  
Revenue diversification and nonprofit financial conditions. The first strand of 
the literature focuses on developing models to predict the financial health and 
performance of nonprofit organizations. Revenue diversification, measured by HHI, is a 
key independent variable in nearly all of the existing empirical studies. Tuckman and 
Chang (1991) first introduced revenue concentration as one criterion of nonprofit 
financial vulnerability, and they further elaborated the Revenue Diversification Index 
based on HHI  (Chang & Tuckman, 1994). Shown in the formula below, the level of 
revenue diversification is measured as the sum of the squares of the shares of the revenue 






































where N is the total number of revenue sources, ri is the revenue from the ith revenue 
source, and R is the total revenue from all sources. DI is on a scale of zero to one. The 
closer the index is to zero, the greater the degree of revenue diversification. DI decreases 
as the total number of revenue sources increases or when the shares of individual revenue 
sources are distributed more equally.  
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Tuckman and Chang (1991) initiated the line of research on nonprofit financial 
vulnerability. They defined financially vulnerable nonprofits as those “likely to cut back 
its service offerings immediately when it experiences a financial shock” (p.445). While 
Tuckman and Chang did not offer an operational definition of financial vulnerability, 
other scholars operationalized the definition, using measures as a reduction in program 
expenses or a decrease in net assets (e.g., Greenlee and Trussel, 2000; Trussel, 2002; 
Frumpkin and Keating, 2011).  In general, these studies report a statistically significant 
positive correlation between revenue concentration and financial vulnerability of 
nonprofit organizations, suggesting that revenue diversification is a rewarding strategy 
for nonprofit financial health. 
The other line of research, also using HHI as an indicator of revenue 
diversification, concentrates on revenue volatility, and generally finds that nonprofits 
with a higher level of revenue diversification experience lower revenue volatility. In 
addition to this general finding, Carroll and Stater (2009) admit that the “positive effect 
of diversification on revenue stability does not capture possible trade-offs [crowding out] 
between funding sources, for instance earned income crowding out private donations” (p. 
962). Mayer and his colleagues (2012) point out that simply increasing the level of 
revenue diversification does not necessarily reduce revenue volatility, and that “the 
impact of a change in diversification depends very much on the composition change of a 
portfolio” (p.15). Wicker and her colleagues (2013) report that revenue diversification 
has a greater impact in reducing club-specific volatility than systematic volatility for a 
sample of German sports clubs, which is consistent with modern portfolio theory. 
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In contrast, a few studies provide evidence in favor of revenue concentration. 
Grønbjerg (1992) find that human service organizations with high reliance on a single 
institutionally based revenue source scored higher in organizational success (e.g. 
surpluses, fund balances). Similarly, a study of 144 nonprofits whose annual revenue had 
increased to at least $50 million since 1970 shows that most of these organizations grew 
by concentrating on a single revenue source that offered a good match for their work 
(Foster, Kim, & Christiansen, 2009). Two other studies that use HHI to measure revenue 
diversification (concentration) also report similar results. Frumpkin and Keating (2011) 
note that the rewards of revenue diversification (i.e. financial health) are achieved at the 
cost of organizational efficiency (i.e. administrative expenses, fundraising expenses, and 
fundraising efficiency). Chikoto and Neely (2014) suggest that revenue concentration, 
rather than revenue diversification, contributes to the financial capacity growth of 
nonprofits. 
Factors of nonprofit revenue composition. Nonprofit organizations vary in their 
revenue composition. For example, private contributions are the most important revenue 
source for arts, culture, and humanities organizations, while private payments for goods 
and services account for a significant portion of total revenue for education, health, and 
human service organizations (Roeger, Blackwood, & Pettijohn, 2012). Therefore, another 
strand of literature focuses on the factors that affect nonprofit revenue composition. Some 
empirical studies find that the level of revenue diversification varies by types of nonprofit 
activities as well as types of organizations. For instance, commercial nonprofits have 
higher revenue concentration than donative nonprofits; nonprofits with high fundraising 
expenditures have a higher level of revenue diversification (Chang & Tuckman, 1994). 
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Some studies find that a nonprofit’s revenue mix is determined by the nature of the 
services it provides. Contrary to the findings of Chang and Tuckman (1994), Fischer, et 
al. (2011) report that nonprofits offering private benefits to a specific group of individuals 
rely more on earned income and have more diversified revenue streams. In contrast, those 
providing public benefits to the general public depend more on donations and have a 
higher level of revenue concentration.  
Scholars from different disciplines offer different explanations on the choice of 
nonprofit revenue composition. Institutional theory posits that nonprofits seek 
heterogeneous revenue sources to increase their legitimacy and recognition in a 
community (Bielefeld, 1992).  Resource dependence theory suggests that nonprofit can 
achieve funding stability and organizational success by concentrating on a few revenue 
sources as they develop a long-time relationship with a few funders (e.g. Grønbjerg, 
1992; Froelich, 1999). According to the “multiattribute utility theory,” nonprofit portfolio 
decisionmaking is influenced by many stakeholders’ perspectives and utilities (Kearns, 
2007). Young’s (2007) normative theory suggests that nonprofits should choose an 
income portfolio that reflects the mix of benefits it provides in addition to the financial 
management concerns (e.g., feasibility, interactions, solvency, risk, mission). Last but not 
the least, the economics perspective of objective maximization rationalizes nonprofit 
behavior as objective-maximizing activities subject to some known constraints (e.g., 
Weisbrod, 1988; Hansmann, 1987; James, 1983). For example, Chang and Tuckman 
(1990; 1991) hypothesize that nonprofit managers are motivated by a desire to increase 
surplus to accumulate wealth and equity. As a result, nonprofit managers consciously 
pursue a diversified revenue mix to manage financial risk and reduce financial 
	  	   41 
vulnerability. The objective maximization perspective has been also applied to model 
optimal fundraising expenses (Steinberg, 1991) and optimal rates and structures of 
membership dues (Steinberg, 2007). As to the choice of revenue composition, nonprofits 
either seek to maximize their mission-related services given a level of risk tolerance; or 
minimize the financial risk for a chosen level of services (Kingma, 1993). This paper 
follows the economic perspective of objective maximization.  
The existing research offers much insight into nonprofit revenue management but 
provides little guidance on what is an optimal combination of revenue sources. For the 
majority of research debating on revenue diversification versus concentration, HHI is not 
a stable indicator of revenue diversification. Hence, it is important to develop a more 
refined measurement of revenue diversification, which is the MPT approach discussed 
below.  
 
Modern Portfolio Theory and Nonprofit Finance 
Modern portfolio theory and its key insights. Harry Markowitz, through his essay 
“Portfolio Selection” (1952) and book Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of 
Investments (1959), developed the theory of portfolio choice, which establishes the 
foundations of the modern portfolio theory. For his pioneering contributions to the theory 
of financial economics and corporate finance, Harry Markowitz, along with Merton 
Miller and William Sharpe, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1990. 
MPT suggests that the purpose of portfolio analysis is to find portfolios that best meet the 
objectives of an investor (Markowitz, 1975, p.3). Investors can make their portfolio 
choices by balancing the expected return and risk of a portfolio, also known as the mean-
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variance analysis. The risk of a portfolio depends on the variance of return on each 
individual asset as well as the pairwise covariances of returns on assets. Therefore, a 
well-diversified portfolio can mitigate risk by considering both the variances and 
covariances.  
MPT offers three important insights to portfolio selection. First, “A good portfolio 
is more than a long list of good stocks and bonds” but “a balanced whole” (Markowitz, 
1975, p.3). Investments are risky due to the uncertainty of the returns on securities. 
However, what matters to an investor is not the risk of an individual security, but its 
contribution to the risk of the whole portfolio.  
Second, returns on securities are correlated. It implies that diversification could 
not eliminate the risk of a portfolio simply by adding as many securities as possible. “One 
hundred securities whose returns rise and fall in near unison afford little more protection 
than the uncertain return of a single security” (Markowitz, 1975, p.5).  Rather, 
diversification reduces portfolio risk by selecting securities with low or negative 
correlations with each other. 
Third, there is a tradeoff between expected return and risk, that is, high risk is 
generally associated with high expected return, whereas low risk with low expected 
return. As such, the analysis of portfolios involves the considerations of both return and 
risk. “The proper choice among efficient portfolios depends on the willingness and ability 
of the investor to assume risk” (Markowitz, 1975, p.6). Using the mean-variance analysis, 
MPT suggests that investors can deliberately choose the proportions of individual 
securities so to minimize the risk of the portfolio for a given level of expected portfolio 
return, or maximize the expected return for a given level of risk. 
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MPT was developed for to help investors to choose security investments given 
their risk preferences, but can be varied to apply for the analysis of nonprofit revenue 
mixes.  Markowitz referred to investors’ other sources of income as “exogenous assets” 
(p.34):  
For a private investor this might include a salary; for a university it would 
include tuition and endowments. These other sources of income are not 
irrelevant to the portfolio selection decision. It is desirable to choose a 
portfolio whose performance will not be too highly correlated with the 
investors’ other income. It is undesirable to have a portfolio perform worst 
when it is needed most. Such considerations may be handled formally by 
including other sources of income as a fictitious security or “exogenous 
asset.” The holding of this asset is not subject to choice in the analysis, but 
the correlations of its income with the yields of securities will influence 
the selection of portfolio. 
 
The Kingma Model and Nonprofit Financial Risk. Kingma (1993) applied MPT 
to nonprofit financial stability and developed a model to help nonprofit managers 
determine the optimal level of revenue diversification. Drawing an analogy between 
corporate and nonprofit finance, Kingma interpreted the goal of nonprofit managers as to 
“provide a certain level of services (a given level of expected return) while minimizing 
unpredictable changes in revenues (risk)” (p. 105). “The expected revenue of a portfolio 
for a nonprofit organization is the weighted sum of the expected revenues from each of 
the organization’s revenue sources” (P.109). The risk, which he defined as the 
unpredictability of a nonprofit’s revenue, “is a weighted sum of the variance and 
covariance of its individual revenue streams” (p. 109). Assuming a nonprofit derives all 
its revenue (I) from two sources—government (G) and donations (D), Kingma modeled 
the expected return 𝑅! and risk of a nonprofit’s revenue portfolio as follows (p. 110)1: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The equation (2) of 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑅!  in Kingma (1993, p.110) is incomplete, which I correct in 
the above equation. 
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 𝐸   𝑅! = 𝑘𝐸 𝑅! + 1− 𝑘 𝐸[𝑅!] 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑅! = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑘𝑅! + 1− 𝑘 𝑅!= 𝑘!𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑅! + 1− 𝑘! 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑅! + 2𝑘 𝑘 − 1 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑅! ,𝑅! , 
where 𝑅!  and 𝑅! are the net return expected from government sources and donations 
respectively, and k is the percentage of net return from government sources. The Kingma 
model suggests that, for a given level of expected return 𝐸 𝑅! , the optimal level of 
revenue diversification—the choice of 𝑘 that minimizes the portfolio variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑅! )—depends on both the variances of individual revenue sources and the 
covariance between the sources.  
Through this pioneering work, Kingma sent out invitations for more research 
along this line. He also suggested future studies to test his model in different subsectors, 
because “covariance of revenue sources across nonprofit organizations of different types 
is irrelevant for the policy that an individual nonprofit organization must make” (p.113). 
However, the Kingma model received little attention over the past 20 years, with two 
exceptions. The first one was by Jegers (1997), who in theory expanded the Kingma 
model by interacting nonprofit managers’ risk attitudes with the efficient frontier. 
Recently, based on the Kingma model, Grasse, et al. (2015) used the digitized data to 
empirically identify the efficient frontier for nonprofit arts organizations. Unfortunately, 
as with many other empirical studies on revenue diversification, Grasse, et al. (2015) did 
not properly define “return.” This is important because proper measurement of return is 
the cornerstone of portfolio analysis, which I will discuss in detail in the following 
section.   
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Return Versus Revenue Growth. In addition to the concept of revenue 
diversification, another common misunderstanding in the nonprofit literature is the 
definition of return. The expected return on an investment is a fundamental concept in 
portfolio analysis, which is often proxied by the average of historical returns on the 
investment. In corporate finance, the gain (or loss) from an investment is called the return 
on that investment. It has two components. One is the income component as an investor 
receives cash dividends from owning the asset. The other is the capital gain or loss when 
the value of the asset increases or decreases. The sum of the dividends and capital gain or 
loss is dollar returns. It is more common to use percentage returns, which tell how much 
an investor earns for each dollar invested. Percentage returns are calculated as the dollar 
return of an investment at the end of a period divided by the beginning value of the 
investment (Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2008, p.369-371):  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
= 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠  𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓  𝑎  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑛  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
 
Previous nonprofit literature calculated the “return” from a revenue source in 
various ways. For example, Wicker et al. (2013) simply used the revenue from individual 
revenue sources, without considering the revenue-generating expenses. In Grasse et al. 
(2015, p.17), the return for a revenue source was calculated by subtracting the revenue 
received in a year from that in the previous year. This approach represents the absolute 
change in gross revenue. In Kingma’s model (1993, p.110), the return was defined as the 
expected percentage change in net income, where net income is gross revenue net of 
revenue-generating costs (p.110). By definition, this is the percentage change in net 
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income rather than percentage return. The net income or gross revenue from 
contributions received in the previous year, for example, cannot be perceived as the 
beginning value of this year’s “investment.” Unlike buying and holding a stock from the 
market, nonprofit organizations do not hold contributions or grants and let their value 
grow (or lose) over a period of time. Instead, they spend the income for charitable 
purposes. Fundraising is thus like “buying” assets (i.e. contributions, grants) that 
depreciate 100% within a year or two and the return on fundraising only comes from the 
income component. In this paper, I take a step further by correctly applying the MPT 
approach to empirical analysis, using the net rate of return rather than the change in gross 
revenue or net income.  
 
Method 
It takes several steps to obtain the efficient frontier for nonprofit organizations in 
each subsector. First, for each subsector, I calculate the average annual return for each 
revenue source. Second, I compute the expected return and standard deviation of these 
returns over the years in the database. Third, I develop the variance-covariance matrix 
and correlation coefficients between the returns on each pair of revenue sources. 
 
Expected Return and Risk  
First, suppose that the nonprofit organization i has a total number of revenue 
sources S. For an individual revenue source s, given the revenue Rev and the revenue-
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generating expenses Exp, the annual return r on the revenue source s for the organization 
i in year t: 2 
𝑟!"# = 𝑅𝑒𝑣!"# − 𝐸𝑥𝑝!"#𝐸𝑥𝑝!"# , 
where s takes values from 1 to S,  i takes values from 1 to I, t takes values from 1 to T.  
Second, calculate the annual average return e(r) on individual revenue sources for 
each subsector, and then obtain the expected return 𝐸(𝑅!) as the average return on source 
s in the past: 
𝑒 𝑟!" = 1𝐼 𝑟!"#!!!! , 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝐼 
𝐸 𝑅! = 1𝑇 𝑒 𝑟!"!!!! , 𝑡 = 1, 2,… ,𝑇 
Third, compute the variance 𝜎!and standard deviation 𝜎  (risk) of the return on 
each revenue source s:  
𝜎!! = 𝑒(𝑟!")− 𝐸(𝑅!) !!!!! /(𝑇 − 1) 
𝜎! = 𝑒(𝑟!")− 𝐸(𝑅!) !!!!! /(𝑇 − 1) 
Fourth, compute covariances and correlation coefficients between returns on each 
pair of revenue sources. For example, given the annual returns of two revenue sources, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I use net income and expenses to obtain returns on total contributions and grants, and 
special events and activities. For savings and temporary cash investments, land, 
buildings, and equipment, and securities, I use net income and average investments to 
calculate returns. See the Data section for details. 
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𝑟!" and 𝑟!", the covariance 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑟! , 𝑟!   and correlation coefficient 𝜌!" are calculated 
respectively as: 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑟! , 𝑟!   = (𝑒(𝑟!")− 𝐸(𝑅!))(𝑒(𝑟!")− 𝐸(𝑅!))!!!! 𝑇 − 1  
𝜌!" = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑟!  , 𝑟!𝜎!𝜎!  
Fifth, the portfolio weight w of a revenue source is the share of the investment (or 
expenses) in total portfolio investments (or total revenue-generating expenses). Given the 
weight w of expenses (or average investments over a year) on each revenue source s in a 
portfolio P, the portfolio return E (RP) is the weighted average return of the revenue 
sources in the portfolio: 
𝐸 𝑅! = 𝑤!𝐸 𝑅!!!!! ,   
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑠 = 1, 2,… , 𝑆,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤!!!!! = 1 
Finally, obtain the portfolio variance 𝜎!! and portfolio risk 𝜎!. The variance of a 
portfolio combination is equal to the weighted average covariance of the returns on 
individual revenue sources: 𝜎!!＝ 𝑤!𝑤!𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟!! ,! 𝑟!) = 𝑤!𝑤!𝜎!𝜎!𝜌!"!!  
𝜎!＝ 𝑤!𝑤!𝜎!𝜎!𝜌!"!!  
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Efficient Frontier of Revenue Sources 
According to MPT, all possible combinations of assets can be plotted in a risk-
return space. The collection of all these possible combinations defines a region in this 
space, which is the feasible set. When there is no risk-free asset, the upward-sloped upper 
boundary of this region is the efficient frontier, which is a collection of efficient portfolios 
with the lowest portfolio risk for a given level of portfolio expected return or the highest 
expected return for a given level of risk. When there is a risk-free asset available, the 
efficient frontier is the tangent line starting from the vertical axis where the return on the 
risk-free asset locates. Any portfolio above the frontier is not feasible and cannot be 
achieved. Any portfolio within the feasible set but not on the efficient frontier is sub-
optimal because the portfolio that lies directly above it on the efficient frontier has higher 
expected return for the same level of risk. Identifying the efficient frontier is thus to find 
the set of efficient portfolios (Markowitz, 1952; 1959; Chen, Chung, Ho, & Hsu, 2010). 
 
[Figure I-1 here] 
 
Mathematically, the portfolio optimization problem can be formulated as solving 
for the weights of investments in a portfolio by minimizing the portfolio risk for each 
target level of expected portfolio return, subject to the weights summing up to one and all 
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Min   𝜎!!＝ 𝑤!𝑤!𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟!! ,! 𝑟!) 
Subject to 𝐸 𝑅! = 𝑤!𝐸 𝑅!!!!! = 𝑑∗, where 𝑑∗ is the target expected return, 𝑤!!!!! = 1, 𝑤! ≥ 0, 𝑠 = 1, 2,… , 𝑆 
The portfolio optimization problem with the inequality constraint is a quadratic 
programming problem, which is to minimize a function of the form !! 𝑥!𝐷𝑥 − 𝑑!𝑥 subject 
to one or more constraints of the form 𝐴!"! 𝑥 = 𝑏!" (𝑙 equality constraints) and 𝐴!"#! 𝑥 ≥𝑏!"# (𝑚 inequality constraints), where 𝐷 is an 𝑛×𝑛 matrix, 𝑥 and 𝑑 are 𝑛×1 vectors, 𝐴!"#!  is an 𝑚×𝑛 matrix, 𝑏!"#is an 𝑚×1 vector, 𝐴!"!  is an 𝑙×𝑛 matrix, and 𝑏!"is an 𝑙×1 
vector. Equivalently, the above portfolio optimization problem can be written as:  
Min 𝑤!Σ𝑤 − 𝑞×𝑑!𝑤, 
where 𝑤 is the vector of weights, equivalent of 𝑥, Σ is the covariance matrix of returns of the revenue sources, equivalent of 𝐷, 𝑞 ≥ 0 is the level of risk tolerance: 𝑞 = 0 works to minimize portfolio variance, 𝑞 = ∞ 
works to maximize portfolio return, 𝑑 is the vector of expected returns, 𝑤!Σ𝑤 is the variance of portfolio returns, 𝑑!𝑤 is the expected return of the portfolio. 
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For the objective function, set 𝐷 = 2×Σ, 𝑞 = 0, and 𝑑 = (0,… ,0)′, then we have 𝑤!Σ𝑤. 
For the 𝑙 = 2 equality constraints 𝑤!𝑑 = 𝑑!𝑤 = 𝑑∗and 𝑤!1 = 1!𝑤 = 1, set 𝐴!"!(2×𝑛) =𝑑′1′  and    𝑏!"(2×1) = 𝑑∗1 , we have 𝐴!"! 𝑥 ≡ 𝑑′1′ 𝑤 = 𝑑∗1 . For the 𝑚 = 𝑛 inequality 
constraints 𝑤 ≥ 0  (𝑛 is the number of revenue sources), set 𝐴!"#!(𝑛×𝑛) = 𝐼! and 𝑏!"#(𝑛×1) =0⋮0 , we have 𝐴!"#! 𝑥 ≡ 𝐼!𝑤 = 𝑤 ≥ 0. We can then use the R package quadprog function 




The paper uses a sample of public charities from the National Center on 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS)-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database 
(“digitized data”). The database includes tax-exempt nonprofit organizations that are 
required to file IRS Form 990 or 990-EZ between 1998 and 2003 (NCCS, n.d.).3 The 
time period of the database is not ideal as it covers the U.S. stock market’s Dom Com 
Bubble Burst in the late 1990s followed by the early 2000s economic recession. 
Nonetheless, the digitized data provide the most detailed financial information that is 
necessary for calculating the expected return and risk of revenue sources. Part I of Form 
990 provides information on revenue and expenses, which are recognized when they are 
measurable and earned if using the accrual basis of accounting. Part IV of Form 990 is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Congregations and organizations with less than $25,000 in gross receipts are not 
required to file Form 990 and thus not included in the database (NCCS, n.d.). 
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balance sheet that presents an organization’s assets and liabilities (beginning and end of 
year). The digitized data include a variety of revenue source categories, and this paper 
analyzes the following categories: 1) voluntary contributions and grants, 2) savings and 
temporary cash investments, 3) securities, 4) land, buildings, and equipment, and 5) 
special events and activities.4  
Voluntary contributions and fundraising expenses. The IRS defines voluntary 
contributions as any payments “for which the donor does not receive full retail value 
from the recipient organization” (IRS, 2000, p.16). Voluntary contributions include those 
that are received directly from the public (line 1a) and any payments from special events 
that are in excess of the retail value of the goods or services sold. Voluntary contributions 
also include those received indirectly from the public through federated fundraising 
agencies (line 1b). Government grants (line 1c) are treated as contributions if their 
primary purpose is to enable the recipient organization to further its exempt purposes 
“rather than to serve the direct and immediate needs of the grantor” (IRS, 2000, p. 17). 
Fundraising expenses (line 15) are defined as “the total expenses those incurred in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Several revenue sources are not included in the analysis. First, membership income is 
not included due to the lack of data on the corresponding expenses. Second, sales of 
inventory are also omitted because it is difficult to differentiate organizations that used 
smoothing production from those who did not. Third, program services are excluded from 
the analysis for two reasons. First of all, there are no data on the expenses associated with 
producing the services and goods for sale. Program service expenses reported on Form 
990 are expenses of the organizations’ mission-related activities, which may include 
grants to individuals and organizations. Second, when a nonprofit receives program 
service revenue by charging for the tax-exempt services it provides, the nonprofit does 
not seek to maximize their net income from the program services. Many nonprofits offer 
program services at a discounted price and use income from other revenue sources to 
compensate for the loss (James, 1983). In corporate finance, there is little reason to invest 
in an asset when the expected return is negative. However, it is not rare for nonprofits to 
continue negative-return revenue activities, which serve their mission purpose but not 
financial objective. For these reasons, I do not consider the revenue from mission-related 
program services as a source for return maximization.  
	  	   53 
soliciting voluntary contributions” (IRS, 2000, p.21), which include: “publicizing and 
conducting fundraising campaigns; soliciting bequests and grants from foundations or 
other organizations, or government grants; participating in federated fundraising 
campaigns; preparing and distributing fundraising materials; conducting special events 
that generate contributions in addition to the retail value” (IRS, 2000, p.21). Form 990 
reports how much a nonprofit spends on fundraising as well as how much contributions, 
gifts, and grants it generates each year. Suppose a nonprofit manager chooses an amount 
to spend on fundraising to obtain an amount of voluntary contributions and grants in 
return, the annual return on fundraising 𝑟!"   for a nonprofit i in year t can be written as: 5 
𝑟!" = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" − 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔!"𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔!"  
 
Savings and temporary cash investments include “interest-bearing checking 
accounts, savings, and temporary cash investments, such as money market funds, 
commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and U.S. Treasury bills or other governmental 
obligations that mature in less than 1 year” (IRS, 2000, p.23). The return on savings and 
temporary cash investments 𝑟!" of an organization i is the interest income (line 4) divided 
by the average savings and temporary cash investments (line 46) held within year t, 
where the average assets are calculated by dividing the sum of the beginning and end of 
year assets by two.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It is possible that the return on the current year’s fundraising (i.e. net contributions and 
grants) does not fully realize until the next year. I assume the lag effect of return on 
fundraising is sufficiently small so the formula is a reasonable approximation.  
6 It is better to use the average of assets over a year rather than the beginning or ending 
value. First, operating assets can be bought and sold during a year, while the beginning 
and ending value represents information at a certain point. Second, income is earned over 
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𝑟!" = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑜𝑛  𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦  𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  !"𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!" + 𝐸𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!" /2 
 
Securities. The annual return on securities 𝑟!"   of an organization i in year t is 
calculated as the sum of dividends and interest from securities (line 5) and gains (or 
losses) from sales of securities (line 8c, column (A)) divided by the average securities 
held as investments in year t (line 54). 7 
𝑟!" = 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠&𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  !" + 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠)!"𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!" + 𝐸𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!" /2 
 
Land, buildings, and equipment (LB&E). The annual return 𝑟!"  on land, buildings, 
and equipment (e.g., rental properties) held for investment purposes are expressed as net 
rental income (line 6c) divided by the average investment assets in year t (55c).8 
𝑟!" = 𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  (𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠)  !"𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!" + 𝐸𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!" /2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a year. Therefore, using the average assets would more accurately reflect the rate of 
return.  
7  There are two issues with the ratio of return on securities. First, while securities are 
reported at their market value on audited financial statements, they could be reported as 
either book value or market value on Form 990 (IRS, 2000, p.24). The final sample 
includes only the organizations that followed GAAP and used accrual accounting, so it is 
reasonable to take the market value as a default. Second, the rate of return is calculated 
differently from the standard way, which is the sum of the cash component and capital 
gains (losses) on a security investment divided by the original cost of the investment. 
Form 990 does not contain information on capital gains or losses of securities, the change 
in the beginning and ending values of securities does not necessarily reflect capital gains 
(losses) result from the price change of securities. The change could also be caused by 
purchases or sales of securities.  
8 Land, buildings, and equipment are reported at their book value, that is, their original 
cost minus accumulated depreciation (Form 990, p.24). I use net book value to calculate 
the return on LB & E investments. Note that a problem associated with this approach is 
that older assets may have a smaller rate of return than newer assets, because older assets 
have larger accumulated depreciation and thus a larger net book value. 
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Special events and activities. Special events “only incidentally accomplish an 
exempt purpose. Their sole or primary purpose is to raise funds other than contributions 
to finance the organization’s exempt activities. This is done by offering goods or services 
that have more than a nominal value for a payment that is more than the direct cost of 
those goods and services” (IRS, 2000, p.19). Examples of special events and activities 
include “dinners, dances, carnivals, raffles, bingo games, other gambling activities, and 
door-to-door sales of merchandise” (IRS, 2000, p.19). Special events may generate both 
sales revenue (reportable on line 9a) and contributions (reportable on line 1). Treating 
special events as an investment on which a nonprofit organization spends a certain 
amount of expenses in order to obtain a certain amount of sales revenue (not including 
contributions), the annual return on special events and activities 𝑟!" is written as net 
income from special events (line 9c) divided by direct expenses other than fundraising 
expenses (line 9b):  
𝑟!" = 𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!"𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠!"  
 
Data Limitations and Cleaning 
Form 990 has been publicly available since 1996 and is widely used as a source of 
data for nonprofit finance research. However, the IRS Form 990 data have many 
limitations, particularly regarding the accuracy of reported financial information (Keating 
& Frumkin, 2003; Wing, Gordon, Hager, Pollak, & Ronney, 2006). By comparing the 
Form 990 data with the audited financial statements (e.g. Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996; 
Froelich, Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000; Krishnan, Yetman, & Yetman, 2006) or with annual 
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reports to state regulatory agencies (Keating, Parsons, & Roberts, 2008; Krishnan & 
Yetman, 2011), researchers revealed that some financial information reported on Form 
990 is not consistent with the other documents. Specifically, quite a few studies find that 
nonprofit organizations typically manipulate financial reporting on Form 990 by expense 
allocation. To “improve” organizational efficiency on the form, nonprofits are found to 
under-report fundraising and/or administrative expenses while over-reporting program 
service expenses (Krishnan & Yetman, 2011; Keating et al., 2008; Krishnan et al., 2006; 
Jones & Roberts, 2006; Urban Institute and Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 
2004; Trussel, 2003). To minimize the unrelated business income taxes (UBIT), 
organizations may shift revenue or expenses from taxable to tax-exempt activities (Omer 
& Yetman, 2003; 2007).  
Due to these data limitations, unusable, erroneous, or suspicious observations 
need to be carefully eliminated based on several commonly used filters (e.g. Calabrese, 
2013; Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 2012; Tinkelman & Neely, 2010). The original 
sample includes 1,388,480 observations, and the final sample has 135,672 observations 
after the following steps of data cleaning.  
Private Foundations. The original sample includes 99% of public charities and 
1% of private foundations. These two types of organizations differ in their charitable and 
financial activities. In addition, private foundations are required to file Form 990-PF, 
which is different from Form 990 filed by public charities. Therefore, I exclude private 
foundations from the original sample.  
Form 990-EZ. The IRS allows small organizations (gross receipts < $100,000 and 
total assets < $250,000) to file Form 990-EZ (IRS, 2000). Compared to Form 990, Form 
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990-EZ includes different line items of expenses and less detailed financial information. 
There are about 20% of records filing 990-EZ in the original sample and they are 
excluded. 
Group Returns. The IRS allows a central organization to file a group return for its 
affiliating organizations. Group returns (only 0.2% of the original observations) can bias 
the sample with extremely large financials and are excluded. There are about 30% 
observations that do not report whether or not they filed a group return. I follow the 
previous literature to take the “unknown” type of returns as individual returns, because “it 
is the most plausible default option for filers” (Bowman et al., 2012, p. 571). 
Accounting methods other than accrual. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) requires audited financial statements to be based on accrual 
accounting methods. However, Form 990 reporting is not subject to GAAP (Keating & 
Frumkin, 2003). Therefore 47 percent of the records use either cash-basis or “other” 
accounting methods. The cash-basis method—recording revenue (expenses) when cash is 
actually received (paid)—does not accurately reflect an organization’s financial 
condition. For example, it does not reveal an organization’s unpaid bills (Bowman, 2011, 
p.16). In contrast, accrual accounting records revenue (expenses) when they are earned 
(incurred) (Keating & Frumkin, 2001). For example, it recognizes a purchase of services 
as an expense when there is an invoice to be paid (Bowman, 2011, p.16). Although using 
this filter means losing nearly half of the sample, it can be misleading to mingle the data 
from both accrual and cash accounting. For example, a capital purchase is an expense 
based on cash accounting; however, it is not an expense if using accrual accounting 
because capital purchase does not cause change in net assets (Bowman et al., 2012). 
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ensure the consistency, comparability, and reliability of financial reporting across 
different nonprofit organizations, I follow previous literature to eliminate all the records 
that are not based on the accrual method from the original sample (e.g., Bowman et al., 
2012).  
Erroneous items. The Form 990 data may involve errors (Wing et al., 2006). First, 
revenue items (Part I of Form 990) are not supposed to take negative values unless they 
are reported as net income or (loss), such as net income or (loss) from rents (line 6c), 
from sales of assets other than inventory (line 8c and 8d), from special events (line 9c), or 
from sales of inventory (line 10c). Therefore, observations with negative revenue items 
are excluded. In addition, for the revenue sources mentioned above, Form 990 requires 
nonprofit organizations to report both gross revenue and expenses in order to calculate 
net income or loss. Nonetheless, these expenses are not supposed to be negative. I take 
the absolute value for a handful of negative expenses for each of these revenue sources.9  
Second, I exclude the records reporting expenses erroneously, such as negative expenses 
or individual expenses items in excess of total expenses. Additionally, there are a number 
of records with zero expenses on program services (24%), management (31%), 
fundraising (73%), or even total expenses (1%). It is hard to imagine how an organization 
can function without any expenses on management or program services.10 Thus, the 
records with 0 management, program services, and total expenses are all excluded. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Some nonprofit organizations may insert negative expenses by error. Instead of 
subtracting expenses from gross revenue, they sum gross revenue and negative expenses 
for net income. Therefore, I use the absolute values to replace the negative expenses 
reported in the Revenue section of Form 990. On the other hand, gross revenue items 
should not be negative, so they are excluded instead. 
10 It could be that some organizations did not break down total expenses into categories 
and only report a lump-sum number. 	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the fundraising expenses, I exclude the observations with 0 value when an organization 
actually receives positive total contributions, gifts, or grants. Other erroneous items are 
also eliminated, including observations with negative total assets, or those with an 
unknown NTEE category.  
A strongly balanced panel. After the above data cleaning steps, the sample size 
drops to 306, 118. The subsector-level annual return on each revenue source is obtained 
by computing the average of organizational annual returns from all organizations in a 
subsector. To reduce any organizational heterogeneity that may impact the subsector-
level return, I keep a strongly balanced panel, using the annual information from the same 
organizations for each year between 1998 and 2003. By only keeping organizations with 
all six years’ data, the sample size is further reduced to 135,672 observations (22,612 
organizations). 
Table I-1 shows the data cleaning step by step. Table I-2 offers a comparison 
between the original and the cleaned sample. In general, the observations in the new 
sample have larger average total revenue and total end-of-year assets, but smaller total 
expenses. Losing 90% of the data points may appear worrisome, but it can be more so 
should I kept the erroneous or suspicious data to compute returns and risks, which would 
lead to misleading results. It is also a common practice among previous studies using the 
990 data to conduct rigorous data cleaning and obtain a much smaller analysis sample 
(e.g., Yetman & Yetman, 2013; Calabrese, 2013; Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 2012; 
Tinkelman & Neely, 2010). Based on this sample, the results of this study is more 
informative to large organizations than smaller ones. 
[Table I-1 and I-2 Here] 
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Extreme and missing values of organizational annual returns. The analysis is 
conducted using four subsamples (subsectors) and the whole sample. In calculating the 
subsectoral annual returns on each revenue source, any organizations with extreme or 
missing values for the organizational annual return of a revenue source are excluded 
from the analysis with respect to that revenue source (Table I-3). First, there are some 
extremely large or small values for the returns on individual revenue sources at the 
organizational level. For example, in the subsample of arts, culture, and humanities 
nonprofits, the largest value of organizational annual return from contributions and grants 
is 61,328, while the median value 7.68. The smallest value of organizational annual 
return from securities is -185, while the median value is 0.03. These extreme values could 
be due to the idiosyncratic differences in organizations’ capabilities or because of 
reporting errors. In either case, it is legitimate to exclude the extreme values from the 
analysis and reduce the bias that they would bring to the annual average of returns at the 
subsectoral level. I use the following exclusion criteria for extrems values. For 
contributions and grants as well as special events, in each year, any data points that lie 
more than three times the interquartile ranges (3*IQR) in each subsample and the whole 
sample are labeled as extreme values. For the other revenue sources, using the 3*IQR 
criteria would result in a significant loss of data points, so I only exclude the observations 
with returns larger than 100% (or smaller than -100%).11 Second, there are also some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that rather than dropping all the observations with extreme values, I only exclude 
the extreme values from the analysis with respect to that particular revenue source. For 
example, an organization reporting an extremely large return on fundraising may not 
have an extreme value of the return on special events. Therefore, the organization is only 
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missing values. It is a missing value when an organization did not report a revenue source 
or when the denominator (expenses or investments) in calculating the return is zero. After 
excluding the extreme and missing values, a strongly balanced panel is maintained but 
the number of organizations used for calculations varies by revenue sources. In general, 
after excluding the extreme and missing values, the organizational annual returns on 
revenue sources do not vary significantly by the level of organization size, as measured 
by quintiles of organizations’ average total revenue, total expenses, and total assets. The 
only exception is the return on rental properties, for which larger organizations tend to 
have a higher level of return. 
[Table I-3] 
 
Results: Expected Return, Risk, and Efficient Portfolios 
In this section, I present the expected return and risk characteristics of individual 
revenue sources as well as the efficient portfolios and efficient frontiers for nonprofits in 
different subsectors and in the whole sample. Based on the National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE) system, I examine four major nonprofit subsectors: 1) arts, 
culture, and humanities  (12% of the final sample); 2) education (14%); 3) health (17%); 
and 4) human services (37%).12 Table I-4 presents the summary statistics of the 
subsectors and the whole sample. I report three organizational size indicators: an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
excluded when calculating the average fundraising return at the subsectoral level but kept 
in the analysis of the average return on special events. 
12 The remaining 20 percent of the sample consists of miscellaneous types of 
organizations (e.g. environment, international, public and societal benefit, mutual benefit, 
religion-related), which I will not discuss by individual subsector in this paper due to the 
limited data points for these types of organizations. However, they are included in the 
analysis for the whole sample. 	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organization’s six-year average total revenue, six-year average total expenses, and six-
year average ending total assets (all values are inflation-adjusted to 2003 dollars). Seen 
from the three indicators, the education organizations in the sample on average have the 
largest size (revenue = $24.8M, expenses = $20.4M, assets = $85.8M), followed by 
health organizations (revenue = $18.1M, expenses = $17.5M, assets = $98.2M). Arts, 
culture, and humanities organizations are comparatively much smaller (revenue = 
$4.35M, expenses = $3.68 M, assets = $12.3M). Human services subsector has the largest 
number of organizations but the average size of human service organizations is the 




Arts, Culture, and Humanities 
The subsample of the arts, culture, and humanities nonprofits includes 15,822 
observations (2,637 organizations). Arts, culture, and humanities nonprofits, such as 
theaters, museums, and historical societies, are those primarily to “promote appreciation 
for and enjoyment and understanding of the visual, performing, folk, and media arts; the 
humanities (e.g. archaeology, art history); history and historical events; and/or 
communications (e.g. film, radio)” (NTEE, n.d.). 
The summary statistics of organizational annual returns on individual revenue 
sources can be found in Table I-5. At the subsector level, the annual return on a revenue 
source is the average of the organizational annual return on that source over all active 
organizations. To illustrate, there are 2,016 arts, culture, and humanities organizations 
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received contributions and grants for all the six years in the sample. By taking the 
average of the organizational annual return of all the 2016 organizations, we get the 
subsectoral annual return from contributions and grants for each of the six years between 
1998 and 2003. The expected return on a revenue source at the subsector level is then the 
six-year average of the subsectoral annual return, and the risk is the standard deviation of 
the subsectoral annual return from the expected return. Table I-6 presents the expected 
return and risk characteristics of revenue sources for the sample of arts, culture, and 
humanities organizations. Fundraising for contributions and grants is the riskiest revenue-
generating activity (s=1.06), but it also comes with the largest expected return (r=9.05). 
Special events and activities are also comparatively high-risk and high-reward (r=0.93, 
s=0.05). In contrast, the returns from land, building, and equipment (LB&E) (r=0.032, 
s=0.005), and saving and temporary cash investments (r=0.053, s=0.012), and securities 
(r=0.047, s=0.031) are less riskier and less rewarding. Note the particular return and risk 
characteristics of securities due to the special time period observed. Consistent with the 
Dot Com Bubble Burst in the late 1990s and the following stock market crash, the return 
on securities was high from 1998 to 2000 and then took a downturn from 2001. The 
return on securities hit the bottom in the economic recession during 2002 and 2003. For 
this particular time period, the return on securities may appear to be more risky than that 
if observed during other periods. 
[Table I-5, I-6] 
 
Portfolio diversification is an attempt to find a number of revenue sources that 
march to the beat of different drummers so that the odds that all sources will go down at 
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the same time become small. The drummers, or the correlation coefficients of the returns 
on revenue sources, offer the key to a proper portfolio diversification. A correlation 
coefficient, on a scale of -1 to 1, indicates how likely the returns of two revenue sources 
move up and down together and to what degree their movements are driven by the same 
market force (Investopedia, n.d.). A correlation coefficient of 1 means perfect positive 
correlation, that is, the returns of two revenue sources move in the same direction with 
the same magnitude 100% of the time. The closer the correlation coefficient is to 1, the 
stronger the relationship between the returns of two revenue sources. On the other hand, a 
correlation coefficient of -1 means perfect negative correlation, that is, the returns of two 
revenue sources move in opposite directions with the same magnitude 100% of the time. 
A correlation coefficient of zero indicates that there is no relationship between the returns 
of two revenue sources, meaning that they are equally likely to move in the same 
direction as to move in opposite directions. The closer the correlation coefficient is to 0, 
the weaker the relationship between the two revenue sources.13 A well-diversified 
portfolio (or revenue mix) is composed of revenue sources with little or low correlations 
so that when the return from one source declines, there is a good chance that the returns 
from the others increase.   
For arts, culture, and humanities organizations, the returns from contributions and 
grants, interest, and securities are significantly highly correlated with each other, 
suggesting that the returns from these three revenue sources move up and down together 
most of the time (Table I-7). For example, the correlation coefficient of the returns from 
contributions and securities is 0.96, meaning that these two revenue sources, likely driven 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Experienced investors in general take correlation coefficients equal or less than 0.7 as 
reasonably good but above 0.8 are poor for portfolio diversification (Anke, 2010). 
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by the same market force, move in the same direction nearly all the time. When the return 
from contributions decreases, the return from securities follows in tandem. When the 
return from contributions increases, so does that from securities. If starting from a single-
source portfolio consisted of 100% contributions, adding securities is not likely to 
improve the portfolio by reducing the portfolio risk. In contrast, both rental properties 
and special events have generally low correlations with the other revenue sources 
(although not significant), so they may be used as risk-reducing sources in composing 
diversified portfolios. This is why simply adding as many revenue sources as possible, as 
HHI indicates, may not be productive in reducing portfolio risk but could drag down the 
return of the whole portfolio.   
[Table I-7] 
 
Given the expected return/risk characteristics of the returns on individual revenue 
sources, as well as the correlations between them, we can then find efficient portfolios 
and plot the efficient frontier. Efficient portfolios are those with the minimum portfolio 
risk for a given level of expected portfolio return or those with the maximum return for a 
given level of risk. Table I-8 shows a range of efficient portfolios with different return 
and risk combinations. Figure I-2 presents the efficient frontier, which is a collection of 
efficient portfolios. A nonprofit manager can use the efficient frontier to obtain an 
optimal portfolio for a certain level of risk or return. The lowest point of the efficient 
frontier is the minimum variance portfolio, which has the smallest portfolio risk and 
return (r=0.036, s=0.004). To achieve the minimum variance portfolio, an arts, culture, 
and humanities organization needs to put 79% of its total investment in rental properties 
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and 21% in savings and temporary cash investments. Note that the weight of a revenue 
source is the investment value of that source divided by the total portfolio value, not by 
total revenue from the portfolio. Seen from Figure I-2, as the expected portfolio return 
increases, so does the portfolio risk. The highest point of the efficient frontier is the 
maximum return portfolio, which has the largest expected return but also the greatest risk 
(r=9.049, s=1.063). To achieve the maximum return, an organization needs to invest 100% 
in fundraising activities for contributions and grants. Because special events have a 
decent level of return and a reasonably good correlation with contributions and grants, 
including special events can mitigate the high risk involved in pursuing only 
contributions and grants while achieving high levels of expected returns. A nonprofit 
manager who is very risk-averse would choose the portfolios at the lower end of the 
efficient frontier. Any portfolios below the frontier are feasible but sub-optimal because 
they are dominated by the portfolios on the frontier.  
[Table I-8 and Figure I-2 here] 
 
Education 
Nonprofit organizations in the education subsector are organizations like 
preschools, elementary and secondary schools, universities, research institutes, and so on. 
There are 19,326 observations (3212 organizations) in the subsample of education 
nonprofits. Table I-9 exhibits the summary statistics of annual returns from revenue 
sources at the organizational level. At the subsector level (Table I-10), contributions and 
grants are still the revenue source with the largest expected return and risk (r = 9.32, s = 
0.845), followed by special events (r = 1.133, s = 0.03). Rental properties, savings and 
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temporary cash investments, and securities are all low-risk and low-reward revenue 
sources. Among them, rental properties are the least risky revenue source (r = 0.041, s = 
0.003). Possibly due to the particularly volatile years for the U.S. stock market in this 
study, securities make a less desirable revenue source (r = 0.052, s = 0.035), because they 
have more volatility but smaller expected return than savings and temporary cash 
investments (r = 0.058, s = 0.014).  Comparing with the arts, culture, and humanities 
organizations, the expected returns from contributions and grants, special events, and 
rental properties for the education organizations are more rewarding and less risky. 
[Table I-9, I-10] 
 
Let us take a look at the correlation coefficients of the returns from each pair of 
revenue sources (Table I-11). Contributions and grants, rents, interest, and securities are 
all significantly highly correlated with each other, indicating that they tend to move up 
and down together most of the time. That is, the portfolio combinations with any of these 
four revenue sources would not necessarily be less risky than a single-source portfolio. 
Special events, in contrast, have negative or low correlations (not significant) with the 
other revenue sources and could be helpful in diversifying away portfolio risk.  
[Table I-11] 
Table I-12 lists the examples of efficient portfolios and Figure I-4 is the efficient 
frontier for the education subsector. The minimum variance portfolio consists of 100% 
investments in rental properties. Although rental properties approach risk-free, they do 
not offer a decent level of expected return. As the level of portfolio expected return 
increases, rental properties are dropped from the efficient portfolios. In contrast, 
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contributions and grants are highly risky but also highly rewarding. At the lower end of 
the efficient frontier, where the portfolios have low levels of expected return and risk, 
contributions and grants do not make a significant component of the portfolios due to 
their high risk. As the portfolio return increases, the proportion of the investments for 
contributions and grants also increases. At the higher end of the efficient frontier, 
contributions and grants become a major revenue source of the high-reward portfolios. 
The maximum return portfolio is a single-source portfolio with 100% investments for 
contributions and grants. Consistent with the correlation coefficients discussed above, 
securities are not used to compose any efficient portfolios. On the other hand, special 
events can be used to form efficient portfolios in most cases for its negative or low 
correlations with the other revenue sources.  
[Table I-12, Figure I-4] 
 
Health 
As an important component of the U.S. nonprofit sector, the health subsector 
includes a diversity of nonprofit organizations, such as hospitals, nursing homes, 
counseling organizations, voluntary health associations, medical research centers, and so 
forth. There are 3,872 health nonprofits (23,232 observations), accounting for 17 percent 
of the nonprofit organizations in the sample. The annual returns from revenue sources at 
the organizational and subsector level are reported in Table I-13 and 14, respectively. 
Once again, contributions and grants are the revenue source with the largest expected 
return and risk (r=11.437, s=0.474), followed by special events and activities (r=1.389, 
s=0.042). Rental properties, savings and temporary cash investments, and securities are 
	  	   69 
all comparatively low-risk and low-reward sources. Rental properties have the smallest 
risk and expected return (r=0.015, s=0.007) among the five revenue sources. Securities 
(r=0.049, s=0.031) appear to be less appealing than savings and temporary cash 
investments (r=0.052, s=0.014) because the latter offers greater expected return for 
smaller risk. Comparing with the arts and education subsectors, contributions and special 
events in the health subsector have even larger expected return but much smaller risk.  
[Table I-13, I-14] 
 
Shown in the correlation coefficients table (Table I-15), contributions and grants, 
savings and temporary cash investments, and securities are significantly and highly 
correlated with each other. It suggests that the portfolios with these any combinations of 
three sources are not well diversified because they tend to fall down together. On the 
other hand, rental properties and special events have negative or reasonably good 
correlations with all the other sources, suggesting that these two revenue sources are good 
candidates for portfolio diversification. 
[Table I-15] 
 
Table16 presents the examples of efficient portfolios and Figure I-6 is the 
efficient frontier for the health subsector. The minimum variance portfolio, with a 
portfolio risk of only 0.003 and an expected return of 0.027, consists of 67% investments 
in rental properties and 33% in savings and temporary cash investments. Once again, as 
the expected portfolio return increases, so does the proportion of investments for 
contributions and grants in the portfolio. The maximum return portfolio, which has an 
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expected return of 11.437 and risk of 0.474, consists of 100% investments for 
contributions and grants. Due to its decent expected return and nice correlations with 
other revenue sources, special events are included in most of the efficient portfolios 
except for the minimum variance and maximum return portfolios. In contrast, securities 
are not used in forming any of the efficient portfolios. Comparing with the arts and 
education organizations, health organizations face much lower risk at high levels of 
expected return. 
[Table I-16, Figure I-6] 
Human Services 
Nonprofit human service agencies comprise a central piece of the U.S. nonprofit 
sector and encompass a broad range of organizations and programs designed to enhance 
the wellbeing of individuals, families, and the community as a whole, such as food 
pantries, soup kitchens, shelters for homeless, job training centers, crime prevention 
organizations, disaster preparedness and relief services organizations. Well-known 
nonprofits like American Red Cross, United Way, and Salvation Army are all human 
service organizations. This subsector has the largest number of organizations. There are 
8,443 human service organizations (50,658 observations), which account for 37% of the 
nonprofits in our sample. The subsample of human service organizations nonetheless has 
the smallest size in terms of their six-year average total revenue ($3.86M), total expenses 
($3.66M), and total assets ($5.34M) (Table I-3).  
Shown in Table I-18, similar to the other subsectors, contributions and grants for 
the human service organizations are the most rewarding and risky revenue source 
(r=16.018, s=1.179), followed by special events (r=1.507, s=0.032). In fact, the expected 
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returns and risks of contributions and special events are larger than those in the other 
subsectors. Once again, rental properties, savings and temporary cash investments, and 
securities have comparatively smaller return and risk. Rental properties are still the least 
risky revenue source that offers the smallest expected return (r=0.026, s=0.003). 
Securities (r=0.043, s=0.025) are unattractive comparing with savings and temporary 
cash investments (r=0.057, s=0.015), because securities have larger risk for smaller 
expected return. 
[Table I-17, I-18] 
 
The correlation coefficients of the returns between contributions, savings and 
temporary cash investments, and securities are significantly high and positive, indicating 
they are driven by similar market forces and tend to move in tandem (Table I-19). On the 
other hand, rental properties and special events have low or negative correlations with the 
other revenue sources, which make them helpful for portfolio diversification.  
[Table I-19] 
 
Table I-20 presents a range of efficient portfolios and Figure I-8 is the efficient 
frontier for human service nonprofits. As rental properties possess little volatility, they 
are used to construct the efficient portfolios at the lower end of the efficient frontier. The 
minimum variance portfolio is consisted of 98% of investments in rental properties and 2% 
in special events. Similarly, because investments in contributions and grants can offer 
large expected return, their weight in an efficient portfolio increases as the level of 
portfolio return increases. The maximum return portfolio is the one consisted of full 
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investment in contributions and grants.  Special events are used for diversifying away the 
portfolio risk in most cases while securities are not used to form any efficient portfolios.  
[Table I-20, Figure I-8] 
 
The whole sample  
We have seen similar patterns from the results by subsector. Finally, let us 
examine the revenue sources regardless the types of organizations. In the whole sample, 
there are 22,612 organizations and 135, 672 observations in total. These nonprofit 
organizations on average have 34.8 million dollars in the six-year average total assets 
(Table I-3). Similar to what we have found so far, the revenue source with the largest 
expected return and risk is still contributions and grants (r=12.356, s=0.925). The second 
place is special events and activities, with an expected return of 1.264 and a risk of 0.021. 
Rental properties, savings and temporary cash investments, and securities are all in the 
low-risk and low-reward category. Rental properties are nearly risk-free but they also 
come with the smallest expected return (r=0.028, s=0.001). Comparing with cash 
investments (r=0.054, s=0.014), securities (r=0.047, s=0.030) do not offer a decent level 
of return given the associated risk (Table I-22).  
[Table I-21, I-22] 
 
The correlation coefficients of the returns from contributions and grants, savings 
and cash investments, and securities are significantly high, meaning that these revenue 
sources can offer little buffer to each other if included in one portfolio (Table I-23). In 
contrast, both rental properties and special events have reasonably good correlations with 
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the other revenue sources (not significant). Depending on the desired level of expected 
portfolio return, both of them may be included to reduce portfolio risk. Table I-24 
includes a list of efficient portfolios, which give the minimum portfolio risk for each 
level of expected portfolio return. Figure I-6 is the efficient frontier for the whole sample 
of nonprofit organizations. The minimum variance portfolio is dominated by investments 
in rental properties, with only 2% in interest for savings and temporary cash investments. 
As the portfolio return improves, the proportion of investments in rental properties 
decreases while that in contributions and grants increases. The maximum return portfolio 
is the one composed of 100% investment in contributions and grants, which has a 
portfolio return of 12.36 and a risk of 0.93. Special events are used to diversify portfolios 
in most cases while securities are not used to form any efficient portfolios. The patterns 
are similar to those seen in each subsector. 14 
[Table I-23, I-24, Figure I-10] 
 
Discussion 
HHI Versus MPT 
Can we use HHI as a simple and convenient approximate to the theoretically 
preferred MPT risk? Or is HHI too simple to be useful? The results discussed above have 
shown how correlation coefficients between two revenue sources play an important role 
in revenue diversification. While the HHI approach suggests that revenue diversification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In the section on data cleaning, I have described the exclusion criteria for extreme 
values of the returns on revenue sources. As a robustness check, I also relaxed the criteria 
and only exclude the organizations with any organizational annual return from 
contributions and grants larger than 100. The alternative method does not lead to 
drastically different results. Tables 25 to 27 showcase the results of the whole sample 
using the alternative exclusion method.  
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is the increase in the number of revenue sources in a portfolio, the MPT approach tells us 
it is not always the case. To compare these two approaches, I also compute the 
corresponding HHI for efficient portfolios.15 It shows that HHI is not a monotone 
function of portfolio risk in some ranges; an increase in diversification by one measure 
corresponds to a decrease in diversification by another.  
Figure I-3 shows the HHI and the MPT risk of efficient portfolios for the 
subsample of arts, culture, and humanities nonprofits. There seems to be a monotonic 
relationship between HHI and MPT risk for efficient portfolios with a portfolio risk 
above 0.2. However, for efficient portfolios with a risk level below 0.2, HHI is not a 
reliable predictor of the portfolio risk. For example, the portfolio with a risk as low as 
0.04 has an HHI as high as 0.81 (Portfolio 5, Table I-8). Explained by the HHI approach, 
the portfolio is risky because it is heavily concentrated on the revenue from special events. 
From the perspective of MPT, given the level of the expected return, the portfolio is 
diversified by including three revenue sources that have low correlations with each other. 
Overall, HHI is not consistent in predicting the MPT risk of efficient portfolios. For a 
certain level of HHI, there could be more than one corresponding level of portfolio risk. 
For example, the HHI of 0.8 is associated with three risk levels from low to high (0.04, 
0.07, and 0.67). This proves that revenue diversification is more complicated than 
counting the number and evenness of revenue sources in a portfolio. Additionally, for the 
portfolio risk ranging from 0 to 1.063, HHI is between 0.41 and 1 on a 0 to 1 scale. Note 
that although HHI and MPT risk have a similar range of values, they are not comparable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Note that the portfolio weight of each revenue source using the MPT approach is the 
proportion of the investments/expenses of obtaining revenue from that source rather than 
the revenue from that source. The corresponding HHI is based on the shares of revenue 
from individual revenue sources and the total revenue from the portfolio combination. 
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in cardinality. HHI takes ordinal values from 0 to 1, while MPT risk is cardinal and can 
take any values.  
Figure I-2 also shows the relationship between HHI and the expected return of 
efficient portfolios. For efficient portfolios with an expected return below about 2, the 
level of HHI fluctuates as the level of return increases. There appears to be a consistent 
trade-off relationship between HHI and expected return for efficient portfolios with 
higher levels of expected return, but a nonprofit manager will always end up with sub-
optimal portfolios if using HHI in the place of MPT risk to make portfolio selections.  
[Figure I-3 here] 
 
Similar patterns hold for nonprofits providing education (Figure I-5), health care 
(Figure I-7), human services (Figure I-9), as well as for the whole sample (Figure I-11). 
Despite the seemingly positive linear relationship between HHI and MPT risk for 
efficient portfolios with higher levels of risk, HHI does not reliably or consistently 
approximate the MPT risk at lower levels. A certain level of HHI may correspond to 
more than one level of MPT risk. The non-monotonic relationship signifies that revenue 
concentration is not always associated with high portfolio risk. The lower levels of HHI 
do not appear in this chart because they are not feasible or inefficient portfolios.    
[Figure I-5, I-7, I-9, I-11 here] 
 
Figure I-4, I-6, I-8, and I-10 shows a similar pattern of the relationship between 
the HHI and the expected return of efficient portfolios for education, health, human 
services nonprofits, and for the whole sample. For the efficient portfolios with 
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comparatively lower levels of expected return, the level of HHI sways between moderate 
to high as the level of return increases. For the efficient portfolios with higher levels of 
expected return, the level of HHI increases as the expected return on efficient portfolios 
rises. However, if replacing the MPT risk with HHI as a tool for portfolio selection, a 
nonprofit manager will always obtain inefficient portfolios that are dominated by the 
efficient portfolios on the efficient frontier. 
Most previous studies suggest that HHI and nonprofit financial risk are 
significantly negatively correlated, that is, a higher level of revenue concentration 
predicts a higher level of financial vulnerability and volatility. In contrast, my finding 
from all the subsectors and the whole sample indicate that low-risk efficient portfolios 
can be achieved by revenue concentration. The HHI approach uses the number and shares 
of revenue sources in a portfolio to predict risk, missing the co-movement of revenue 
sources that is essential in the MPT analysis. Therefore, revenue concentration, as 
indicated by a high HHI, does not always lead to a high portfolio risk. Using the approach 
HHI as a tool to approximate risk in portfolio selections, a nonprofit manager would 
always obtain sub-optimal portfolios, that is, falsely assuming more “risk” for a given 
level of expected return. This would presumably lead to overly risk-averse behavior 
among nonprofits.  
 
Beyond Portfolio Optimization 
Modern portfolio theory greatly simplifies portfolio selection as an objective 
maximization problem. In addition to the expected return and risk of a portfolio, there are 
nonetheless several additional choice constraints that are unique to nonprofit 
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organizations in deciding a revenue mix. The first constraint is the organizational 
heterogeneity in the availability of funding streams. A revenue source could be more 
readily available to some organizations than to others. For example, membership income 
is only available to membership organizations. The income from the sales of a particular 
good may not be available if the nature of the good is not sufficiently private or mission-
congruent. A non-excludable good cannot be charged therefore no fee income can be 
derived from selling it. Generally speaking, private payments for services and goods are 
primary revenue sources for education and health organizations, accounting for over half 
of their total revenue. While private contributions constitute a significant portion of the 
total revenue for arts and culture organizations, government funding flows more into 
human service and health care organizations. Investment income, on the other hand, only 
constitutes a small fraction of the total revenue for nonprofits (Roeger, et al., 2012).  
The second is the constituency constraint, which comes from the differing 
preferences of various types of stakeholders in the decisionmaking process of portfolio 
selections. This constraint is minimal in a pure for-profit setting as there is a less 
ambiguous goal common to shareholders—to increase the current stock value. In the 
nonprofit sector, however, various stakeholders—donors, funders, customers, 
beneficiaries—have different utility functions in evaluating the attributes of revenue 
sources, such as their mission appropriateness, income significance, financial risk, 
opportunity costs, impact on organizational autonomy, and so on (Kearns, 2007). This is 
not contradictory with the MPT approach. In fact, a nonprofit manager can incorporate 
the preferences of different stakeholders into the organization’s risk attitude or expected 
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service provisions, given which the nonprofit manager can find the optimal portfolio that 
either maximizes the return or minimize the risk.  
The third is the regulatory constraint. Different revenue activities may reflect 
differently on an organization’s nonprofit status and mission purpose. In the U.S., 
nonprofits are governed by both state and federal laws. The state laws vary at the state 
and local levels, meaning some portfolios may endanger the tax-exempt status of a 
nonprofit. In addition, there has been an overall growth in fees for service, sales of goods, 
investment income, and other types of commercial revenue in the past decades. 
Regardless, the nonprofit sector is increasingly confronting a crisis in their nonprofit 
identity, as it becomes more difficult to distinguish themselves from their for-profit 
counterparts (Salamon, 2012). In the case that private fees for a service are highly 
rewarding, it is still not appropriate for a nonprofit to make 100% investment in sales of 
the service due to its nonprofit status. In fact, because nonprofits are exempt from 
corporate income tax, there have been concerns about the “unfair” competition between 
for-profits and nonprofits that rely heavily on commercial income (Weisbrod, 1998). In 
the case that a nonprofit suffers from negative returns from a mission-fulfilling program 
service, the organization could not withdraw from providing the service due to its mission 
constraint. Rather, the nonprofit should maximize the return from other revenue sources 
and use the income to cross-subsidize its mission-related programs (James, 1983). In a 
for-profit setting, there are little reasons for investors to pursue an investment with 
negative returns. This is also a reason that I left out the program service revenue from the 
portfolio analysis.  
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Applying MPT to Nonprofit Finance: Caveats, Challenges and Future Research 
Criticisms of MPT in Corporate Finance 
Despite the theoretical and practical importance of MPT, we need to be aware of 
the criticisms of MPT in corporate finance as well as the additional complications when 
applying MPT to nonprofit finance. As a mathematical approximation based on a series 
of assumptions, MPT has been criticized for not being able to really model the market. 
For example, MPT assumes that returns on assets are normally distributed, while some 
empirical evidence shows that markets more than often experience large swings, which 
are 3 to 6 standard deviations from the mean (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004). Unlike what 
MPT assumes, correlations between asset returns are not fixed over time. In fact, many 
investments tend to become more positively correlated and move downward together 
during financial crisis (Fustey, 2011). Some studies also provide counterexamples to the 
tradeoff between risk and return (Murphy, 1977). Moreover, MPT has been criticized for 
relying on historical data to predict future market performance. These criticisms are 
relevant in a nonprofit setting. Due to data availability, the current study examined a 
particular time period for the U.S. stock market and economy. The results show that 
securities are not a desirable revenue source for nonprofit revenue mix optimization. 
However, it would be interesting to examine the same revenue sources in other time 
periods and test if their return and risk characteristics vary over time. It would also allow 
us to determine with more confidence to what degree the nonprofit historical data can 
predict future performance.  
MPT has also received criticisms from behavioral finance. MPT assumes 
investors are always rational, risk-averse, and seek to maximize their economic utility 
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without any other considerations (e.g., emotions). It also assumes investors always have 
accurate projections of returns, and are interested in solving the mean-variance 
optimization problem. However, behavioral finance has refuted these assumptions. 
Instead of rational calculations, plenty of studies find that people often use heuristics 
(rules of thumb) when making decisions under uncertainty, which can cause cognitive 
biases and market inefficiency (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 1974; Thaler, 1992; 
1999). In fact, investors may act overconfidently (e.g., Odean, 1998; 1999), underreact or 
overreact to new market information (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998). Similarly, rather than being always risk averse, 
prospect theory suggests that people’s attitudes toward risks may vary, depending on how 
a problem is framed. Specifically, people tend to be risk-averse facing choices concerning 
gains but risk-seeking facing choices involving losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In 
general, behavioral finance describes how decisions under uncertainty are actually made. 
On the other hand, MPT is a normative theory about how decisions under uncertainty 
should be made. For this reason, MPT is still a valuable theoretical approach. 
 
Challenges of MPT in Nonprofit Finance 
There are differences between corporate and nonprofit finance and therefore 
additional complications when applying a corporate finance concept to nonprofit finance. 
First of all, when different for-profits purchase an asset from the market, they face the 
same expected return and risk properties associated with that asset. However, when 
different nonprofits pursuing a revenue source, such as donations from individuals, the 
return on the source is determined by both the “asset-specific” factors common to all 
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organizations in a subsector and the “investor-specific” factors that are unique to an 
organization’s characteristics in generating the revenue (e.g. the donor pool unique to an 
organization). To illustrate, suppose the Art Institute of Chicago and Indianapolis 
Museum of Art both conduct the same fundraising activities to obtain member donations 
every year. Over time, they may observe different expected return and risk of member 
donations due to their different member pools.  
Conceptually, the risk of a nonprofit revenue source has three components 
(Greenlee & Tuckman, 2007). In addition to the organization-specific risk that I have 
discussed above, nonprofits also face a market risk that affects all nonprofits (e.g., 
economic recessions, changes in tax laws) and an industry risk that affects nonprofits in a 
particular subsector (e.g., the industry-specific supply and demand for services or 
government regulations). In this paper, I examined the correlations between the returns of 
individual revenue sources for a specific time period without exploring the affecting 
factors behind them. For example, what are the forces driving the co-movement of the 
returns of contributions and securities? Do internal forces account for a bigger role in the 
observed patterns of correlations than external forces? It would be meaningful for future 
studies to decompose the three types of risk, examine what drives the movement of 
returns, and how diversification influences each of the risk components.  
Second, while MPT assumes linear rates of return on investments, nonprofits face 
a changing marginal rate of return on fundraising, which may vary across different 
nonprofits or different life stages of a nonprofit (Steinberg, 1986; Tinkelman, 2006). This 
paper uses average return on fundraising, assuming that nonprofit organizations generally 
realize the return on fundraising within a year and the marginal rate of return is constant 
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for the years observed. Future studies on nonprofit portfolio analysis need to model the 
non-linear rate of return on fundraising.  
Third, the Form 990 data provide a basis for this study to compare the results with 
previous research. However, the data have many limitations. In the analysis of corporate 
finance, each day represents a data point. In the digitized data, there are only six years’ 
data points, which may not be sufficient for observing the expected return and risk 
properties of nonprofit revenue sources. More data points would also allow us to observe 
if the correlations between revenue sources change over time. In addition, there are only 
five revenue sources with complete information for analysis in this dataset. In reality, 
nonprofit revenue sources are more granulated. My results show that the risk of 
contributions and grants varies by different subsectors, which may be due to the different 
compositions. For example, contributions include those directly from the general public, 
those from members or loyal donors, those from United Way and other federated 
campaigns, grants from foundations, or in-kind donations from corporates, among others. 
Even government grants can come from different levels of government. Third, the sample 
used in this study is abnormal in terms of the size of organizations. For the results to be 
more practically meaningful, future studies should examine the expected return and risk 
properties of more granulated revenue sources, possibly using a different dataset.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper applies modern portfolio theory to nonprofit revenue management and 
challenges the predominant use of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in studying revenue 
diversification. HHI indicates that revenue diversification is achieved by increasing the 
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number of revenue sources and/or the equality of the shares of revenue in total revenue. 
Contrary to HHI, MPT suggests that a portfolio (i.e. revenue mix) with 100 revenue 
sources, which however move in the same direction, is not less risky than a portfolio with 
only one source. In fact, according to MPT, a well-diversified portfolio is a combination 
of assets whose returns do not move together all the time, that is, do not put all your eggs 
in one basket. Just like an investor in the for-profit world, the objective of a nonprofit 
manager is to deliberately choose a portfolio of revenue sources that can minimize the 
risk of the portfolio for a given level of expected return (program services), or maximize 
the expected return for a given level of risk. The expected return of a portfolio is 
computed as the weighted average of the expected returns on individual revenue sources 
which comprise the portfolio. The weights are the proportion of the investment/expenses 
of individual revenue sources in total portfolio value. The risk (standard deviation) of a 
portfolio depends on not only the variances of individual revenue sources in the portfolio 
but also how the returns on the revenue sources vary together (covariance). 
By analyzing the NCCS-GuideStar Digitized Data from 1998 to 2003, this paper 
demonstrates how to find an optimal portfolio for a nonprofit using the MPT approach. 
Due to the data limitations, the results on the properties of the five revenue sources are 
more theoretically than practically suggestive. By subsector of nonprofits and in the 
whole sample, I analyzed five revenue sources—contributions and grants; land, buildings, 
and equipment for investment (rental properties); saving and temporary cash investments; 
securities; and sales from special events. The results vary by subsectors but similar 
patterns hold for all. Overall, among the five revenue sources, contributions and grants 
are the revenue source with the highest expected return and risk, followed by sales from 
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special events. The other three revenue sources are comparatively less rewarding and less 
risky. Note that securities generally do not have a desirable return and risk package. It 
may be largely due to the observed time period (1998-2033) that covers the Dot Com 
Bubble Burst in the late 1990s and the economic recession in the early 2000s during 
which the U.S. stock market and economy experienced unusual ups and downs. In 
general, special events and rental properties have low correlations with contributions and 
grants (but insignificant) and therefore could be helpful in portfolio diversification and in 
mitigating some of the high risk associated with contributions and grants. In contrast, 
saving and temporary cash investments, securities, and contributions and grants present 
significant and high correlations with each other across subsectors, meaning that they 
tend to move together and may not be good candidates for revenue diversification. For 
the four subsectors—arts, culture, and humanities; education; health; and human 
services—and the whole sample, I also identified the efficient frontier, which is a 
collection of efficient portfolios.  
More importantly, I compared the HHI with the MPT risk of efficient portfolios 
and find a non-monotonic relationship between the two. For a certain level of HHI, there 
could be more than two corresponding levels of portfolio risk. For very low levels of 
portfolio risk, HHI can be as high as 1. It suggests that revenue concentration, as 
indicated by HHI, may not always cause high portfolio risk. In general, the efficient 
portfolios in my analysis have HHI ranging from around 0.5 to 1, which indicates the 
efficient portfolios are concentrated. On the other hand, the portfolios with lower levels 
of HHI, although more “diversified,” are not efficient portfolios. If using HHI to 
approximate risk and to guide portfolio selections, nonprofits will always end up 
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choosing sub-optimal portfolios, that is, assuming greater risk for a certain level of return. 
The findings cast cautions to future studies using HHI as a measure for revenue 
diversification to predict nonprofit financial health.  
This paper is among the first to properly apply modern portfolio theory to 
nonprofit revenue management. It addresses two common misbeliefs in previous 
literature. First, portfolio analysis is based on net return rather than the change in gross 
revenue; second, revenue diversification involves evaluating the covariances of revenue 
sources rather than naively adding more revenue sources to a portfolio of revenue 
combination. My findings pose a challenge to the predominant approach in previous 
studies and suggest that HHI is unreliable in guiding revenue mix selections. I propose 
that MPT can be theoretically and practically more helpful in guiding nonprofit revenue 
management as it offers a more sophisticated guidance to what is the optimal revenue 




	  	   86 
Table I-1. Data Cleaning 
 
Original sample size 
 
1,388,480 
Less: private foundations 
 
14,645 
Less: organizations filing 990-EZ 
 
282,032 
Less: group returns 
 
2,880 
Less: organizations not reporting on the accrual basis  
 
435,748 
Less: organizations with reporting errors in revenue items1 2,240 
Less: organizations with reporting errors in expenses2 
 
 337,416  
Less: organizations with negative or 0 assets 
 
6,715 
Less: organizations with unknown NTEE code 
 
 686  
Less: organizations reporting 0 or negative functional expenses   1,279  
Less: organizations with missing years  
 
 169,167  





1. Organizations reporting negative gross revenue items  
 2. Organizations reporting negative expenses, 0 program services or management or total 
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Table I-2. Summary Statistics: Original Sample vs. Cleaned Sample  
 
Original Sample 
 Total Revenue ($) Total Expenses ($) Ending Total Assets ($) 
Mean 3,587,624 14,100,000 7,442,082 
SD 50,200,000 12,700,000,000 943,000,000 
Median 175,203 155,416 194,050 
Min (348,000,000) (147,000,000) (34,700,000) 
Max 20,000,000,000 14,900,000,000,000 798,000,000,000 
N 1,388,480 1,388,480 1,388,480 
 
Cleaned Sample 
 Total Revenue ($) Total Expenses ($) Ending Total Assets ($) 
Mean 9,675,159 8,662,796 34,800,000 
SD 73,300,000 61,300,000 3,230,000,000 
Median 1,222,203 1,116,984 1,636,269 
Min (356,000,000) 849 60 
Max 6,380,000,000 3,620,000,000 882,000,000,000 
N 135,672 135,672 135,672 
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Table I-3. Cleaning Organizational Annual Returns on Revenue Sources in 
Subsectors and Whole Sample 
Arts, Culture, Humanities  
Org Annual Returns Missing >= 3 IQR * > 100% or <100% # of Obs # of Orgs 
Contributions 449 1214 N/A 12096 2016 
Rents 13882 N/A 102 660 110 
Interest 4036 N/A 204 9282 1547 
Securities 9042 N/A 129 4734 789 
Special events 8872 257 N/A 4422 737 
 
* The 3IQR thresholds for contributions range from 45.47 to 67.10, depending on year.  
* The 3IQR thresholds for special events range from 6.71 to 7.56, depending on year.  
      
      
Education 
     Org Annual Return Missing >= 3 IQR* > 100% or <100% # of Obs # of Orgs 
Contributions 2482 1379 N/A 13410 2235 
Program services 909 50 N/A 18402 3007 
Rents 15714 N/A 165 2010 335 
Interest 4451 N/A 385 11850 1975 
Securities 7432 N/A 148 9822 1637 
Special events 13713 184 N/A 3552 592 
 
* The 3IQR thresholds for contributions range from 54.58 to 70.09, depending on year.  
* The 3IQR thresholds for special events range from 7.23 to 8.22, depending on year.  
      
      
Health 
     Org Annual Return Missing >= 3 IQR* > 100% or <100% # of Obs # of Orgs 
Contributions 5198 1488 N/A 14478 2413 
Program services 1084 95 N/A 21570 3595 
Rents 20644 N/A 106 1002 167 
Interest 6714 N/A 351 12768 2128 
Securities 13035 N/A 175 7338 1223 
Special events 14661 320 N/A 5772 962 
 
* The 3IQR thresholds for contributions range from 72.94 to 82.77, depending on year.  
* The 3IQR thresholds for special events range from 8.07 to 10.37, depending on year.  
      
      
Human Services 
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Org Annual Return Missing >= 3 IQR > 100% or <100% # of Obs # of Orgs 
Contributions 10795 3472 N/A 32040 5340 
Program services 564 187 N/A 49476 8246 
Rents 44849 N/A 150 2316 386 
Interest 13741 N/A 982 28926 4821 
Securities 32760 N/A 326 12090 2015 
Special events 33738 610 N/A 10836 1806 
 
* The 3IQR thresholds for contributions range from 106.94 to 132.02, depending on year.  
* The 3IQR thresholds for special events range from 8.77 to 9.65, depending on year.  
      
      
Whole Sample 
     Org Annual Return Missing >= 3 IQR > 100% or <100% # of Obs # of Orgs 
Contributions 21554 9729 N/A 91,416 15236 
Program services 4457 452 N/A 128,772 21462 
Rents 118446 N/A 539 7,296 1216 
Interest 35132 N/A 2,283 79,092 13182 
Securities 77011 N/A 1,037 42,450 7075 
Special events 90670 1653 N/A 28572 4762 
 
* The 3IQR thresholds for contributions range from 75.14 to 94.63, depending on year.  
* The 3IQR thresholds for special events range from 8.06 to 9.08, depending on year.  
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Table I-4. Summary Statistics by Subsector and Whole Sample, 1998-2003 
 
Arts, Culture, Humanities N Mean S.D. Median 
Average Total Revenue  15,822 4,350,877 17,400,000 1,021,878 
Average Total Expenses 15,822 3,684,991 15,200,000 895,344 
Average Total Assets 15,822 12,300,000 64,300,000 1,387,160 
Age in 2003 2,604 29 16 25 
     
Education N Mean S.D. Median 
Average Total Revenue 19,326 24,800,000 147,000,000 3,179,512 
Average Total Expenses 19,326 20,400,000 111,000,000 2,722,543 
Average Total Assets 19,326 85,800,000 755,000,000 5,574,859 
Age in 2003 3,176 34 19 32 
     
Health N Mean S.D. Median 
Average Total Revenue 23,232 18,100,000 90,600,000 1,721,309 
Average Total Expenses 23,232 17,500,000 87,400,000 1,588,720 
Average Total Assets 23,232 98,200,000 4,490,000,000 2,007,518 
Age in 2003 3,809 26 16 22 
     
Human Services N Mean S.D. Median 
Average Total Revenue 50,658 3,858,229 33,400,000 1,059,563 
Average Total Expenses 50,658 3,661,055 32,400,000 977,417 
Average Total Assets 50,658 5,340,762 39,400,000 1,403,512 
Age in 2003 8,323 27 16 23 
     
All N Mean S.D. Median 
Average Total Revenue 135,672 9,675,159 71,400,000 1,276,505 
Average Total Expenses 135,672 8,662,796 60,300,000 1,143,135 
Average Total Assets 135,672 34,800,000 1,880,000,000 1,692,544 
Age in 2003 22,302 28 17 24 
 
Notes:  
1. All dollar values are inflation-adjusted to 2003 dollars. 
2. Average total revenue is an organization’s six-year average total revenue.  
3. Average total expenses are an organization’s six-year average total expenses. 
4. Average total assets are an organization’s six-year average end-of-year total assets. 
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Table I-5.	  Summary Statistics of Organizational Annual Returns on Revenue 
Sources, Arts, Culture, and Humanities, 1998-2003 
 





Grants 9.049 9.018 6.282 -1.000 66.981 12096 2016 
Rents 0.032 0.088 0.000 -0.122 0.785 660 110 
Interest 0.053 0.092 0.030 0.000 0.970 9282 1547 
Securities 0.047 0.090 0.035 -0.868 0.838 4734 789 
Special events 0.932 1.217 0.667 -1.000 7.481 4422 737 
 
 
Table I-6.	  Subsector Annual Returns on Revenue Sources, Arts, Culture, and 
Humanities, 1998-2003 	  
Fiscal Year Contributions 
& Grants 
Rents Interest Securities Special events 
1998 10.433 0.033 0.062 0.080 1.005 
1999 9.893 0.030 0.056 0.066 0.986 
2000 9.430 0.030 0.063 0.071 0.896 
2001 8.756 0.029 0.061 0.042 0.883 
2002 8.118 0.027 0.039 0.011 0.898 
2003 7.662 0.041 0.036 0.010 0.927 
Expected Return 9.049 0.032 0.053 0.047 0.932 
Risk 1.063 0.005 0.012 0.031 0.051 
 
 
Table I-7. Correlation Coefficients of Returns on Revenue Sources, Arts, Culture, 
and Humanities 	  
 Contributions 
& Grants 
Rents Interest Securities Special Events 
Contributions 
& Grants 1.0000 -0.2694 0.8209
** 0.9626*** 0.6832 
Rents -0.2694 1.0000 -0.3981 -0.2257 0.2789 
Interest 0.8209** -0.3981 1.0000 0.9012** 0.2037 
Securities 0.9626*** -0.2257 0.9012** 1.0000 0.5346 
Special Events 0.6832 0.2789 0.2037 0.5346 1.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level. 
  
	  	   92 
Table I-8. Efficient Portfolios, Arts, Culture, and Humanities: Expected Return, 














0.036 0.004 0% 79% 21% 0% 0% 0.67 
0.220 0.012 0% 63% 17% 0% 21% 0.41 
0.404 0.022 0% 47% 12% 0% 41% 0.44 
0.588 0.032 0% 30% 8% 0% 62% 0.60 
0.772 0.042 0% 14% 3% 0% 82% 0.81 
0.956 0.053 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.97 
1.140 0.071 3% 0% 0% 0% 97% 0.79 
1.324 0.092 5% 0% 0% 0% 95% 0.67 
1.508 0.113 7% 0% 0% 0% 93% 0.59 
1.692 0.135 9% 0% 0% 0% 91% 0.55 
1.875 0.158 12% 0% 0% 0% 88% 0.52 
2.059 0.181 14% 0% 0% 0% 86% 0.50 
2.243 0.203 16% 0% 0% 0% 84% 0.50 
2.427 0.226 18% 0% 0% 0% 82% 0.50 
2.611 0.249 21% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0.51 
5.370 0.597 55% 0% 0% 0% 45% 0.76 
5.554 0.620 57% 0% 0% 0% 43% 0.78 
5.738 0.644 59% 0% 0% 0% 41% 0.79 
5.922 0.667 61% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0.81 
6.106 0.690 64% 0% 0% 0% 36% 0.82 
6.290 0.714 66% 0% 0% 0% 34% 0.84 
6.474 0.737 68% 0% 0% 0% 32% 0.85 
6.658 0.760 71% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0.86 
6.842 0.783 73% 0% 0% 0% 27% 0.87 
7.025 0.807 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0.89 
7.209 0.830 77% 0% 0% 0% 23% 0.90 
7.393 0.853 80% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0.91 
7.577 0.877 82% 0% 0% 0% 18% 0.92 
7.761 0.900 84% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0.93 
7.945 0.923 86% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0.94 
8.129 0.946 89% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0.95 
8.313 0.970 91% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0.96 
8.497 0.993 93% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0.97 
8.681 1.016 95% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0.98 
8.865 1.040 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0.99 
9.049 1.063 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
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Table I-9. Summary Statistics of Organizational Annual Returns on Revenue 
Sources, Education, 1998-2003 	  





Grants 9.320 10.040 5.989 -1.000 69.980 13410 2235 
Rents 0.041 0.120 0.000 -0.634 0.968 2010 335 
Interest 0.058 0.101 0.031 -0.164 0.998 11850 1975 
Securities 0.052 0.082 0.039 -0.676 0.941 9822 1637 
Special events 1.133 1.345 0.864 -1.455 7.867 3552 592 
 
 
Table I-10. Subsector Annual Returns on Revenue Sources, Education, 1998-2003 	  
Fiscal Year Contributions & Grants Rents Interest Securities Special events 
1998 10.212 0.045 0.071 0.089 1.149 
1999 9.863 0.045 0.064 0.073 1.149 
2000 9.911 0.041 0.066 0.078 1.104 
2001 9.322 0.040 0.068 0.052 1.089 
2002 8.485 0.040 0.044 0.012 1.149 
2003 8.125 0.038 0.036 0.008 1.162 
Expected Return  9.320 0.041 0.058 0.052 1.133 




Table I-11. Correlation Coefficients of Returns on Revenue Sources, Education 	  
 Contributions 
& Grants 




1.0000 0.8445** 0.9466*** 0.9951*** -0.3442 
Rents 0.8445** 1.0000 0.7196 0.8157** 0.1327 
Interest 0.9466*** 0.7196 1.0000 0.9386*** -0.5647 
Securities 0.9951*** 0.8157** 0.9386*** 1.0000 -0.3501 
Special Events -0.3442 0.1327 -0.5647 -0.3501 1.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
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Table I-12. Efficient Portfolios, Education: Expected Return, Risk, Weights, and 
HHI 









0.041 0.003 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
0.231 0.006 0% 65% 18% 0% 17% 0.42 
0.420 0.009 0% 17% 49% 0% 34% 0.41 
0.609 0.013 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 0.54 
0.799 0.017 1% 0% 36% 0% 63% 0.61 
0.988 0.021 1% 0% 23% 0% 76% 0.69 
1.177 0.025 2% 0% 9% 0% 89% 0.78 
1.367 0.031 3% 0% 0% 0% 97% 0.78 
1.556 0.043 5% 0% 0% 0% 95% 0.67 
1.745 0.060 7% 0% 0% 0% 93% 0.60 
1.935 0.078 10% 0% 0% 0% 90% 0.55 
2.124 0.096 12% 0% 0% 0% 88% 0.52 
2.314 0.115 14% 0% 0% 0% 86% 0.51 
2.503 0.135 17% 0% 0% 0% 83% 0.50 
2.692 0.154 19% 0% 0% 0% 81% 0.50 
5.533 0.449 54% 0% 0% 0% 46% 0.74 
5.722 0.469 56% 0% 0% 0% 44% 0.76 
5.911 0.489 58% 0% 0% 0% 42% 0.78 
6.101 0.509 61% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0.79 
6.290 0.528 63% 0% 0% 0% 37% 0.81 
6.479 0.548 65% 0% 0% 0% 35% 0.82 
6.669 0.568 68% 0% 0% 0% 32% 0.84 
6.858 0.588 70% 0% 0% 0% 30% 0.85 
7.047 0.607 72% 0% 0% 0% 28% 0.86 
7.237 0.627 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0.88 
7.426 0.647 77% 0% 0% 0% 23% 0.89 
7.615 0.667 79% 0% 0% 0% 21% 0.90 
7.805 0.686 81% 0% 0% 0% 19% 0.91 
7.994 0.706 84% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0.93 
8.184 0.726 86% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0.94 
8.373 0.746 88% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0.95 
8.562 0.765 91% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0.96 
8.752 0.785 93% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0.97 
8.941 0.805 95% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0.98 
9.130 0.825 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0.99 
9.320 0.845 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
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Table I-13. Summary Statistics of Organizational Annual Returns on Revenue 
Sources, Health, 1998-2003 	  





Grants 11.437 12.849 7.116 -1.000 82.634 14478 2413 
Rents 0.015 0.083 0.000 -0.511 0.996 1002 167 
Interest 0.052 0.090 0.029 -0.851 0.970 12768 2128 
Securities 0.049 0.090 0.036 -0.904 0.949 7338 1223 
Special events 1.389 1.593 1.055 -1.000 10.362 5772 962 
 
 
Table I-14. Subsector Annual Returns on Revenue Sources, Health, 1998-2003 	  
Fiscal Year Contributions & Grants Rents Interest Securities Special events 
1998 11.961 0.016 0.064 0.081 1.425 
1999 11.823 0.008 0.059 0.071 1.322 
2000 11.704 0.007 0.064 0.075 1.406 
2001 11.302 0.014 0.058 0.041 1.386 
2002 11.108 0.018 0.039 0.009 1.361 
2003 10.728 0.027 0.030 0.018 1.434 
Expected Return  11.437 0.015 0.052 0.049 1.389 
Risk  0.474 0.007 0.014 0.031 0.042 
 
 
Table I-15. Correlation Coefficients of Returns on Revenue Sources, Health 	  
 Contributions & 
Grants 
Rents Interest Securities Special 
Events 
Contributions 
& Grants 1.0000 -0.7769
* 0.9153** 0.9311*** -0.25 
Rents -0.7769* 1.0000 -0.8267** -0.7028 0.56 
Interest 0.9153** -0.8267** 1.0000 0.9046** -0.16 
Securities 0.9311*** -0.7028 0.9046** 1.0000 -0.02 
Special Events -0.2484 0.5612 -0.1582 -0.0207 1.00 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
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Table I-16. Efficient Portfolios, Health: Expected Return, Risk, Weights, and HHI 






Securities %Special Events HHI 
0.027 0.003 0% 67% 33% 0% 0% 0.55 
0.260 0.006 2% 95% 0% 0% 4% 0.62 
0.493 0.010 2% 83% 0% 0% 15% 0.41 
0.726 0.015 3% 71% 0% 0% 26% 0.35 
0.959 0.020 4% 58% 0% 0% 38% 0.36 
1.192 0.025 4% 46% 0% 0% 49% 0.40 
1.424 0.030 5% 34% 0% 0% 61% 0.45 
1.657 0.035 6% 22% 0% 0% 72% 0.50 
1.890 0.040 6% 10% 0% 0% 84% 0.55 
2.123 0.045 7% 0% 0% 0% 93% 0.59 
2.356 0.052 10% 0% 0% 0% 90% 0.54 
2.589 0.059 12% 0% 0% 0% 88% 0.51 
2.822 0.068 14% 0% 0% 0% 86% 0.50 
3.054 0.078 17% 0% 0% 0% 83% 0.50 
3.287 0.088 19% 0% 0% 0% 81% 0.50 
7.013 0.261 56% 0% 0% 0% 44% 0.77 
7.246 0.273 58% 0% 0% 0% 42% 0.79 
7.479 0.284 61% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0.80 
7.712 0.295 63% 0% 0% 0% 37% 0.82 
7.945 0.306 65% 0% 0% 0% 35% 0.83 
8.177 0.317 68% 0% 0% 0% 32% 0.85 
8.410 0.329 70% 0% 0% 0% 30% 0.86 
8.643 0.340 72% 0% 0% 0% 28% 0.87 
8.876 0.351 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0.88 
9.109 0.362 77% 0% 0% 0% 23% 0.90 
9.342 0.373 79% 0% 0% 0% 21% 0.91 
9.575 0.385 81% 0% 0% 0% 19% 0.92 
9.807 0.396 84% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0.93 
10.040 0.407 86% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0.94 
10.273 0.418 88% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0.95 
10.506 0.429 91% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0.96 
10.739 0.441 93% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0.97 
10.972 0.452 95% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0.98 
11.205 0.463 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0.99 
11.437 0.474 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
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Table I-17. Summary Statistics of Organizational Annual Returns on Revenue 
Sources, Human Services, 1998-2003 	  





Grants 16.019 18.770 9.406 -1.000 131.505 32040 5340 
Rents 0.026 0.105 0.000 -0.307 0.999 2316 386 
Interest 0.057 0.099 0.031 -0.192 0.986 28926 4821 
Securities 0.043 0.090 0.027 -0.910 0.958 12090 2015 
Special events 1.507 1.579 1.148 -1.000 9.565 10836 1806 
 
 
Table I-18. Subsector Annual Returns on Revenue Sources, Human Services, 1998-
2003 	  
Fiscal Year Contributions & Grants Rents Interest Securities Special events 
1998 17.573 0.025 0.071 0.068 1.494 
1999 16.973 0.021 0.062 0.060 1.508 
2000 16.441 0.026 0.067 0.063 1.563 
2001 15.594 0.029 0.066 0.039 1.471 
2002 15.031 0.028 0.042 0.009 1.488 
2003 14.502 0.030 0.036 0.017 1.520 
Expected Return  16.019 0.026 0.057 0.043 1.507 
Risk  1.180 0.003 0.015 0.025 0.032 
 
 
Table I-19. Correlation Coefficients of Returns on Revenue Sources, Human 
Services 	  
 Contributions & 
Grants 
Rents Interest Securities Special 
Events 
Contributions 
& Grants 1.0000 -0.7643* 0.8526** 0.9293*** 0.1085 
Rents -0.7643* 1.0000 -0.4910 -0.6771 -0.2261 
Interest 0.8526** -0.4910 1.0000 0.8978** 0.0326 
Securities 0.9293*** -0.6771 0.8978** 1.0000 0.3237 
Special Events 0.1085 -0.2261 0.0326 0.3237 1.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
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Table I-20. Efficient Portfolios, Human Services: Expected Return, Risk, Weights, 
and HHI 	  








%Special Events HHI 
0.085 0.002 0% 98% 0% 0% 2% 0.86 
0.410 0.007 0% 77% 0% 0% 23% 0.48 
0.735 0.014 0% 56% 0% 0% 44% 0.52 
1.060 0.022 0% 34% 0% 0% 65% 0.66 
1.385 0.029 0% 13% 0% 0% 86% 0.83 
1.711 0.037 1% 0% 0% 0% 99% 0.84 
2.036 0.056 4% 0% 0% 0% 96% 0.68 
2.361 0.079 6% 0% 0% 0% 94% 0.58 
2.686 0.103 8% 0% 0% 0% 92% 0.53 
3.011 0.129 10% 0% 0% 0% 90% 0.51 
3.337 0.154 13% 0% 0% 0% 87% 0.50 
3.662 0.180 15% 0% 0% 0% 85% 0.50 
3.987 0.206 17% 0% 0% 0% 83% 0.51 
4.312 0.232 19% 0% 0% 0% 81% 0.53 
4.637 0.258 22% 0% 0% 0% 78% 0.55 
9.840 0.679 57% 0% 0% 0% 43% 0.82 
10.166 0.706 60% 0% 0% 0% 40% 0.84 
10.491 0.732 62% 0% 0% 0% 38% 0.85 
10.816 0.758 64% 0% 0% 0% 36% 0.86 
11.141 0.785 66% 0% 0% 0% 34% 0.87 
11.466 0.811 69% 0% 0% 0% 31% 0.88 
11.792 0.837 71% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0.89 
12.117 0.864 73% 0% 0% 0% 27% 0.90 
12.442 0.890 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0.91 
12.767 0.916 78% 0% 0% 0% 22% 0.92 
13.092 0.943 80% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0.93 
13.417 0.969 82% 0% 0% 0% 18% 0.94 
13.743 0.995 84% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0.95 
14.068 1.022 87% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0.96 
14.393 1.048 89% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0.96 
14.718 1.074 91% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0.97 
15.043 1.101 93% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0.98 
15.369 1.127 96% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0.99 
15.694 1.154 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0.99 
16.019 1.180 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
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Table I-21. Summary Statistics of Organizational Annual Returns on Revenue 
Sources, Whole Sample, 1998-2003 
 





Grants 12.356 13.638 7.833 -1.000 94.624 91416 15236 
Rents 0.028 0.101 0.000 -0.650 0.999 7296 1216 
Interest 0.054 0.094 0.030 -0.851 0.998 79092 13182 
Securities 0.047 0.090 0.034 -0.922 0.997 42450 7075 
Special events 1.264 1.467 0.932 -1.455 9.041 28572 4762 
 
 
Table I-22. Subsector Annual Returns on Revenue Sources, Whole Sample, 1998-
2003 	  
Fiscal Year Contributions & Grants Rents Interest Securities Special events 
1998 13.565 0.029 0.066 0.078 1.284 
1999 13.026 0.026 0.060 0.067 1.261 
2000 12.760 0.027 0.064 0.071 1.285 
2001 12.069 0.028 0.062 0.043 1.236 
2002 11.614 0.027 0.040 0.009 1.244 
2003 11.100 0.029 0.033 0.014 1.273 
Expected Return  12.356 0.028 0.054 0.047 1.264 
Risk  0.925 0.001 0.014 0.030 0.021 
 
 
Table I-23. Correlation Coefficients of Returns on Revenue Sources, Whole Sample 	  
 Contributions 
& Grants 
Rents Interest Securities Special 
Events 
Contributions 
& Grants 1.0000 -0.2578 0.8810** 0.9464*** 0.4499 
Rents -0.2578 1.0000 -0.2096 -0.2257 0.1255 
Interest 0.8810** -0.2096 1.0000 0.9234*** 0.2267 
Securities 0.9464*** -0.2257 0.9234*** 1.0000 0.5371 
Special Events 0.4499 0.1255 0.2267 0.5371 1.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
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Table I-24. Efficient Portfolios, Whole Sample: Expected Return, Risk, Weights, 
and HHI 








%Special Events HHI 
0.029 0.001 0% 98% 2% 0% 0% 0.96 
0.280 0.004 0% 80% 0% 0% 20% 0.54 
0.532 0.009 0% 59% 0% 0% 41% 0.52 
0.784 0.013 0% 39% 0% 0% 61% 0.65 
1.035 0.017 0% 19% 0% 0% 81% 0.83 
1.287 0.022 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.98 
1.538 0.037 2% 0% 0% 0% 98% 0.77 
1.790 0.056 5% 0% 0% 0% 95% 0.65 
2.041 0.076 7% 0% 0% 0% 93% 0.57 
2.293 0.096 9% 0% 0% 0% 91% 0.53 
2.545 0.116 12% 0% 0% 0% 88% 0.51 
2.796 0.137 14% 0% 0% 0% 86% 0.50 
3.048 0.157 16% 0% 0% 0% 84% 0.50 
3.299 0.178 18% 0% 0% 0% 82% 0.51 
3.551 0.199 21% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0.52 
7.576 0.531 57% 0% 0% 0% 43% 0.80 
7.827 0.551 59% 0% 0% 0% 41% 0.81 
8.079 0.572 61% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0.83 
8.331 0.593 64% 0% 0% 0% 36% 0.84 
8.582 0.614 66% 0% 0% 0% 34% 0.85 
8.834 0.635 68% 0% 0% 0% 32% 0.86 
9.085 0.655 71% 0% 0% 0% 29% 0.88 
9.337 0.676 73% 0% 0% 0% 27% 0.89 
9.588 0.697 75% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0.90 
9.840 0.718 77% 0% 0% 0% 23% 0.91 
10.091 0.738 80% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0.92 
10.343 0.759 82% 0% 0% 0% 18% 0.93 
10.595 0.780 84% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0.94 
10.846 0.801 86% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0.95 
11.098 0.821 89% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0.96 
11.349 0.842 91% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0.97 
11.601 0.863 93% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0.98 
11.852 0.884 95% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0.98 
12.104 0.905 98% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0.99 
12.356 0.925 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
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Table I-25. Robustness check: Summary Statistics of Organizational Annual 
Returns on Revenue Sources, Whole Sample, 1998-2003 	  
Revenue Sources Average SD Median Min Max # of Obs # of 
Orgs 
Contributions & 
Grants 13.223 15.321 8.039 -1.000 99.980 93726 15621 
Rents 0.028 0.101 0.000 -0.650 0.999 7296 1216 
Interest 0.054 0.094 0.030 -0.851 0.998 79092 13182 
Securities 0.047 0.090 0.034 -0.922 0.997 42450 7075 
Special events 1.264 1.467 0.932 -1.455 9.041 28572 4762 
Note: In the robustness check, the 3*IQR exclusion criteria for organizational annual 
returns on contributions and grants are relaxed while the exclusion criteria for other 
revenue sources remain the same. Using the new criteria, the organizations with 
organizational annual returns on contributions and grants larger than 100 are excluded.  
 
Table I-26. Robustness check: Subsector Annual Returns on Revenue Sources, 
Whole Sample, 1998-2003 	  
Fiscal Year Contributions & Grants Rents Interest Securities Special events 
1998 14.209 0.029 0.066 0.078 1.284 
1999 13.779 0.026 0.060 0.067 1.261 
2000 13.618 0.027 0.064 0.071 1.285 
2001 12.944 0.028 0.062 0.043 1.236 
2002 12.590 0.027 0.040 0.009 1.244 
2003 12.201 0.029 0.033 0.014 1.273 
Expected Return  13.223 0.028 0.054 0.047 1.264 
Risk  0.769 0.001 0.014 0.030 0.021 
 
 
Table I-27. Robustness check: Correlation Coefficients of Returns on Revenue 
Sources, Whole Sample 	  
 Contributions 
& Grants 
Rents Interest Securities Special 
Events 
Contributions 
& Grants 1.0000 -0.2701 0.8777** 0.9540*** 0.4819 
Rents -0.2701 1.0000 -0.2096 -0.2257 0.1255 
Interest 0.8777** -0.2096 1.0000 0.9234*** 0.2267 
Securities 0.9540*** -0.2257 0.9234*** 1.0000 0.5371 
Special Events 0.4819 0.1255 0.2267 0.5371 1.0000 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level. 
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Figure I-1. The Efficient Frontier of Risky Assets  	  
	  
Source: Chen, W.-P., Chung, H., Ho, K.-Y., & Hsu, T.-L. (2010). Portfolio Optimization Models 
and Mean-Variance Spanning Tests. In C.-F. Lee, A. C. Lee, & J. Lee (Eds.), Handbook 
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Service clubs, like the Lions Clubs, Rotaries, and Kiwanis, provide collective goods. 
Membership in a service club involves by two essential elements: members’ shared 
interest in the club’s charitable mission; and private benefits stemming from social 
interactions with other members, such as networking, fellowship, and fun. We report 
results from a laboratory experiment designed to test whether membership in a service 
club makes a person more generous. We find that female individuals are the least 
generous when they are reminded of the socializing aspect of service-club membership. 
Male individuals in the social treatment donated more than those in the mission treatment 
mathematically, although the difference is not statistically significant. Results are 
consistent with a variant of social identity theory we develop, as well as motivational 
crowding-out from psychology and economics.  
 
Keywords: service clubs, nonprofit membership associations, motivation for charitable 
giving, social identity, motivational crowding-out, gender differences in charitable giving 
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Introduction 
Service clubs, such as Lions Clubs, Rotary, and Kiwanis, provide a space where 
members get together to satisfy their self-interest and social needs, as well as to solve 
their community concerns (Charles, 1993). Giving circles, where groups of individuals 
donate their time and money to a pooled fund and collectively allocate their funds to 
other charities and community projects, are similar (Eikenberry, 2006). This paper is 
concerned with the effectiveness of service clubs and other similar types of organizations 
in fostering members’ generosity and support for collective goods. A common belief is 
that the higher the level of member commitment, the more successfully a service club can 
pursue its mission. We argue that this analysis is too simple, that the way in which 
member commitment is built matters. Indeed, we find that one approach to building 
commitment is counterproductive, that member donations decline relative to other 
approaches. We explain this by noting two broad categories of benefits to members. First, 
“service benefits”—members benefit from their association with an organization that 
helps nonmembers and from their personal role in helping the club to do so. Members 
may want that association to enhance their charitable reputation or meet psychological 
needs, but the intended effect is the provision of a charitable service to nonmembers. 
Second, “socializing benefits”—members benefit from their interactions with other 
members, such as gaining networking opportunities, making friends, or having fun.  
The dual goals of providing service and socializing benefits may have conflicting 
effects on members’ charitable behavior. On the one hand, service clubs assemble like-
minded individuals to support the provision of collective goods. This reduces free riding 
through self-selection, repeated interactions with other members, and community 
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enforcement (Kandori, 1992). Joiners also develop identities with their service clubs and 
behave according to the social norms associated with the identities (e.g., Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000). Regular participation in club meetings and service projects fosters 
heightened levels of member identification with the club, resulting in greater member 
support for club mission attainment. On the other hand, service clubs are complex 
institutions satisfying both self-regarding and other-regarding member motivations. The 
theory of motivational crowding-out argues that the provision of extrinsic incentives 
undermines member’s intrinsic motivation for charitable behaviors under certain 
circumstances (e.g., Frey & Jegen, 2001; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). To the extent 
that socializing benefits are framed and perceived as extrinsic, intrinsic generosity may 
decline.  
This paper reports a laboratory experiment that examines the effect of service club 
membership—stressing either the service or socializing aspects—on individual support 
for collective goods. We were motivated by the then surprising results of a pilot 
experiment, which found that a treatment designed to increase members’ identity with the 
service club reduced donations. That led us to this experiment, in which we provide 
alternative treatments designed to activate either the service or socializing aspect of 
membership. We find that emphasizing the social benefits reduces donations. 
In the next section, we summarize relevant literature from economics and social 
psychology, and present our model, a variant of the economic model of social identity. 
We also discuss other theories that make predictions consistent with our results. Next, we 
describe our experiment in detail and report the results, followed by a concluding 
discussion.  




Before presenting our model, we first discuss the two strands of literature from 
economics and social psychology that provide insights to our model: the theory of 
collective goods and social identity theory.  
Collective Goods. Collective goods are defined as nonrival in consumption – that 
is, it costs nothing to let an additional person enjoy them once they are provided 
(Samuelson, 1954). Like many nonprofits, service clubs provide collective goods and 
such provision is enshrined in their mission statements. For example, Lions Club 
International lists its mission as “To empower volunteers to serve their communities, 
meet humanitarian needs, encourage peace and promote international understanding 
through Lions clubs.” (Lions Clubs International, 2015). An additional member, as well 
as nonmembers, can benefit from the fact that Lions provide these services to others 
without diminishing existing members’ enjoyment of the same benefits. The service club 
in our experiment provides access to higher education, which is collectively enjoyed by 
people valuing others’ access to education. 
A well-known problem with voluntary support for collective goods is free riding, 
enjoying service provision without personally contributing. This leads to under-provision 
of collective goods relative to the social optimum. Andreoni’s (1988, 1989) impure 
altruism model provides a framework that predicts the observed distribution of charitable 
giving and free riding. In his model, potential donors care about both the level of 
collective good provision (labeled “altruism”) and their personal contribution to the 
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collective good (“warm glow”), Variation in the relative importance of these two 
motivations explains why some people free ride, others do not, and still others take an 
easy ride (less extreme free-riding). 
Social Identity. We model the mutability of individual preferences for collective 
goods using social identity theory. This theory was originally developed by social 
psychologists (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), and was modified by economists Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) to explain economic behavior. Social identity theory highlights the 
importance of social contexts to decisionmaking, explaining why the same person makes 
different decisions from otherwise identical choice sets. In the original formulation, 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) define social identity as a person’s sense of who she is based on 
the groups to which she belongs. People divide the world into the in-group (us) and out-
group (them) in order to enhance self-image and achieve a positive social identity. 
Following this categorization, people adopt the identity and conform to the norms of the 
in-group, and also compare with and discriminate against the out-group to achieve 
superiority (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).  
Many studies in social psychology and behavioral economics use experimental 
methods and find significant effects of group membership and identity on individual 
behavior. Some experiments use “priming”—reminding subjects of their natural social 
identities (e.g. gender, ethnicity, race), and find that people behave in accord with the 
stereotypes associated with the salient identity. For example, Shih, Pittinsky, and 
Ambady (1999) report that Asian-American women scored higher on a math test when 
their Asian identity is salient than when female identity is salient. Other experiments find 
that inducing artificial group identities in labs triggers a favorable bias to the in-group. 
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This was first observed in “minimal groups:” group memberships are ostensibly 
established based on trivial tasks (e.g. preferences for paintings), but participants actually 
are assigned randomly and anonymously to complete seemingly irrelevant tasks when no 
direct self-interest or interactions with others are involved (Tajfel et al., 1971). Early 
social psychology studies using the minimal group paradigm generally found that even 
“trivial, ad hoc intergroup categorization leads to ingroup favoritism and discrimination 
against the outgroup.” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.39).  
Economics experiments are particularly concerned with the effects of group 
identities when there is a tradeoff between self-interest and collective interest, breaking 
one condition of the minimal group paradigm. Chen and Li (2009) show that the ingroup 
favoritism persists even when minimal groups include a link between subject decisions 
and self-interest. Eckel and Grossman (2005) find that just being identified with a group 
alone is insufficient to solve the conflicts between self- and collective interest; only 
higher levels of identity can restrain self-interest and lead to higher degrees of group 
cooperation. 
In our experiment, we attempt to induce group identities in a fictitious service 
club using various treatments. Members and nonmembers donate to an education fund 
that advances the organization’s mission, so the design presents subjects with a potential 
tradeoff between self- and collective interest.  
 
The Model 
Our model shows how context effects can be introduced into an economics model 
that incorporates the theories of impure altruism and social identity. It provides a way to 
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interpret empirical results, although as we shall discuss, there are other theories allowing 
interpretation. The starting point is the economic model of social identity developed by 
economists Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In their model, individuals define themselves as 
members of certain social categories that constitute their social identities. Each social 
identity comes with exogenously determined expectations and norms of behavior, labeled 
“prescriptions.” The saliency of each identity depends on the perceived context in which 
decisions are made. When an identity is made salient, individuals increase utility by 
following closely to that identity’s prescription. 
We adapted the economic model of social identity by adding explicit terms for 
altruism and warm glow as in the impure altruism model. In our model, individuals 
(indexed by i) choose an amount to donate (di) in support of the collective good “access 
to education,” and retain the rest of their endowment (ei) for private consumption (xi). We 
assume that the collective good is produced with constant returns to scale and measure 
the quantity of the collective good in units such that $1 donated produces 1 unit of 
educational access. In treatments where membership is not an option, a nonprofit 
organization simply collects the donations (costlessly) and provides 𝐷 = 𝑑!!!!!  units of 
the collective good. In treatments where membership is mandated, we assume that 
member services are costless. Then a nonprofit service club costlessly collects donations 
and provides 𝐷 units of the collective good. 
We assume that there are two distinct member identities – socializing (subscript 
S) and collective service providing (subscript C) to capture the two features of service 
clubs. The socializing identity is salient when the club provides a setting for hobnobbing 
and mingling, and the collective service identity is salient when the club organizes 
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members to provide charitable service. Member’s utility depends on the salience of each 
member identity times “prescription functions,” denoted PS (PC), and on the difference 
between i’s donation and the prescribed donation for members in each category.  
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assume that prescriptions arise from shared cultural 
norms and appropriate behavior for various social roles. Here, we assume that there is an 
exogenously specified prescribed donation for the collective service identity (socializing 
identity) denoted DC (DS). We assume that DC is greater than the amount that each 
individual would give if neither identity is made salient, but we do not make the same 
assumption about DS. We also assume DC is greater than DS. 
 Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), departures in either direction from 
prescribed donations reduce utility stemming from the socializing identity. It is clear why 
giving less than the prescribed amount lowers utility, less clear why giving more than the 
prescribed amount does so. Giving too much may be as alienating as giving too little 
because the generous donor will lose some identification with other club members. We 
therefore speculate that the overly generous will face a bigger penalty in the socializing 
identity term than in the service identity term. We note that there is no need for the 
prescription functions to be symmetric about the prescribed amount. 
The importance of each identity is a function of exogenous personal preferences 
and the level of specific induction applied to each. We denote the level of induction by 𝜎!   𝜖   0, 1 , 𝑗 = 𝑆,𝐶. The salience of the induced socializing identity, 𝑎(𝜎!) takes values 𝑎 
when 𝜎! = 0 and 𝑎 when 𝜎! = 1, with 0 ≤ 𝑎 < 𝑎. Similarly, the salience of the induced 
collective service identity is 𝑏(𝜎!) which takes values 𝑏 and 𝑏 respectively. The 
combined identity function, 𝐼! 𝑑! ,𝜎!,𝜎! , takes the form: 
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𝐼! = −𝑎 𝜎! 𝑃! 𝑑! − 𝑑! − 𝑏(𝜎!)𝑃!(𝑑! − 𝑑!) 
Where:  𝑃!′ > 0  and  𝑃!′′ < 0  𝑖𝑓  𝑑! < 𝑑!  𝑜𝑟  𝑑!;   𝑃!′ ≤ 0  and  𝑃!′′ ≤0 otherwise,  𝑃! 0 = 0; for 𝑗 = 𝑆,𝐶,  
and 𝑑!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑑!  are the prescribed donations for each identity, with 
 𝑑! > 𝑑! . 
Putting this all together, utility takes the following form: 
         𝑈! = 𝑈 𝑑! , 𝑥! ,𝐷, 𝐼! 𝑑! ,𝜎!,𝜎!  
      Where: 𝐷 = 𝑑!!!!! . 
U is assumed concave and increasing in all its arguments. When i becomes a 
member, she maximizes utility by choosing a level of donations and private consumption 
subject to a budget constraint and non-negativity constraints. One non-negativity 
constraint recognizes that D is mostly outside the control of i, and that di can add to, but 
not subtract from the gifts of others. The individual is also constrained by 𝜎!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜎! , 
which are chosen by the experimenters for each subject. The solution to this problem 
gives i’s best response function, and the solutions to the system of best response 
functions gives the Nash equilibria to the simultaneous moves game for each combination 
of induction levels. We restrict attention to symmetric Nash equilibria. 
Our model is identical to the impure altruism model (Andreoni, 1989; 1990) with 
two twists. First, agents receive utility from their membership identities. This does not 
change the nature of individual equilibrium because identities are exogenously activated.1 
Second, we add norm prescriptions to the impure altruism model, and introduce a way to 
manipulate the salience of alternative preference elements in an impure altruism 
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framework. This change is a restriction on the functional form of impurely altruistic 
utility, and so results that hold for the general case also hold for our particularization. 
Our model produces three predictions cast as the following hypotheses: 
H1: Many people will make positive donations when they are asked to, regardless of 
whether they are members. 
Existing proofs suffice for this proposition (Cornes and Sandler, 1985). This is mainly 
due to the warm-glow term in donor utility, which seems to be a naturally present 
intrinsic motivation in a variety of other experiments (Andreoni & Payne, 2013). 
H2: Members whose collective-service identity is salient will make larger contributions 
than nonmembers, who receive only basic information about the charitable cause. 
This comes from our assumption that the prescribed amount of donations exceeds the 
nonmember-identity equilibrium for each person. If the induction of service identity 
is successful, each individual will find that their marginal benefit of donating 
increases at each level of donations whereas marginal costs remain the same. This 
induces a rightward shift in each member’s reaction function, which shows optimal 
individual donations at each level of giving by others. Because these reaction 
functions are downward sloping (Andreoni, 1989), this implies that individual and 
collective donations increase for a pool of members with salient collective-service 
identity in symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
H3: Service club members donate less when their socializing identity is salient than when 
their collective service identity is salient.  
We believe that the norm prescribed by the socializing identity is to be an active 
participant in the club’s social activities, whereas the norm for the service identity is 
	  	   128 
to be an altruistic member who support the club’s charitable. Hence, focusing 
subjects’ attention on the socializing aspect would frame the context of giving 
decisions as a social club rather than an altruistic service club. Members with salient 
service identity would gain utility by making appropriate amount of donations, while 
those with salient socializing identity would not gain utility by making donations.  
 
Alternative Theory 
Our model is not the only way to rationalize the behavior observed in our 
experiment. According to Clark and Wilson (1961), organizations generally provide three 
broad categories of incentives – material, solidary, and purposive – in order to increase 
donations. Material incentives are tangible benefits with a monetary value, like savings 
on car rentals. Solidary incentives are intangible rewards “derived from the act of 
associating” (p.134), including socializing, having fun, providing a sense of belonging, 
and sometimes obtaining elite status. Purposive incentives are intangible rewards 
associated with the goals and values of organizations. Although service clubs offer all the 
three types of incentives, they primarily rely on solidary incentives (Clark & Wilson, 
1961). This attracts members more responsive to solidary than purposive and material 
benefits. In contrast, nonprofit organizations without members rely more on purposive 
incentives, attracting donors who are more motivated by mission attainment. So we can 
interpret results as answering “Which organizational form collects more donations: 
contributor- or membership-based? A purposive or a solidary group? 
The theory of motivational crowding-out provides another way to interpret our 
results (Deci, 1971; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). This literature 
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distinguishes between two types of motivation for behavior: extrinsic incentives 
(externally-supplied rewards) and intrinsic incentives (naturally-present; doing something 
for the inherent satisfaction and enjoyment of the activity itself (Deci, 1971; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). Many studies find that the provision of extrinsic incentives at any level 
crowds out intrinsic motivations, so that sometimes providing extrinsic incentives is 
counterproductive to promoting pro-social behavior (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; 
Frey & Goette, 1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). Other studies find that monetary 
rewards differ from other extrinsic incentives. Noncash incentives, like lottery tickets or 
T-shirts, increased blood donations (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Lacetera, Macis, & Slonim, 
2012), but cash incentives significantly decreased blood donations among female donors 
(Mellström & Johannesson, 2008). Diverse theories explain motivational crowding-out. 
Extrinsic incentives can be perceived as controlling, offending psychological needs for 
autonomy and competence (Deci & Ryan, 1985). When people are rewarded for 
performing an intrinsically motivating activity, they no longer attribute their behavior as 
representing desirable traits but to the external rewards (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 
1973). 
People have intrinsic motives for charitable giving, that is, they give anyway 
without extrinsic incentives. Some extrinsic incentives are providing through tax breaks 
and other sources when people give regardless of membership status, but membership in 
a service club might alter the balance. The socializing benefits of membership may 
provide a reason to increase donations while crowding out intrinsic generosity. On 
balance, either effect could dominate so that the sign of the membership effect becomes 
an empirical question. This leads to our last hypothesis:  
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H4: Members focusing on the socializing benefits give less than those focusing on 
collective service provision—members or nonmembers. 
It is reasonable to conjecture that a service club member has a combination of 
both intrinsic (altruistic) and extrinsic motivations for giving. When focusing on 
the socializing aspect, a member is made to focus on the extrinsic incentives (e.g. 
networking, fellowship, fun) that may crowd out her altruistic motivation and thus 
becomes more generous. In either case, we would expect people focusing on 
socializing benefits give less than those who are not made to focus on any 
external rewards, whether they are members of a service club or contributors of a 
nonprofit organization.  
 
Experiment  
Design and Participants Assignment 
We used a between-subject design, consisting of one control (no club membership) 
and two treatments with club membership (salience of service vs. socializing identity) 
(Table 1). 113 students at a midwestern university participated in our experiment and 
received an average compensation of $7.60. Our final sample includes 93 good 
observations (35% men, 65% women). Subjects were assigned to 18 single-treatment 
sessions based on their availability, and each participated in the experiment only once.2 
Subjects did not know in advance which treatment they would receive, so there is no self-
selection into treatment. Moreover, each treatment had multiple sessions, on different 
days and times, so that selection based on unobservable attributes correlated with time 
should not be a problem.  
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[Table II-1]  
 
Procedure 
Subjects proceeded through five stages. First, they chose an organization they 
would like to be associated with from a list of two options. Second, subjects participated 
in a practice round, practicing a neutrally framed decisionmaking task. Third, subjects in 
the treatment groups were welcomed to membership in the fictitious Education Service 
Club (ESC), and then completed a task intended to make either the service or socializing 
member identity salient. Subjects in the control group skipped this step. Fourth, subjects 
in all groups were read a fundraising message and asked to allocate their tokens. Fifth, 
subjects designated a real-world charity to receive their donations and filled out 
questionnaires. Subjects were privately compensated in cash before leaving. During the 
whole time, subjects were instructed to finish their tasks independently without 
interacting with others during the experiment—they sat behind black paper shields 
without seeing others’ activities and were not allowed to talk with others. 
Membership Manipulation. We used the following procedure to prevent 
subjects from framing themselves as forced into membership. Upon arrival, subjects were 
asked to choose an organization they would “like to get involved with” from a list of two 
organizations, with a one-sentence vague mission statement for each. One of the 
organizations was always the fictitious Education Service Club (ESC) (or Education 
Service Association (ESA) in the control group). The other was a fictitious organization, 
either the Society of Accounting Standards (SAS) or the Society of Warehousing 
Standards (SWS) depending on the session, which we intentionally described in a way 
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that led very few subjects to make this choice. Those subjects picking the ESC (ESA) 
continued with the experiment. Those choosing the SAS/SWS were taken to another 
room and completed the questionnaires. Because they did not experience the rest of the 
experiment, they were omitted from the analysis sample.3  
 Following the practice round, subjects in the treatment groups were told: “You 
have chosen the Education Service Club, and are now being granted the membership in 
the Education Service Club.” The experimenter then read a new member welcome letter 
orally while subjects read the printed version. Those in the control group heard nothing 
about membership. They were told instead: “You have chosen the Education Service 
Association and here is more information about it.”  
Club Identity Induction. The welcome letter was also used to induce the two 
club identities and make them salient. It included not only the welcoming message, but 
also basic information about the ESC’s mission, service projects and social activities, and 
membership obligations. Immediately after reading the welcome letter, subjects in the 
mission treatment were asked to highlight in the letter “at least 3 phrases that are directly 
related to the ESC’s charitable mission,” in order to raise the salience of the service 
identity. In contrast, subjects in the social treatment were asked to highlight “at least 3 
phrases that are directly related to the ESC’s social activities,” in an effort to raise the 
salience of the socializing identity.  
Decision Task. All subjects received a short and neutral fundraising message 
from the ESC (or ESA in the control group). For the control group, the fundraising 
message, which was only four sentences long, introduced the charity’s mission and its 
scholarship fund, and then requested donations by asking “please make a donation to the 
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ESA Scholarship Fund.” The message also stated “100% of your donation will benefit 
students because an anonymous donor is covering all of the administration and 
fundraising costs associated with this campaign” in an effort to remove heterogeneity 
resulting from subjects making diverse assumptions about these matters. The message for 
the treatment groups was identical, except that the organization was called ESC and the 
charity’s mission statement was omitted (as it was presented already in the new member 
welcome letter). The message was read aloud to subjects by the experimenters. 
After reading the fundraising message, subjects were asked to complete the 
allocation task, that is, to divide their 600-token endowment between a personal account 
and the scholarship fund. They were told: “At the end of each session, tokens are 
converted to real money at the rate of 100 tokens to $1. Your token donations will 
become real donations to a scholarship fund you will choose from a list of real-world 
charities.” 4 The money that a subject kept for herself was added to her $5 show-up fee to 
determine her monetary compensation. Subjects were presented with multiple examples 
and the opportunity to ask questions in an effort to minimize misunderstandings and 
miscalculations. Then subjects were told to “place the tokens you wish to keep for 
yourself in the envelope labeled ‘Personal Account,’ and place the tokens you wish to 
donate in the envelope labeled ‘Charity.’” The envelopes were sealed by subjects and 
then processed by an assistant in another room to preserve the anonymity of subject 
decisions. 
Questionnaires. Subjects completed questionnaires post-treatment. The first was 
a psychometric scale designed to check whether those in the treatment group identified as 
ESC members, adopted from Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997).5  The second 
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contained 14 questions used to construct the Empathic Concern (EC) and Perspective 
Taking (PT) scales (Davis, 1983). The EC and PT scales respectively allow us to control 
for individual differences in the level of empathy with unfortunate others and tendency to 
spontaneously adopt others’ psychological point of view. 
Then, subjects completed the Unlikely Virtues (UV) scale (Patrick et al., 2002), 
which allowed us to control for social desirability bias. Although anonymity is 
guaranteed and explained to subjects, this scale serves as an additional check for any 
subjects who do not understand or trust the anonymity procedure. The UV scale is the 
sum of “true” responses to 14 true-false items that describe socially desirable behaviors 
that are rarely true, such as “My opinions are always completely reasonable,” or “I have 
never felt that I was better than someone else.”  
Finally, a socio-demographic questionnaire asks about subjects’ basic socio-
demographic characteristics, including gender, age, ethnicity and race, educational level, 
academic major, marital and parental status, and frequency of religious activities. In 
addition, subjects were asked if they had made donations to any charities before, and if 





Our final sample includes 93 observations: 30 for the control group, 32 for 
mission treatment, and 31 for social treatment.6 We report treatment effects in panel A of 
Table II-3. Average token donations were 353.33 out of 600 in the control group. 
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Subjects in the mission treatment donated the largest average amount of tokens (365.63), 
while those in the social treatments made the least (275.81). The corresponding median 
tokens are 300, 400, and 200, showing similar patterns. Another measure of the treatment 
effect is by the share of subjects who donated all their 600 tokens. 27% of participants in 




Panel C of Table II-3 reports the nonparametric Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney tests 
to examine whether the amounts of donations between each pair of treatments come from 
the same population.7 Results from independent sample t-tests, not displayed, are quite 
similar. The difference between the two treatments is marginally significant at the 10% 
level. However, the differences between mission and control and between social and 
control are not statistically significant. While statistical difference tells whether the 
results are likely to be due to chance, effect size helps understand the magnitude of the 
difference between groups. Panel D of Table II-3 reports the effect size (Cohen’s d) of 
the differences between conditions. Cohen (1988) interprets the effect size as small 
(d   =   0.2), medium (d   =   0.5), and large (d ≥ 0.8). The Cohen’s d effect size suggests a 
small practical difference between mission and social (d = 0.426) and between social and 
control (d = 0.386). There is no effect for the difference between mission and control (d = 
0.059).    
Panel B of Table II-3 reports results for gender subsamples. Women in the control 
group donated an average amount of 372.73 (median = 300). The average amount of 
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tokens donated increased to 423.68 (median = 500) in the mission treatment and 
decreased to 268.42 (median=200) in the social treatment. The difference between the 
mission and social treatments is significant at the 5% level, and the difference between 
the social treatment and control group is marginally significant at the 10% level. 
According to Panel D of Table II-3, there is a medium effect for the difference between 
mission and social (d = 0.726) and that between social and control (d = 0.506). The effect 
size is small for the difference between mission and control (d = 0.255). The pattern for 
men was starkly different, with the largest mean donations for the social treatment 
(309.09), followed by the control group (300). Those in the mission treatment donated the 
lowest amount (280.77). There are no statistically significant or practical differences 
between the groups.  
Although random assignment obviates the need for covariates, we estimated 
regressions to control for sampling variations that lead to departures from “all else held 
equal” and report results in Table II-4. We used Tobit to account for the censoring of the 
dependent variable at 0 and 600 tokens. The baseline specification includes treatment 
dummies for social and control (mission was the omitted category), a female dummy, and 
empathy measured as the sum of the empathic concern and perspective taking scores.8 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table II-4 report the raw coefficients and unconditional average 
marginal effects in the baseline specification. Compared with the mission treatment, the 
social treatment has a negative average marginal effect on donations (-88.5 tokens), 
which is statistically significant at the .10 level. This suggests that emphasizing personal 
benefits leads to lower donations than stressing charitable missions. The difference in 
donations between the control and mission treatments was not significant. The sum of 
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empathic concern and perspective taking scores has a small positive effect: a one 
standard deviation increase in the combined score increases tokens donated by 37.90 
(significant at the .10 level).9 This indicates that people with higher level of empathic 
concern and perspective taking scores tend to be more generous. The gender effect is not 
statistically significant in the baseline model.  
Next, we allow treatment effects to vary with gender by adding interaction terms, 
reporting results in columns 3 and 4 of Table II-4. A likelihood ratio test does not reject 
the nested baseline model, but results of the less parsimonious specification are 
sufficiently interesting to warrant their display. The social treatment, compared with the 
mission treatment, still has a negative average marginal effect (-97.45 tokens) and is now 
significant at the .05 level. The treatment effects between the control and mission 
treatments are still not significantly different. Although the total effect of Female is not 
significant, the partial effect of gender being female is large and positive (201.32 tokens) 
and significant at the .10 level, whereas the interaction effect between Female and social 
treatment is large and negative (-266.6 tokens) and significant at the .10 level. We can 
interpret this as saying that females are more generous than males in the mission and 
control groups, but have such a large negative reaction to the social treatment that they 
become less generous than males in this group. The sum of the empathic concern and 
perspective taking scores is not significant in this specification.10  
We also conducted corresponding OLS and median regressions as robustness 
checks and find similar patterns. Social treatment was equally significant in all 
three estimations. However, the point estimate for the effect of the social treatment on 
mean (median) donations ranges from -97.45 in tobit to -162.87 in OLS to -195 in 
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median regression. And the total effect of gender is significant for OLS, but not the other 
two. 
[Table II-4]  
 
Although there are no significant difference of empathic concern and perspective 
taking scores across conditions, we find that men (M = 38.16, SD = 7.60) and women (M 
= 43.08, SD= 6.27) in our sample are significantly different in their empathic concern and 
perspective taking scores (t = -3.1365, p = 0.0028). This leads us to examine donations 
separately for the female and male subsamples respectively (Table II-5). For women, the 
social treatment, compared with the mission treatment, has a large negative average 
marginal effect on donations (-157.44 tokens), which is statistically significant at the .05 
level. There is still no significant difference between the control and mission treatment. 
The sum of the empathic concern and perspective taking scores is not significant. For 
men, the treatment effects are not significant. Although the size of the subsamples is 




Our results show that the way a person identifies with her club matters. Our two 
treatments represent different ways of building members’ identity with the club – 
focusing on the club’s charitable mission or private membership benefits. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, subjects receiving the mission treatment gave significantly more than the 
social treatment. Our model rationalizes this result in terms of context activating distinct 
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identities with different norm prescriptions. A service club setting where charitable 
purposes are emphasized frames a contextual norm of altruism. When personal benefits 
are emphasized, selfish behavior becomes more acceptable. 
Our results are also consistent with motivational crowding-out theory. Donations 
in the control and mission treatments were costly and fully anonymous, reinforcing the 
conclusion of hundreds of studies that giving is, in part, intrinsically motivated. The 
social treatment leads subjects to anticipate extrinsic rewards, such as having fun, 
makings friends, and building professional networks and career opportunities. Hence, 
motivational crowding-out is the greatest under the social treatment. As explained by 
attribution theory, when extrinsic rewards are introduced to an intrinsically motivated 
task, people are likely to attribute their behavior to extrinsic rewards and discount their 
intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). In our social treatment, subjects 
might think that making donations is in exchange for those benefits and hence decrease 
their donations.   
On the other hand, we did not find that those in the mission treatment gave 
significantly more than the control group, although average donations were 38.83 tokens 
higher in the mission treatment. This could be due to insufficiently strong induction of 
new club members, and strong induction of group identification has been found necessary 
when self-interest is added to the minimal group paradigm (Eckel and Grossman, 2005). 
Or the fundraising letter given post-induction to the mission group may have interacted 
with or superseded the induction of service identity. It may also because the subjects in 
the control group were mission-primed by a simple reminder of the mission of the 
association. In any case, we suggest future researchers experiment with alternative 
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induction tasks that manipulate the strength of identity and a more sophisticated 
manipulation check to test the mechanisms.  
An unexpected result from our experiment is the gender difference in donations. 
We find that women have a significantly higher level of empathic concern and 
perspective taking than men in our sample. Women in the social treatment donated 
significantly less than those in the mission treatment. We did not find statistically 
significant treatment effects for a small sample of men in our study. However, men in the 
social treatment donated a larger amount than those in the mission treatment. The 
findings are consistent with a recent study reporting that men are less willing to give to 
poverty relief because of their low levels of empathic concern. When giving is framed as 
consistent with self-interest, women are generally less motivated to give whereas men are 
the opposite (Willer, Wimer, & Owens, 2015). It would be interesting for future research 
to further explore the gender differences in charitable giving.  
 
Conclusion 
Service clubs support the private provision of collective goods, yet we know little 
about their effectiveness in securing donations relative to non-membership based 
nonprofit organizations. We find no evidence that soliciting donations from new 
members offers advantage over soliciting donations from the general public. Our most 
compelling finding is that focusing members’ attention on private membership benefits is 
counterproductive, particularly for female members. Service club members build 
connections with the club in different settings, which may lead to distinct club identities 
and norm prescriptions. Reminding members of the networking opportunities and social 
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events may help build initial buy-in and attachment, but this may come at the cost of 
identification with the club’s charitable mission. In contrast, although it may be difficult 
in the short run, emphasizing mission-related projects may foster and certainly does not 
hinder the altruistic mindset that leads to increased donations. Along this line, research is 
needed to see whether social events and private membership benefits have large positive 
impacts on the recruitment and retention of members. If so, lower donations per member 
can be overcome by the resulting increase in the number of members. 
The complex mixture of member benefits is behind our differing treatment 
effects, that some aspects of membership oppose other aspects in determining member 
generosity. We develop an identity-theory-based model that is consistent with our 
findings, but point out that other theories are also consistent with results – motivational 
crowdout, or the simple focusing of attention. Our model is testably distinct from these 
other theories, providing an opportunity for further research on the mechanism behind 
member generosity. Finally, future researchers can use this approach to study more 
complicated funding structures. For example, when a service club structures campaigns 
specific to members as well as seeking donations from the general public, how do the two 
revenue streams interact? Do identity theory and/or motivational crowdout help us to 
understand these interactions? How does gender affect charitable giving in service clubs? 
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Notes 
1. In the full Nash Equilibrium, it matters whether we increase the salience of each 
identity for one member or for all members, but aside from this, the twist has no 
impact on the nature of equilibrium. 
2. The sessions were conducted in the summer and fall semesters of 2014. For each 
week of experiments, students could sign up for morning, noon, or afternoon sessions. 
Students were asked to list all their available times, and we later blindly assigned 
them to certain sessions based on their availability and session capacity. Sessions 
were cancelled if only one subject arrived as scheduled. That person was assigned to 
another session upon her agreement. 
3. Only 12 out of 113 participants chose SAS or SWS, a reasonably low ratio. The 
majority of them were male actuarial science or accounting or economics students, 
with only one female participant choosing SAS/SWS. The combined empathic 
concern and perspective taking score on average (31.3) were lower than that in the 
full sample (41.3) and male subsample of our experiment (38.2). 
4. Subjects did not see the list of real-world charities until they completed their 
allocation tasks. This order ensures that subjects’ allocation decisions are not 
influenced by their feelings about the real-world charities on the list.  
5. The average identity score is 4.88 (SD = 1.93) in the mission treatment and 5.68 in 
the social treatment (SD = 2.17). There was not a significant difference in the scores 
between the two treatments (t = -1.56, p = 0.13). The scale is reliable (Cronbach’s α 
= .96) in measuring subjects’ identity with the club in each setting, but it lacks 
construct validity for comparing our treatments and inapplicable to our control group.  
6. The 12 participants who did not choose to get involved with the ESC/ESA and were 
filtered out in the initial membership manipulation process, as well as 8 additional 
participants who did not complete or misunderstood the identity-induction task. The 
final sample was further adjusted because there were subjects who did not highlight 
the letter appropriately according to the instructions. For example, some highlighted 
both mission-aspect phrases and friends (or fun) in the mission treatment. Others 
highlighted fundraising and peer mentoring in the social treatment without 
highlighting anything regarding social events. It could because: 1) they did not pay 
attention to the instructions; or 2) they had different ideas about mission/social 
aspects. Either way, these cases may suffer from induction failure so we need to deal 
with these observations carefully. We first exclude 3 subjects because they did not 
complete the identity-induction task. We then excluded 4 subjects in the mission 
treatment because they highlighted social aspects of membership. Another subject 
highlighted the entire paragraphs concerning both mission and social aspects and so 
was excluded. 4 subjects in the social treatment highlighted all the mission aspects 
and none of the social aspects of membership. Hence, contrary to directions, they 
actually experienced the mission treatment. We re-assigned these subjects to the 
mission treatment in our main analysis, but also check robustness by excluding them 
from the analysis. 
7. Without adjusting problematic observations, average donations in the social treatment 
are still lower than the mission treatment (297.14 vs. 313.64), but this difference is 
not statistically significant (p=0.76) in t-tests. The mission treatment has a lower 
mean (313.64) than the control group (353.33), but this difference is not significant 
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(p=0.46). The social treatment mean is still lower but not significantly different from 
the control group (p=0.27). If the problematic observations are dropped instead of 
being re-categorized, the mission and social treatment means are 351.79 and 275.81 
(the difference is only significant at p=0.18). The control mean is not significantly 
different from the mission mean (p=0.98), although it is nearly significantly higher 
than the social mean (p=0.14). Nonparametric tests (the Mann-Whitney rank-sum test 
and Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test) provide similar patterns. 
8. We ran a variety of alternative specifications, not reported here, with additional 
controls including the Unlikely Virtue score (as a level or as a dummy equaling 1 
when the score was very high), a dummy equaling 1 for the majors of philanthropic 
studies, social work, and nursing, and a dummy representing membership experience 
in any real-life service clubs. We also ran variants with interaction terms between 
these additional variables and the treatment variables. None of these additional 
variables were robustly significant, and inclusion of these variables had small effects 
on our baseline coefficients, although the p values for the treatment effects sometimes 
varied by a percentage point or two. 
9. We also ran a regression with empathic-concern and perspective-taking scores as two 
separate independent variables, and found that the latter was positive and significant 
at the 10% level.  
10. Similarly, we find that neither empathic concern nor perspective taking scores were 
significant when entered separately. 
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Table II-2. Summary Statistics  	  
Variables N Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Empathic Concern 
(EC)  92 23 21.99 4.45 6 28 
Perspective Taking 
(PT) 92 19 19.27 4.37 9 28 
EC and PT 
Combined 92 42 41.26 7.14 20 54 
Unlikely Virtue (UV) 90 1 2.11 2.35 0 10 
Age 90 20 22.38 6.65 18 60 
 
 
Variables N Percent 
Gender Female 60 65 Male 32 35 
Race 
White 64 70 
Black 8 9 
Asian 9 10 
Other 10 11 
Education Some College/College Graduate 57 96 Some Postgraduate 4 4 
Major 
Economics/Business/Engineering 30 32 
Philanthropic Studies/Social 
Work/Nursing 20 22 
Other 43 46 
Religious 
Activities 
Frequent (once a week or more) 20 23 
Less frequent (once a month) 11 12 
Seldom (once or twice a year) 33 37 
Do Not Attend 25 28 
Marital Status Single/Separated 81 92 Married/Living with a partner 7 8 




No 45 51 
Yes/Not now, but used to  44 49 
   
Made donations 
before 
No 4 4 
Yes 86 96 
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Table II-3. Treatment Effects 
Panel A Whole Sample 
 Control Mission  Social  
Average donations 353.33 365.63 275.81 
Std.Dev 199.54 218.29 202.43 
Median 300 400 200 
Bottom 25% 200 125 100 
Top 25% 600 600 450 
Number of 0 donations 1 2 2 
Number of 600-token donations 8 12 6 
Number of subjects 30 32 31 
 
Panel B Gender Difference 
Treatment All Women Men 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N 
Control 353.33 300 30 372.73 300 22 300 300 8 
Mission 365.63 400 32 423.68 500 19 280.77 300 13 
Social 275.81 200 31 268.42 200 19 309.09 300 11 
 
Panel C  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests (p values) 
Treatment All Women Men 
Mission vs. 
Social 0.0982 0.0349 0.5928 
Mission vs. 
Control 0.7295 0.3723 0.941 
Social vs. Control 0.1315 0.0844 0.8658 
 
Panel D  Effect Size   
All 
Effect Size 
(Cohen’s d) 95% Confidence Interval 
Mission vs. Social 0.426 -0.073 0.926 
Mission vs. Control 0.059 -0.44 0.557 
Social vs. Control 0.386 -0.892  0.121 
Women 
Mission vs. Social 0.726 0.069 1.382 
Mission vs. Control 0.255 -0.361  0.871 
Social vs. Control 0.506 -0.118  1.129 
Men 
Mission vs. Social 0.145 -0.659 0.949 
Mission vs. Control 0.089 -0.792  0.97 
Social vs. Control 0.047 -0.958  0.864 
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Table II-4. Tobit Regressions on Donations, Full Sample 	  
 (1) (2) 








     
Social -128.537* -88.502* 28.099 -97.452** 
 (74.620) (50.821) (113.604) (49.768) 
     
Control -38.829 -25.930 27.022 -33.401 
 (76.550) (51.067) (126.373) (50.029) 
     
Empathic Concern & 
Perspective Taking 
7.823* 5.316* 6.565 4.468 
(4.624) (3.070) (4.612) (3.087) 
     
Female 65.579 45.154 201.319* 47.608 
 (67.584) (46.824) (108.404) (46.975) 
     
Female×Social   -266.605*  
   (149.541)  
     
Female×Control   -125.962  
   (155.010)  
N 91 91 91 91 
pseudo R2 0.010  0.013  
Regressions estimated by double tobit with truncation at 0 and 600 tokens.  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table II-5. Tobit Regressions on Donations, Female vs. Male 	  
 Female Male 








     
Social -241.672** -157.441** 28.256 21.787 
 (103.992) (65.264) (103.196) (79.546) 
     
Control -99.600 -60.310 24.811 19.135 
 (99.997) (59.722) (116.536) (89.774) 
     
Empathic Concern & 
Perspective Taking 
7.327 4.635 5.460 4.208 
(6.526) (4.071) (6.302) (4.767) 
     
N 59 59 32 32 
pseudo R2 0.014  0.002  
Regressions estimated by double tobit with truncation at 0 and 600 tokens.  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A The Membership Manipulation Question (All Groups)	  
 
Out of the following two organizations, which one would you like to get involved with? 
Please circle ONE.  
 
A. The Education Service Club (ESC)1: The ESC is a nonprofit organization believing 
that education is not only a learning opportunity, but also helps develop the whole person 
in body, mind, and social skills. The mission of the ESC is to support students of all 
educational levels to make the most of their educational experiences and reach their full 
potential. 
 
B1. The Society of Warehousing Standards (SWS)2: The SWS is a nonprofit organization 
promoting a rigorous process to ensure that warehousing and storage standards prescribed 
are of a consistent high quality. The mission of the SWS is to provide support for 
developing high-quality warehousing standards and promoting the use and application of 
these standards. 
 
B2. The Society of Accounting Standards (SAS) 2: The SAS is a nonprofit organization 
promoting a rigorous process to ensure that the accounting standards prescribed are of a 
consistent high quality. The mission of the SAS is to provide support for developing 





1. Subjects in both control and treatment groups are presented with the same question. 
There is only one difference—the organization’s name is in Option A is the Education 
Service Association (ESA) for control group while the Education Service Club (ESC) in 
treatment groups.  
2. Option B1 and B2 are used alternatively. 
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Appendix B . Instructions for Practice Decision (All Groups) 
 
You are asked to participate in a study of individual decision-making. This study has 
been designed to maintain the anonymity of each participant’s decision. To preserve this 
anonymity, we ask that from this point on, there be NO TALKING among the 
participants and that all participants take precautions to maintain the confidentiality of 
their materials.  
 
The instructions are simple and please follow them carefully. You will be paid in cash in 
private at the end of the session. We will first explain the allocation problem, and conduct 
a practice decision round to familiarize you with the process. Then we will proceed to the 
actual decision round.  
 
Your Packet for Practice Decision Round. Before we begin, please verify that you 
have the following items before you on your desk.  
• Instructions sheets 
• 600 tokens 
• An empty envelope named “Charity for Practice”  
• An empty envelope named “Personal Account for Practice” 
 
Do you have any questions about your packet? 
 
The Allocation Problem. You have been given 600 tokens to use in this study in place 
of money. You can keep any share of these tokens for yourself or donate any share of 
these tokens to a charity named ABC. At the end of the study, tokens will be converted to 
real money at the rate of 100 tokens to $1. Your token donations will become real 
donations to a charitable organization that you will choose from a list of real-world 
charities.   
 
For example, if you keep 250 tokens for yourself and donate 350 tokens to ABC in this 
study, you will receive $2.50 in addition to your $5 show-up fee, and a real scholarship 
fund will receive $3.50. More examples are specified in the following table, please take a 
minute to read the table:  
 





Tokens to  
ABC 
Donations to a 
Real-World 
Charity 
Example 1 0 0 600 $6 
Example 2 100 $1 500 $5 
Example 3 200 $2 400 $4 
Example 4 300 $3 300 $3 
Example 5 400 $4 200 $2 
Example 6 500 $5 100 $1 
Example 7 550 $5.5 50 $0.5 
Example 8 600 $6 0 0 
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These are only examples. You may allocate any amount of your tokens to yourself and to 
charity. The only restriction is that the sum of your allocation to yourself plus your 
allocation to charity must equal to 600 tokens; you must allocate all 600 tokens between 
yourself and charity. 
 
Do you have any questions about the allocation problem? 
 
Practice Round. To illustrate your decision tasks, we will go through a practice round of 
the allocation problem. We will not practice choosing a real-world charity in this round. 
Nothing you do in this practice round will affect your payment in this study.  
 
Now decide how many tokens you how many you wish to keep for yourself, and how 
many you want to donate. You must allocate all 600 tokens. Use the tokens and 
envelopes for practice: 
 
1. Please place the tokens you wish to keep for yourself in the envelope labeled “Personal 
Account for Practice,” and 
 
2. Place the tokens you wish to donate to the charity ABC in the envelope labeled 
“Charity for Practice.” 	  
(In the actual decision round, you will seal the envelopes. However, you are not asked to 
seal them in this practice round, because we want to save some envelopes for future use. ) 
 
Do you have any questions about the decision making process? 	  
(Now put your packet aside. Our assistant will collect the used packet except for the 
instructions, and give you a new packet for actual decision round. Please DO NOT open 
the new packet until I ask you to. While our assistant is working on your packets, let us 
observe the anonymity procedure together.)  	  
Anonymity. This study has been designed to maintain the anonymity of each 
participant’s decision. The researchers and assistants will not know how many tokens you 
donate and how many you keep for yourself. We keep track of your payments without 
knowing your identity by the following procedure.  
 
1. Nobody in the room will see how many tokens you place in your Personal Account 
envelope or your Charity envelope.  Both will be sealed by yourself.  
 
2. Your envelopes will be brought by our first assistant to our second assistant in 
another room. The second assistant will see your Claim Check Number, but does not 
meet you or see your name (you will receive your Claim Check Number shortly). 
After the first assistant leaves the room, the second assistant will open the envelopes 
and process them. The second assistant will count the tokens in your Personal 
Account envelope, calculate your payment, and place the appropriate amount of 
money in an envelope labeled with your Claim Check Number, but not your name. 
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This envelope is sealed before the first assistant returns to pick up the envelopes and 
bring them back to your room.  
 
3. You claim your payment envelope by matching your Claim Check Number with that 
on the payment envelopes delivered to your room. 
 
4. In the actual decision round, if you decide to donate, you will be asked to choose a 
real-world charity from a list, and sign a Delegation of Authority form. The former 
contains a Claim Check Number, while the latter does not. The researchers will 
record donations to each charity on the list by matching your Claim Check Number, 
and see confirmation that someone with your Number has signed a Delegation of 
Authority form. The Delegation of Authority form is prepared for IUPUI’s Finance 
and Administration. The researchers will not open the Delegation of Authority form 
until finishing all recording, so not be able to match your Number on the charity list 
with your signature on the Delegation of Authority form.  
 
5. After receiving your payment, you will also be asked to sign a payment receipt. The 
payment receipt is for accounting purpose only. No one else except for the accountant 
will open the sealed envelope. 
 
In short, no one will be able to tie your name with your decision made in this study.  
 
Do you have any questions about the anonymity procedure?  
 
Your Packet for Actual Decision Round. Now please verify that you have the 
following items before you on your desk. Please DO NOT open any envelopes until I ask 
you to.  
• A small envelope named “Charity”  
• A small envelope named “Personal Account” 
• A small envelope named “Real-World Charity” 
• A small envelope named “Delegation”  
• A small envelope named “For Accountant Only”  
• A big envelope named “Questionnaires”  
• A big envelope named “Instructions” 
• 600 tokens attached to the “Instructions” envelope 
 
Your Claim Check # is tagged on top of your “Questionnaires” envelope, also at the back 
of your “Charity” and “Personal Account” envelope. Please check if the Claim Check # is 
the same for all these three envelopes. If not, raise your hand.  
 
Please take the tokens from your “Instructions” envelope, and count if there are 600 
tokens in total. If not, raise your hand.  
 
Do you have any other questions about your packet?  
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Appendix C . Instructions for Actual Decision (Control Group) 
 
Now we are ready to begin the actual decision round, in which you will apply what you 
just learned in the practice round. The only difference between the practice and actual 
decision round is that you will be asked to fill out some forms and questionnaires in 
addition to the allocation task.  Now, open the Instructions envelope in your new packet. 
Please DO NOT open any other envelopes at this point.  
 
About the Education Service Association (ESA). You have chosen the Education 
Service Association and here is more information about it. The Education Service 
Association is a charity whose mission is to enhance the educational experiences of 
students from elementary school to college. In particular, the ESA Scholarship Fund 
provides support for minority, disabled, as well as first-generation college students. 
Please make a donation to the ESA Scholarship Fund. 100% of your donation will benefit 
students because an anonymous donor is covering all of the administration and 
fundraising costs associated with this campaign. 
 
The Allocation Problem. As in the practice round, you have been given 600 tokens to 
use in place of money. You can keep any share of these tokens for yourself or donate any 
share of the tokens to the ESA Scholarship Fund. At the end of the study, tokens will be 
converted to real money at the rate of 100 tokens to $1. Your token donations will 
become real donations to a scholarship fund you will choose from a list of real-world 
charities.   
 
For example, if you keep 350 tokens for yourself and donate 250 tokens to the ESA 
Scholarship Fund, you will receive $3.50 in addition to your $5 show-up fee, and a real 
scholarship fund will receive $2.50. More examples are specified in the following table:  
 








Donations to a 
Real-World 
Charity 
Example 1 0 0 600 $6 
Example 2 100 $1 500 $5 
Example 3 200 $2 400 $4 
Example 4 300 $3 300 $3 
Example 5 400 $4 200 $2 
Example 6 500 $5 100 $1 
Example 7 550 $5.50 50 $0.50 
Example 8 600 $6 0 0 
 
These are only examples. You may allocate any amount of the tokens between yourself 
and the ESA Scholarship Fund. The only restriction is that the sum of the allocation to 
yourself plus the allocation to the ESA Scholarship Fund must equal to 600 tokens. 
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Decision Making. Now decide how many tokens you wish to keep for yourself, and how 
many tokens you want to donate to the ESA Scholarship Fund. The illustration chart 
attached is to guide you through all the steps. Please follow my instructions step by step. 
 
Step 1: Please place the tokens you wish to keep for yourself in the envelope labeled 
“Personal Account,” and place the tokens you wish to donate in the envelope labeled 
“Charity.” 
Make sure you have put all 600 tokens into these two envelopes, and then seal the 
envelopes. Our first assistant is collecting all your sealed envelopes and bring them to 
our second assistant who is waiting in another room. The second assistant will calculate 
your payment according to the tokens in your envelopes. Everyone will receive a 
payment envelope, whether or not they designate tokens for themselves. 
 
Step 2: Please open the envelope named “Real-World Charity.” There is a form labeled 
“Make a Donation on My Behalf to this Charity.” Use this form to choose a real-world 
charity if you put tokens in your Charity envelope. Be sure to check the box on the 
bottom of the page confirming your willingness to delegate authority to make this 
donation.  If you don’t, we cannot make a donation for you. Also, please double check if 
the Claim Check Number on top of the form is right; if not, please let us know. Then 
place the completed form back in the Real-World Charity envelope and seal it. 
 
Step 3: Please open the envelope labeled “Delegation.” There is a form named 
“Delegation of Authority to Donate” in the envelope. Please sign the form if you put 
tokens in your Charity envelope (you are the person authorizing). Then put the completed 
form back to the Delegation envelope and seal it. 
 
Step 4: Please open the envelope labeled “Questionnaires.” There are four short 
questionnaires in the envelope. Please fill out the questionnaires. Three out of the four 
questionnaires are double-sided, so please turn over to complete the questionnaires. 
After completing all the questionnaires, put them back to the Questionnaires envelope 
and seal it.  
 
Step 5: Our first assistant comes back with payment envelopes. You can claim your 
payment by matching your Claim Check Number with that on the payment envelope. 
Please check if the payment amount is right. If not, let us know.  
 
Step 6: Now, please open the envelope labeled “For Accountant Only.” There is a form 
named “Payment Receipt” in the envelope. After confirming that your payment amount is 
correct, sign the form and put it back in the For Accountant Only envelope. The sealed 
envelope will then be brought to the accountant. No one else except for the accountant 
will see your receipt.  
This ends the experiment, please leave on the desk all your materials except for your 
payment envelope, and you are free to leave. Please do not discuss what you did in this 
experiment with your classmates who have not participated. Let them make their 
decisions independently in their sessions. Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Appendix D . Instructions for Actual Decision (Treatment Groups) 
 
 
Now we are ready to begin the actual decision round, in which you will apply what you 
just learned in the practice round. The only difference between the practice and actual 
decision round is that you will be asked to fill out some forms and questionnaires in 
addition to the allocation task. Now, open the Instructions envelope in your new packet. 
Please DO NOT open any other envelopes at this point.  
 
 
About the Education Service Club (ESC). You have chosen the Education Service 
Club, and are now being granted the membership in the Education Service Club. In your 
Instructions envelope, there is a letter from the Education Service Club. Let us read the 
letter together.	  
 
Mission treatment: In the letter, there is a section subtitled “Projects and Activities” (the 
third and fourth paragraphs). It provides detailed information about both the ESC’s 
service projects and social activities. In this section, please find and highlight at least 3 
phrases that are directly related to the ESC’s charitable mission.  
 
Social treatment: In the letter, there is a section subtitled “Projects and Activities” (the 
third and fourth paragraphs). It provides detailed information about both the ESC’s 
service projects and social activities. In this section, please find and highlight at least 3 
phrases that are directly related to the ESC’s social activities.  	  
About the ESC Scholarship Fund. It provides support for minority, disabled, as well as 
first-generation college students. Please make a donation to the ESC scholarship fund. 
100% of your donation will benefit students because an anonymous donor is covering all 
of the administration and fundraising costs associated with this campaign. 
 
The Allocation Problem. As in the practice round, you have been given 600 tokens to 
use in place of money. You can keep any share of these tokens for yourself or donate any 
share of the tokens to the ESC Scholarship Fund. At the end of the study, tokens will be 
converted to real money at the rate of 100 tokens to $1. Your token donations will 
become real donations to a scholarship fund you will choose from a list of real-world 
charities.   
 
For example, if you keep 350 tokens for yourself and donate 250 tokens to the ESC 
Scholarship Fund in this study, you will receive $3.50 in addition to your $5 show-up fee, 
and a real scholarship fund will receive $2.50. More examples are specified in the 
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Tokens to the ESC 
Scholarship Fund 
Donations to a 
Real-World 
Charity 
Example 1 0 0 600 $6 
Example 2 100 $1 500 $5 
Example 3 200 $2 400 $4 
Example 4 300 $3 300 $3 
Example 5 400 $4 200 $2 
Example 6 500 $5 100 $1 
Example 7 550 $5.5 50 $0.5 




These are only examples. You may allocate any amount of the tokens between yourself 
and the ESC Scholarship Fund. The only restriction is that the sum of the allocation to 
yourself plus the allocation to the ESC Scholarship Fund must equal to 600 tokens. 
Decision Making. Now decide, as an ESC member, how many tokens you wish to keep 
for yourself, and how many tokens you want to donate to the ESC Scholarship Fund. The 
illustration chart attached is to guide you through all the steps. Please follow my 
instructions step by step. 
 
 
Step 1: Please place the tokens you wish to keep for yourself in the envelope labeled 
“Personal Account,” and place the tokens you wish to donate in the envelope labeled 
“Charity.” 
 
Make sure you have put all 600 tokens into these two envelopes, and then seal the 
envelopes. Our first assistant is collecting all your sealed envelopes and bring them to 
our second assistant who is waiting in another room. The second assistant will calculate 
your payment according to the tokens in your envelopes. Everyone will receive a 
payment envelope, whether or not they designate tokens for themselves. 
 
Step 2: Please open the envelope named “Real-World Charity.” There is a form labeled 
“Make a Donation on My Behalf to this Charity.” Use this form to choose a real-world 
charity if you put tokens in your Charity envelope. Be sure to check the box on the 
bottom of the page confirming your willingness to delegate authority to make this 
donation.  If you don’t, we cannot make a donation for you. Also, please double check if 
the Claim Check Number on top of the form is right; if not, please let us know. Then 
place the completed form back in the Real-World Charity envelope and seal it. 
 
Step 3: Please open the envelope labeled “Delegation.” There is a form named 
“Delegation of Authority to Donate” in the envelope. Please sign the form if you put 
tokens in your Charity envelope (you are the person authorizing). Then put the completed 
form back to the Delegation envelope and seal it. 
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Step 4: Please open the envelope labeled “Questionnaires.” There are four short 
questionnaires in the envelope. Please fill out the questionnaires. Three out of the four 
questionnaires are double-sided, so please turn over to complete the questionnaires. 
After completing all the four questionnaires, put them back to the Questionnaires 
envelope and seal it.  
 
Step 5: Our first assistant comes back with payment envelopes. You can claim your 
payment by matching your Claim Check Number with that on the payment envelope. 
Please check if the payment amount is right. If not, let us know.  
 
Step 6: Now, please open the envelope labeled “For Accountant Only.” There is a form 
named “Payment Receipt” in the envelope. After confirming that your payment amount is 
correct, sign the form and put it back in the For Accountant Only envelope. The sealed 
envelope will then be brought to the accountant. No one else except for the accountant 
will see your receipt.  
 
 
This ends the experiment, please leave on the desk all your materials except for your 
payment envelope, and you are free to leave. Please do not discuss what you did in this 
experiment with your classmates who have not participated. Let them make their 
decisions independently in their sessions. Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Appendix E . Welcome Letter to New Members (Treatment Groups) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ladies and Gentlemen,  
 
 
On behalf of the officers and members of the Education 
Service Club (ESC), I want to express our sincere pleasure 
at your presence here. You have been invited to become members and it is my privilege 
and honor today to welcome you into membership in the ESC. You are now uniting with 
other ESC members who share a dedication to our common mission.  
 
Mission: The mission of the ESC is to enhance the educational experiences of students 
from elementary school to college. Your membership in the ESC will help us carry on 
this legacy and share in this effort.  
 
Projects and Activities: Becoming an ESC member gives you the opportunity to help 
improve education by participating in a variety of projects. For example, you can assist 
students in need by making contributions to our scholarship fund, providing adult or peer 
mentoring, and organizing and attending fundraising activities to solicit support from 
other people in the community.  
 
Being an ESC member is also fun. There are numerous social activities for our members 
and guests, through which you will make new friends and build professional connections. 
In recent years, activities have included monthly luncheons and dinner gatherings, annual 
picnic and holiday party, outings to the Shakespeare Festival, and college sporting events.  
 
Membership Obligations: By holding membership in the ESC, you agree to accept the 
obligations of membership to: 
• Promote the mission of the ESC;  
• Participate in club service projects and meetings;  
• Attend social activities.  
 
Welcome to the Education Service Club! We are all extremely proud and happy to have 
you as a fellow ESC member! 
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Appendix F . Forms and Questionnaires 
 
 
Claim Check Number__________________ 	  	  
Make a Donation on My Behalf to this Charity (All Groups) 
 
The following is a list of real world charities with scholarship funds. First, please choose 
ONE charity you wish to donate. Next, check the box to confirm you willingness to 
delegate the Principal Investigators authority to donate. After completing this form, put it 
into the Real-World Charity envelope and seal it. In order to maintain your anonymity, 
you will not receive individual receipts for donations so your donations today may not be 
deductible.  
 
1. Indiana University Foundation 
The IU Foundation was established in 1936 “to fulfill a dream of educational 
opportunity for all.” You can donate to a student scholarship fund by specifying a 
school, unit, or program on the Indianapolis campus that you wish to support 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Central Indiana Community Foundation Scholarship Funds 
 “Central Indiana Community Foundation (CICF) is committed to college success 
for students through the power of scholarships.” CICF’s Indianapolis Foundation 
Community Scholarship Fund and the Legacy Fund Community Scholarship 
Fund were established to support students from Marion County and Hamilton 
County pursuing higher education respectively. 
 
3. Rotary International  
Rotary International is an international public service club with a commitment to 
“service, fellowship, diversity, integrity, and leadership.” Education is one of its 
areas of focus. Rotary clubs support “basic education and literacy, reduce gender 
disparity in education, and increase adult literacy.” 
 
4. Scholarship America Scholarships  
Scholarship America’s mission is to “mobilize America, through scholarships and 
educational support, to make postsecondary success possible for all students.”  
 
☐I am willing to delegate the Principal Investigators of this study the authority to donate 
on my behalf to the charity that I choose above.  The amount I authorize for donation is 
determined by my decisions in the study, as specified in the instructions.  	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Claim	  Check	  Number__________________	  
	  
 
Questionnaire I (Control Group) 
 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts about the Education Service 
Association (ESA) you are assigned to.  Please indicate to what extent you agree with the 
following statements by choosing the appropriate score from the scale of 1 to 9 (1 = not 
at all, 9 = very much). When you have decided your answer, fill (or mark) in the circle 
that corresponds with the score you choose for each of the statements.  
 
 1              2             3             4             5            6            7            8             9  
 
Not at all                                                                                                              Very much 
 
 
1. After reading the information about the ESA, I identified with the ESA. 
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
2. After reading the information about the ESA, I felt committed to the ESA.  
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
3. After reading the information about the ESA, I felt solidarity with the ESA. 
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Claim	  Check	  Number__________________ 
 
 
Questionnaire I (Treatment Groups) 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts about the Education Service Club 
(ESC) you are assigned to.  Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following 
seven statements by choosing the appropriate score from the scale of 1 to 9 (1 = not at 
all, 9 = very much). When you have decided your answer, fill (or mark) in the circle that 
corresponds with the score you choose for each of the statements.  
 1              2             3             4             5            6            7            8             9  
 
Not at all                                                                                                               Very much 
 
1. After reading the letter from the ESC, I identified with the ESC. 
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
2. After reading the letter from the ESC, I saw myself as an ESC member.  
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
3. After reading the letter from the ESC, I was happy to belong to the ESC. 
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
4. After reading the letter from the ESC, I felt committed to the ESC.  
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
5. After reading the letter from the ESC, I felt solidarity with the ESC. 
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
6. After reading the letter from the ESC, I felt I fit into the ESC. 
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
 
7. After reading the letter from the ESC, I felt I was similar to other ESC members. 
¢1      ¢2      ¢3      ¢4      ¢5      ¢6      ¢7      ¢8       ¢9  
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Claim	  Check	  Number__________________	  
 
 
Questionnaire II (All Groups) 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations.  For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
letter on the scale:  A, B, C, D, or E (A = does not describe me at all, E = describes me 
very well).  When you have decided your answer, fill (or mark) in the circle that 
corresponds with the letter you choose for each statements. Please read each item 




                 A               B               C               D               E 
 
DOES NOT                                                                   DESCRIBES ME 
DESCRIBE ME                                                            VERY 
AT ALL                                                                         WELL 
 
 
1.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
3. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having 
problems.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
4. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.  
    
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
5. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
them.  
 





PLEASE TURN OVER AND COMPLETE THE OTHER SIDE. 
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ANSWER SCALE: 
                 A               B               C               D               E 
 
DOES NOT                                                                   DESCRIBES ME 
DESCRIBE ME                                                            VERY 
AT ALL                                                                         WELL 
 
6. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
7. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
8. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's arguments.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
9. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity 
for them.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
10. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
12. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
13. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.  
 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E  
 
14. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
¢A      ¢B      ¢C      ¢D      ¢E 
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Claim	  Check	  Number__________________	  
 
Questionnaire III (All Groups) 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate if it describes you accurately. If the 
statement is true, circle a) on your answer sheet; if the statement is false, circle b) on your 
answer sheet. Please read each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as 
you can. Thank you. 
 




2. My table manners are not always perfect. 
a) True  
b) False 
 




























PLEASE TURN OVER AND COMPLETE THE OTHER SIDE. 
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Claim	  Check	  Number__________________	  
 
 
Questionnaire IV (All Groups) 
 
The questionnaire asks questions about you. We are asking these questions because we 
wish to understand the correlations between demographic characteristics (e.g. gender or 
education) and decision making. We will not be able to match these characteristics to 
your name. All the information is reported in aggregate form only, and no personally 
identifiable information is released. When you have decided your answer, fill (or mark) 
in the circle that corresponds with the choice (or write down the answer directly for some 
questions). 
 




2. In what year you were born? _____ 
 




4. Are you: 
¢White 
¢Black or African American 
¢American Indian or Alaska Native 




5. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 




¢Some postgraduate work 
¢Post graduate degree 
 
6. What is your major?  
¢Economics/Business 
¢Philanthropic Studies/Social Work/Nursing 
¢Other (please specify)________________ 
¢Haven’t decided 
 
PLEASE TURN OVER AND COMPLETE THE OTHER SIDE. 
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7. How often do you attend religious activities/services? 
¢Do not attend 
¢About once every year 
¢About once every six months 
¢About once every month 
¢Once a week 
¢More than once a week 
 
8. What is your marital status? 
¢Single/Never been married 
¢Married/Living with a partner in long-term committed relationship 
¢Separated/Divorced/Widowed 
¢I prefer not to say 
 
9. Do you have children?  
¢Yes 
¢No 
¢I prefer not to say 
 
10. Are you a member of any public-service clubs (e.g. Lions Clubs, Rotary Clubs, 
Kiwanis, BEAN, DoSomething. org., etc.)?  
¢Yes  
¢Not now, but I used to be  
¢No, I never was 
 





	  	   168 
 
References 	  
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000). Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics , 115 (3), 715-753. 
Andreoni, J. (1988). Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of 
Altruism. Journal of Public Economics , 35, 57-73. 
Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian 
Equivalence. Journal of Political Economy , 97, 1447-1458. 
Andreoni, J., & Payne, S. A. (2013). Charitable Giving. In A. J. Auerbach, R. Chetty, M. 
Feldstein, & E. Saez (Eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 5 (pp. 1-50). 
North Holland. 
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Economic 
Review, 96 (5), 1652-1678. 
Charles, J. A. (1993). Service Clubs in American Society: Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions. 
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Chen, Y., & Li, S. (2009). Group Identity and Social Preferences . The American 
Economic Review , 99 (1), 431-457. 
Clark, P. B., & Wilson, J. Q. (1961). Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly , 6 (2), 129-166. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2. Auflage). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1985). “The Simple Analytics of Public Good Provision. 
Economica , 52, 103–116. 
Davis, M. H. 1983. “Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a 
Multidimensional Approach. “Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 
113–126. 
Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 18 (1), 105-115. 
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Selfdetermination in Human 
Behavior. New York: Plenum. 
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation. 
Psychological Bulletin , 125 (6), 627-668. 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. P. (2005). Managing Diversity by Creating Team Identity. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 58 (3), 371-392. 
Eikenberry, A. M. (2006). Giving Circles: Growing Grassroots Philanthropy. Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly , 35, 517-532. 
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & & Doosje, B. (1997). Sticking Together or Falling Apart: In-
group Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment 
versus Individual Mobility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 
617–626. 
Frey, B. S., & Goette, L. (1999). Does Pay Motivate Volunteers? Mimeo. 
Frey, Bruno S., & Jegen, Reto. (2000). Motivation Crowding Theory. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 15(5), 589-611. 
	  	   169 
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000). Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All . The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics , 115 (3), 791-810 . 
Goette, L., & Stutzer, A. (2008). Blood Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment. IZA Working Paper , No. 3580. 
Kandori, M. (1992). Social Norms and Community Enforcement. Review of Economic 
Studies , 59, 63-80. 
Lacetera, N., Macis, M., & Slonim, R. (2012). Will There Be Blood? Incentives and 
Displacement Effects in Pro-Social Behavior . American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy , 4 (1), 186-223 . 
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining Children's Intrinsic 
Interest with Extrinsic Rewards: A Test of the "Overjustification" Hypothesis. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 129-137. 
Lions Clubs International. (n.d.). Mission and History. Retrieved August 22, 2015, from 
Lions Clubs International: http://www.lionsclubs.org/EN/who-we-are/mission-
and-history/index.php 
Mellström, C., & Johannesson, M. (2008). Crowding out in Blood Donation: Was 
Titmuss Right? . Journal of the European Economic Association , 6 (4), 845-863 . 
Patrick, C. J.; Curtin, J. J., Tellegen, A. 2002. “Development and Validation of a Brief 
Form of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire.” Psychological 
Assessment, 14, 150-164. 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic 
Definitions and New Directions. Contemporary Educational Psychology , 25, 54-
67. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics , 36 (4), 387-389. 
Shih, Margaret, Todd L. Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady. 1999, “Stereotype Susceptibility: 
Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance.” Psychological Science, 
10: 80-83. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In W. 
Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 
33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social Categorization and 
Intergroup Behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology , 1 (2), 149-178 
Willer, R., Wimer, C., Owens, L.A.. (2015). What Drives the Gender Gap in Charitable 
Giving? Lower Empathy Leads Men to Give Less to Poverty Relief, Social 
Science Research. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.12.014. 
	   	  	  	  







Ph.D. in Philanthropy Studies  
Indiana University 
 July 2016  
Indianapolis, IN 
Minor: Nonprofit Finance and Economics  
 
M.A. in Political Science  
School of Government, Sun Yat-Sen University 
June 2009 
Guangzhou, China 
Concentrations: Public Policy and Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
B.A. in Political Science 






⋅ Nonprofit finance and organizational capacity  
⋅ Motivations for individual charitable giving and nonprofit resource development 
⋅ Social innovation and impact investing/mission investing/program-related 
investments 
⋅ Effects of pro-social behavior on psychological well-being 
⋅ Nonprofit financial reporting and accountability  
 
Awards and Honors 
 
 
Science of Philanthropy Initiative Ph.D. Grant Award ($5,000) 




Doctoral Fellow  2015 




Diversity Scholars and Leaders Award  




Doctoral Fellow  2014 
International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR)  
  
Emerging Scholars Award  




	   	  	  	  
Awards and Honors, cont’d  
 
Distinction on Ph.D. Qualifying Exams  
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy  
 
2013 
The Anne Donchin Graduate Research Award  
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis Women’s Studies Program 
2012 
  
National Fellowship for Distinguished Graduate Students  
Sun Yat-Sen University  
2006-08 
   
Distinguished Graduate Honor  
Sun Yat-Sen University 
 
2006 
Outstanding Undergraduate Thesis Award  
Sun Yat-Sen University 
 
2006 
First-Class Scholarship Award for Distinguished Students (Top 5%) 






Grants and Scholarships 
 
Graduate Assistantships and Scholarships 
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
 
2009-16 
Grant for Workshop in Multidisciplinary Philanthropic Studies 2014-15 
USA Funds  
 
 
Graduate Student Research Fund  









Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis 
 
2014 
Travel Grants  
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
 
2014 
Summer Internship Grant  









Qu, Heng, & Osili, Una. (2016). Beyond Grantmaking: An Investigation of Program-
Related Investments by U.S. Foundations. Accepted in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly. 
 
Manuscripts Under Review  
Qu, Heng, & Steinberg, Richard. (2015). Charitable Giving in Nonprofit Service 
Associations: Identities, Incentives, and Gender Differences. Revise for Resubmission to 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly.	  
 
Practitioner-Oriented Writing 
Qu, Heng. (2013). Giving by Foundations. In Giving USA 2013: The Annual Report on 
Philanthropy for the Year 2012 (pp. 81-90). A publication of Giving USA Foundation™, 
researched and written by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. 
 
Qu, Heng. (2013). Giving to Foundations. In Giving USA 2013: The Annual Report on 
Philanthropy for the Year 2012 (pp. 165-170). A publication of Giving USA 
Foundation™, researched and written by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy. 
 
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. (2013). Leveraging the Power of 
Foundations: An Analysis of Program-Related Investing.  
 
Work in Progress 
Qu, Heng. Modern Portfolio Theory and the Optimization of Nonprofit Revenue Mix. 
 





Conference Presentations and Guest Lectures  
 
Panel Organized  
Qu, Heng & Burger, Ronelle. (2016). “Detecting Nonprofit Fraud in Three Continents.” 
The 12th International Conference of the International Society for Third-Sector Research 
(ISTR). June 28-July 1, 2016. Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
Qu, Heng & Duffy, B. (2015). “Joy of Giving and Volunteering.” The Annual 
Conference of Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary 




	   	  	  	  
Papers Presented  
Qu, Heng; Steinberg, Richard; & Burger, Ronelle. (2016). “Dirty data, done dirt cheap? 
Nonprofit financial reporting in the U.S.” The 12th International Conference of the 
International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR). June 28-July 1, 2016. 
Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
Qu, Heng. (2015). “Which is a Better Approach to Nonprofit Revenue Diversification: 
Modern Portfolio Theory or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index?” Paper to be presented at the 
Annual Conference of Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and 
Voluntary Action (ARNOVA). November 19-21, 2015. Chicago, IL. 
 
Duffy, B. & Qu, Heng. (2015). “Does Charitable Giving Have Mental Health Benefits 
for Donors?” Paper to be presented at the Annual Conference of Association for Research 
on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA). November 19-21, 2015. 
Chicago, IL. 
 
Qu, Heng. (2014). “Revenue Diversification and Portfolio Optimization of Nonprofit 
Organizations.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of Association for Research 
on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA).  November 20-22, 2014. 
Denver, CO. 
 
Steinberg, Richard, & Qu, Heng. (2014). “Does Membership in a Public-Service Club 
Make a Person More Generous?” Paper presented at the 11th International Conference of 
the International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR). July 22-25, 2014. Muenster, 
Germany. 
 
Qu, Heng. (2014). Financing Nonprofit Membership Associations. The Second Ph.D. 
Seminar of the International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR). July 20-22, 2014. 
Muenster, Germany. 
 
Qu, Heng, & Richard Steinberg. (2013). “Does Membership in a Public-Service Club 
Make a Person More Generous?” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of 
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA). 
November 21-23, 2013. Harford, CT. 
 
Kou, X., Kim, S., & Qu, Heng. (2013). “It Matters to Ask Where the Dollars Come 
From: Source of Household Financial Resources and High Net Worth 
Philanthropy.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of Association for Research on 
Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA).  November 21-23, 2013. 
Harford, CT. 
 
Osili, U., & Qu, Heng. (2013). “Private Aid for International Issues: Evidence from 
Million Dollar Donations.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of Association for 
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA). November 21-
23, 2013. Harford, CT. 
	   	  	  	  
Qu, Heng. (2013). “The Framing Effects of Public-Service Club Membership.” The 
Science of Philanthropy Initiative (SPI) Annual Summit Subaward Recipients 
Presentation. October 18-19, 2013. Chicago, IL. 
 
Qu, Heng. (2013). “International Players and China’s Nonprofit and Philanthropic 
Development.” Paper presented at the Doctoral Student Research Seminar of the Framing 
the Global Conference. September 26-28, 2013. Bloomington, IN.  
 
Osili, U., Qu, Heng, & McKitrick, M. A. (2012). “Leveraging the Power of Foundations: 
Program- and Mission-Related Investments.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference 
of Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action 
(ARNOVA). November15-17, 2012. Indianapolis, IN.  
 
Qu, Heng. (2012). “The Membership Development of Kiwanis International.” Poster 
presentation at the Annual Conference of Association for Research on Nonprofit 




 “Nonprofits and Philanthropy in China” in Introduction to Philanthropic Studies 
(Undergraduate). Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. 2012-2015. 
“NGOs, Philanthropy, and Civil Society in China” in Civil Society and Philanthropy 
(Graduate). Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. 2015. 
 
 




Giving and Volunteering in America (Undergraduate) 





Mentor IUPUI Service Learning Assistant Scholarship Program Fall 2014; 







The Research Department, IU Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy 
Research Assistant 
          
Indianapolis, IN 
Feb 12 – July 14 
Researched and coordinated multiple research projects on philanthropy and 
nonprofits organizations, including: Program-Related Investments; High Net Worth 
Philanthropy; Giving USA; Global Giving by U.S. Corporations; Million Dollar 
Gifts; and Giving in Chicago. 
   
	   	  	  	  
International Programs, Center on Philanthropy at IU Indianapolis, IN 
Research Assistant Jan 11 – May 11 
Researched and composed a report on the practice of fiscal sponsorship by U.S. 
universities and form recommendations to nonprofit development in China. 
 
Women’s Philanthropy Institute, Center on Philanthropy at IU Indianapolis, IN 
Research Assistant Sep 10 – Dec 10 
Completed an awarding-winning research project on women’s philanthropy in 
China.  
   
School of Public and Environmental Affairs, IUPUI Indianapolis, IN 
Research Assistant   Aug 09 – May 10 
Worked for the Performance Measurement and Citizen Engagement Project for 
Indianapolis. 
   
School of Government, Sun Yat-Sen University Guangzhou, China 
Project Coordinator Dec 07 – Dec 08 
Led Grassroots NGOs in Guangzhou research project. 
   
Institute for Civil Society, Sun Yat-Sen University Guangzhou, China 
Research Assistant Sep 05 – Dec 07 
Researched on two research projects, including: Grassroots NGOs and the 
Provision of Public Service for Migrant Workers, and the Status of NGOs in 







Academic Programs, IU Lilly Family School of Philanthropy Indianapolis, IN 
Research Assistant Aug 15 – Present 
 Facilitate undergraduate internship program and Undergraduate Faculty 
Learning Community. 
 
Global Philanthropy, Council on Foundations  Arlington, VA 
Summer Associate May 13 – Aug 13 
 Composed an Introductory Guide to Grantmaking and Social Investing in China; 
assisted in the Impact Investing Toolkit for Community Foundations project; and 




The Fundraising School, Center on Philanthropy at IU Indianapolis, IN 
Research Assistant Jan 11 – May 11 
 Facilitated course participant database management and course evaluation 
reports. 
 
Indianapolis Mayor’s Office Indianapolis, IN 
Research Assistant        May 10 – Aug 10 
 Performed research to form the City’s performance measurement and citizen 
engagement strategies. 
 
	   	  	  	  
Service 
 
Co-director, Workshop in Multidisciplinary Philanthropic Studies 
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
  2015-2016 
  
Member, Undergraduate Faculty Learning Community  
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
2013-2016 
  
Member, Philanthropic Studies Academic Program Committee 
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
2013-2015 
 
   
 
Professional Affiliations 	  












Language: English, Mandarin Chinese 
 
Statistical software: Stata 
   
 
